CHESTERFIELD FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO SEVERE STORM EMERGENCIES

EXECUTIVE ANALYSIS OF FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

BY: Robert P. Avsec
                          Chesterfield Fire Department
              Chesterfield, Virginia

An applied research project submitted to the National Fire Academy
 as part of the Executive Fire Officer Program

January 2000

	The United States experience some of the most severe weather in the world.  Every year storms unleash strong winds, torrential rains, lightning, and hail that kill hundreds of people, injure thousands more, and cause property losses in the billions of dollars.  Chesterfield County, Virginia experiences severe weather every year in the form of strong thunderstorms during the spring and summer months.  The county also has a pertinent history of small tornados, hurricanes, and the remnants of tropical weather systems passing through the county with significant adverse impact.  When such weather does strike,  it creates a rapid escalation in emergency calls for service that put a severe strain on the emergency response resources of Chesterfield Fire Department.  Presently, the department does not have a comprehensive response policy that enables its personnel to manage the extraordinary problems and demands for resources that severe weather can cause.
	The purpose of this applied research project is to develop a model policy and standard operating guidelines for the department using the information presented in the Executive Analysis of Fire Department Operations in Emergency Management course.  This study used the historical, evaluative, and action research methods to answer the following questions:

1.	abHow vulnerable is Chesterfield County to severe weather, i.e., thunderstorms, hurricanes, tornados, etc.?
2.	abHow does severe weather affect the number of calls for service received by the department? 

3.	abWhat policies and procedures does Chesterfield Fire Department currently have in place for response and emergency operations during severe weather?
4.	abWhat training do Chesterfield Fire Department officers receive for response and emergency operations before, during, and after severe weather and how well prepared do they feel they are for such operations?
5.	abWhat are benchmarks for response to severe storm emergencies exist that could enable Chesterfield Fire Department to make its operations more safe, effective, and efficient?
	This study used a survey to assess the attitudes of company officers (lieutenants and captains) and middle managers (senior battalion chiefs, battalion chiefs, and senior captains) regarding their ability to manage problems and resources during severe weather operations.  The survey was distributed to 86 fire officers of those ranks.
	The study findings indicated that a majority of officers have a high level of confidence in their training and ability to manage the consequences of severe weather.  Those findings seem to be at odds with the department’s lack of a policy, and the necessary training, that covers such key area of severe storm response as: (1) situational assessment, i.e., “windshield surveys”; (2) development of formal incident objectives; (3) comprehensive resource management; (4) safety issues related to severe storms; and (5) an expanded ICS structure.

	The recommendations of the research were for the department to: (1) adopt a comprehensive and systematic policy for emergency operations at severe storm emergencies; (2); (2) provide severe storm response policy training to all personnel; (3) provide basic training on the use of Doppler Radar imagery and visual weather forecasting techniques to all personnel; (4) identify a better methodology for the recall of off-duty personnel; (5) make improvements to the department’s current ICS policy; and (6) equip reserve fleet apparatus for rapid deployment during storm response when off-duty or staff personnel have been recalled.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	2

INTRODUCTION	8

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE	10

LITERATURE REVIEW	25

PROCEDURES	69

RESULTS	74

DISCUSSION	92

RECOMMENDATIONS	107

REFERENCES	109

APPENDICES
Appendix A - Chesterfield Emergency Communications Center - Fire Codes		115
Appendix B - County of Chesterfield Emergency Operations Plan, Part I 	119
Appendix C - Storm Readiness Survey of Chesterfield Fire Department Officers	121
Appendix D - Chesterfield Fire Department, Operational Policy #13	122
Appendix E - Chesterfield Fire Department, Operational Policy #13, Addendum D	125
Appendix F - Preliminary Assessment Plan, Myrtle Beach, SC, Fire Department	128
Appendix G - Windshield Survey Form, Redmon, WA , Fire Department	131
Appendix H - Priority 1 Call Types Recommended for Revision to Priority 2		132
Appendix I - Proposed Severe Storm Response Guidelines for Chesterfield Fire Department
	133
Appendix H - Incident Command System Forms 201-220	168

FIGURES
	Figure 1. Risk/Frequency Analysis of Policy and Procedure (Graham, 1997).	41
Figure 2. Risk Management to ensure proper conduct at incidents (Graham, 1997)	41
Figure 2. Risk Management to ensure proper conduct at incidents (Graham, 1997)	42
Figure 3. Incident Complex Organization (FEMA, 1994, p.3-22)	51
Figure 4. Area Command Organization (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-22).	51
Figure 5. Battalion Command Team. (Palm Beach Fire Rescue, 1999).	53
Figure 6. Department Command Team. (Palm Beach County Fire Rescue, 1999).	53

Figure 7. Tornado of August 6, 1993. Comparison of calls for service vs. 6-day average for time period 1330 hours to 1730 hours.	76
Figure 8. Micro-burst of March 8, 1995. Comparison of calls for service vs. 6-day average for time period 1730 hours to 2330 hours.	77
Figure 9. Tropical Storm Fran, September 6, 1996. Comparison of calls for service vs. 6-day average, 0100 hours to 1900 hours.	78

TABLES
Table 1. Incidents of Damaging Wind, 1/1/55 through 12/31/95	12
Table 2. Incidents of Hail-Producing Storms, 1/1/55 through 12/31/95	13
Table 3. Tornado Segments, 1/1/50 through 12/31/95	13
Table 4.  Severe Weather History, Chesterfield County, 1969-1999	14
Table 5. Call Activity for Selected Severe Weather Events, Chesterfield County, 1989-1999	15
Table 6.  On-duty Career Platoon Staffing, November, 1999.	20
Table 7.  Fujita-Pearson Tornado Scale (FPP Scale), www.stormfax.com/fujita.htm, 1999	33
Table 8. Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Damage Potential Scale 	34
Table 9.  Rainfall from Hurricane Opal, 1995, http://ww2010.atmos.uiuc.edu, 1999	34
Table 10. Comparison of calls for service per hour received.  Selected storms vs. 6 day-average for same time period.	79
Table 11. First-Line Supervisor Responses to survey	84
Table 12. Middle Manager Responses to Survey	85

	Fire Departments  in the United States form the backbone of the nation’s ability to respond to emergency incidents caused by severe weather and other natural phenomena.  From earthquakes in California, to tornados in the Midwest, to hurricanes in Florida, firefighters are there to manage the consequences of severe weather.  Even before the wind stops blowing or the rain stops falling, firefighters begin working on the tasks necessary to help their communities recover from the devastation wrought by “Mother Nature.”  From searching destroyed buildings for survivors, to clearing streets and roads of trees and debris, to treating the injured, firefighters start taking care of the critical tasks long before other resources can arrive.
	Though the fire service has accepted this role, and the public has come to expect such disaster response from fire departments, most departments receive very little additional resources to help meet the extraordinary challenges presented when severe weather strikes.  In most communities, the same level of resources, that are in most cases only adequate for daily response requirements, must somehow be “stretched” to meet demands for services that encompass an entire community at once.
	Severe weather does not need to be of the magnitude of a tornado or hurricane to have a significant impact on a fire department’s operation.  Spring and summer thunderstorms packing strong winds,  lightning, torrential rains, or any combination of the three, can create a significant increase in calls for service in a short period of time.  This rapid influx of calls puts a severe strain on a fire department’s resources as fire officers and firefighters try to manage multiple incidents occurring simultaneously, or several significant incidents.

Severe weather can create conditions that make response too hazardous for responders (strong winds, lightning, downed powerlines, etc.); block ordinary response routes with trees and building debris.
	Experience has shown that fire departments must recognize the special operations that they must employ when responding to emergencies caused by severe weather.  Departments that respond safely, effectively, and efficiently to emergencies brought on by severe weather do so because of preplanning, specialized training, and standard operating guidelines that clearly delineate the different methodologies that will be used to manage hazards and resources.
	The problem examined in this Applied Research Project is that Chesterfield Fire Department has no system for managing the extraordinary demands for service that a severe storm can enact upon its resources.  The department’s present adverse weather policy is inadequate and provides no strategic direction to the department’s middle and upper managers to aid them in conducting fire department operations during such events.  The purpose of this applied research project is to develop a model policy and standard operating guidelines for the department using the information presented in the Executive Analysis of Fire Department Operations in Emergency Management course.  This study used the historical, evaluative, and action research methods to answer the following questions:

1.	abHow vulnerable is Chesterfield County to severe weather, i.e., thunderstorms, hurricanes, tornados, etc.?
2.	abHow does severe weather affect the number of calls for service received by the department? 

3.	abWhat policies and procedures does Chesterfield Fire Department currently have in place for response and emergency operations during severe weather?
4.	abWhat training do Chesterfield Fire Department officers receive for response and emergency operations before, during, and after severe weather and how well prepared do they feel they are for such operations?
5.	abWhat are benchmarks for response to severe storm emergencies exist that could enable Chesterfield Fire Department to make its operations more safe, effective, and efficient?

Chesterfield County, Virginia
	Chesterfield County is a suburban county that borders Virginia's capital city, Richmond, to the south. The County encompasses 446 square miles and has an estimated population of 260,000 residents.  The governing body is a five-member Board of Supervisors with each member representing one of five magisterial districts.  A County Administrator, appointed by the Board, manages the daily operations of the County.
Chesterfield Fire Department
	Chesterfield Fire Department provides emergency and non-emergency services to the public using a combination career/volunteer system.  The Department provides a full range of emergency responses services to County citizens including: fire suppression, emergency medical services, hazardous materials response, water rescue, and technical rescue.   In addition, the Department also provides non-emergency services such as injury prevention education, fire safety inspections, building code reviews, fire brigade training to local industry, etc.  

	The Department uses a career staff of 370 officers and firefighters and a volunteer staff of 250 officers and firefighters to operate seventeen engine companies and five truck companies from seventeen fire stations.  Six stations are staffed entirely by career personnel, and one by volunteer personnel;  the remaining ten stations are operated by a career/volunteer staff.  Each platoon has eighty-six firefighters and Company Officers assigned for fire station staffing.  The Deputy Chief of Operations provides management and leadership to a three-platoon system that has a Senior Battalion Chief responsible for each of the three platoons.
	Each Senior Battalion Chief has two Battalion Chiefs (North and South Battalions) and a Senior Captain that make up their battalion staff for daily operations of the platoon.  The Senior Battalion Chief also has battalion level responsibilities for the Central Battalion, the smallest of the three battalions with three stations.
	The Deputy Chief of Support Services is responsible for management of the Training and Safety Division, the Fire and Life Safety Division, the Maintenance and Logistics Division, the Information Services Division, and the Administrative Services Division.
Vulnerability
	Chesterfield County is in the coastal plain and Piedmont sections of east-central Virginia.  It is bounded on the north by the City of Richmond (the fall line that separates the Piedmont and coastal sections of Virginia) and Henrico County.  The County is bounded on the east by Henrico and Charles City counties; on the west by Amelia and Powhatan counties; and on the south by Dinwiddie, Prince George, and Amelia counties.  The James River forms the northern boundary and the Appomattox River forms the southern boundary.

	The Central Virginia region, and Chesterfield County, have a history of severe weather.  The presence of two major eastward flowing rivers provides a strong conduit for severe weather that typically approaches from the west.  According to the National Weather Service Office in Wakefield, Virginia the region has a thirty-year average of 36.5 days per year with thunderstorm activity.  The most favorable time of year for thunderstorm development is early spring to late summer.  (William Sampler, personal communication, October 14, 1999).  For the Central Virginia Region, Table 1 illustrates thunderstorm incidents that produced damaging winds (Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan, Part I, August 5, 1997).

Windspeed

40-49 MPH

50-59 MPH

60-69 MPH

70-79 MPH

80-89 MPH

90+ MPH

# of Incidents

2230

278

102

36

12

6

Fatalities

9

0

0

0

0

0

Injuries

135

5

15

6

0

8
Table 1. Incidents of Damaging Wind, 1/1/55 through 12/31/95
For the same region, Table 2 illustrates thunderstorm incidents that produced significant hail (Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Plan, Part 1, Basic Plan, August 5, 1997).

Hail Size
0.75"
1.0"
1.5"
2.0"
3.0"
4.0"
Total

# of Incidents
297
191
223
66
4
1
782

Fatalities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Injuries
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Table . Incidents of Hail-Producing Storms, 1/1/55 through 12/31/95
	Table 3 illustrates the number of tornado segments that the region experienced from 1950 through 1995 (Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan, Part I, August 5, 1997).  A tornado segment is a term used to describe the often “spotty” or “segmented” path that a tornado may take.  Each time the funnel cloud “drops down” and creates damage constitutes another segment.  Each segment may create damage that falls into a different category on the Fujita-Pearson Tornado Scale used to rate the destructiveness of a tornado (Tim Armstrong, personal communication, November 16, 1999).
Tornado Scale
F0
F1
F2
F3
F4
F5
Total

# of Incidents
117
184
87
31
9
0
428

Fatalities
0
2
4
25
6
0
37

Injuries
18
76
90
152
278
0
614
Table . Tornado Segments, 1/1/50 through 12/31/95
	As part of the Central Virginia Region, Chesterfield County has experienced its share of this severe weather over the years.  Table 3 contains a listing of the significant weather events that have resulted from thunderstorm activity in the county or in the region that affected the county, i.e., flooding on the James or Appomattox rivers due to rain upstream in their respective river basins (Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan, Part I, August 5, 1997).

Date
Event

1969
Hurricane Camille

1970
Flooding from hurricane remnants

1972
Hurricane Agnes

1984
Flooding from hurricane remnants

1985
Flooding from Hurricane Juan

1989
Microburst

1990
Tornado

1990
Tornado

1993
Tornado

1995
Microburst 

1996
Tropical Storm Fran

1999
Hurricane Floyd
Table .  Severe Weather History, Chesterfield County, 1969-1999

	The county has been relatively fortunate in that the consequences of these storms have, for the most part been minimal.  With the exceptions of Hurricane’s Camille and Agnes, the impact on life and property has been very small when compared to the devastation that a tornado or hurricane is capable of inflicting on a community.  For the most part the small tornados and microbursts (small, powerful straight-line windstorms) have struck only small portions of the county.

	When severe weather does strike the county it has a significant impact on the number of calls for service that are received by the county’s Emergency Communications Center.  Table 5 shows the call data for five selected storms that have occurred in the past ten years (Computer Aided Dispatch System Archive Records, October, 1999).
Severe Weather Event
Area Affected
# of Fire Calls
# of EMS Calls
Hazardous Condition Calls
Public Service Calls
Fire Alarm Activations

Micro-burst, 5/6/89, 1600-2300 hrs.
Dale and Matoaca Districts
63
12
39
16
2

Tornado / Thunderstorm, 8/6/93, 1330-1730 hrs.
Matoaca District
29
16
13
6
3

Micro-burst, 3/8/95, 1730-2330 hrs.
Cloverhill District
75
15
23
34
5

Tropical Storm Fran, 9/6/96
County-wide
325
30
116
127
22

Hurricane Floyd, 9/16/99, 0540-1830 hrs.
County-wide
180
30
112
35
21
Table . Call Activity for Selected Severe Weather Events, Chesterfield County, 1989-1999
	Hazardous Condition calls  include response for downed power lines, transformer fires, lightning strikes with no fire, hazard control for situations not involving a motor vehicle accident, etc.  Public Service calls include response for water shut offs, tree removal from the roadway, trees into structures with no other hazards, etc. (See Appendix A).

	Part of the Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) contains a Hazard Analysis Matrix to calculate the vulnerability of the County to the major types of natural and man-made disasters based on history, vulnerability, maximum threat, and probability.  In that analysis, a significant hazardous material incident received the highest rating (17).  The windstorm/tornado/sever thunderstorm category was rated second (15) and the hurricane/tropical storm category was rated a close third (13).  The information contained in Tables 4 and 5 indicates that this hazard analysis is quite accurate as it relates to the probability of severe weather striking Chesterfield County.
Fire Department Responsibilities in Disaster Response-Preparation
	In Chesterfield County’s Emergency Operations Plan, Functional Appendix 5: Fire Service,  the Fire Department is charged with the following strategic response activities in the Response Phase (See Appendix B):

1.	abContain and extinguish fires
2.	abRemove victims from any situation in which injury or loss of life has occurred, or the potential for injury or loss of life exists, to include any situation involving fire or threat of fire
3.	abMonitor radiological defense (RADEF) for personal protection and for reporting
4.	abContain hazardous materials situations
5.	abAssist in dissemination of warning to public
6.	abAssist volunteer EMS as necessary 

	The Functional Appendix outlines the types of activities and levels of operations that the department should prepare for to adequately respond to large scale emergencies or disasters.  Two activities outlined for the department during normal operations are to develop and maintain procedures to provide fire services in time of emergency, and to review and update those plans and procedures as time permits.  Chesterfield Fire Department Operational Policy #13, Floods and Storm Related Emergencies, designates that the Senior Battalion Chief, or the Emergency Incident Command is responsible for the overall operation.  Though the department has actively used the Incident Command System (ICS) since 1985,  there are no provisions in the departmental ICS policy that address the need for command and control of multiple large scale incidents, or incidents covering large portions of the county.  Operational Policy #13 identifies notification, reporting, and data collection functions for which the Senior Battalion Chief is responsible, but it does not provide guidance and direction on the more complex level of incident management that is necessitated by severe weather.
	The department, in the past, has not provided any initial training to its officer corps on either the County EOP, or Operational Policy #13.  Recently, however, a class providing an overview of the EOP has been developed for the department’s Officer Development Program (ODP) Level II.  All current battalion level officers and chief officers were required to attend the pilot presentation for that program, and that has been the only formal exposure to the EOP for most of that group of officers.  The target audience for ODP Level II is the Company Officer, captains and lieutenants, who have completed ODP Level I.  (Participation in both levels of that program is currently voluntary with bonus points awarded for the participant’s next level promotion panel.)
The department does not currently conduct training for its officers on Operational Policy #13, response to storm related emergencies, or the expanded use of ICS for such incidents.   The department does not engage in either of these activities for severe storm emergencies.
	Lastly, the department does not routinely conduct a systematic review and evaluation of its operations at severe storm related emergencies to make improvements to its processes and policies.  Operational Policy #13 was last revised September 20, 1996 in response to Tropical Storm Fran passing through the county.  The only significant change to the policy was to add standardized damage assessment forms to the policy.  This was in response to the large numbers of structures damaged by the sustained winds and falling tree that Fran caused.  Though the officers of the department collect a tremendous amount of data during storm operations, there is no standardized process to convert that data into information, and then “plow” that information back into policies and procedures to improve same.
	Under the Increased Readiness Phase of the EOP, two of the departmental requirements are to alert on-duty personnel that this portion of the plan is being implemented and to identify the status of vehicles and equipment.  Operational Policy #13 does not specify a standard methodology for alerting on-duty personnel of impending severe weather and the need to make preparations for the likelihood of response to severe weather emergencies. The policy’s main focus is on managing potential flooding on the James and Appomattox Rivers, and Swift Creek.  

Nor does the policy address the need, or methodology, to alert those members and resources not assigned to the Emergency Operations Division, i.e., the Training and Safety Division, Fire and Life Safety Division, Administrative Services, etc., of approaching severe weather and how they may be deployed particularly during operations that would require an expansive ICS organizational structure.

	The department also lacks a comprehensive system for alerting and calling back to service off-duty personnel.  During the few times that an attempt has been made to recall off-duty personnel, the last being the tornado/thunderstorm of August 6, 1993, the effort has been haphazard at best with unaffected stations being directed to attempt calling personnel at home.  The current policy is predicated on some stations being unaffected by response activities and available to make telephone calls to off-duty personnel at home.  It directs that those personnel who are contacted should report to their duty station, but provides no direction for those personnel who may not be able to reach their assigned station, or for the station that may no longer exist.
	Table 6 below shows the available staffing levels for the on-duty career platoon.  Those staffing levels reflect the number of firefighters and officers available to respond to emergencies aboard engines, trucks, and medic units (ambulances).  Severe weather that struck during a weekday, between the hours of 0800 through 1800, would have a significant impact on the on-duty platoon because that is when the platoon is at its lowest staffing level.  This was borne out by both Tropical Storm Fran and Hurricane Floyd that struck the county during this time period.

Station
Maximum Staffing
Minimum Staffing

1 (Engine Co.)
4
3

2 (Engine Co.)
4
3

3 (Engine, Truck, Medic)
8
8

4 (Engine Co.) *
5
3

5 (Engine Co.)
4
3

6 (Engine Co.)
3
3

7 (Engine, Truck) *
8
6

8 (Engine, Medic)
5
5

9 (Engine, Truck) *
8
6

10 (Engine) *
5
3

11 (Engine, Medic)
6
5

12 (Engine, Truck) *
8
6

14 (Engine, Truck)
8
6

15 (Engine, Medic, CFR)
7
6

16 (Engine, Medic)
6
5

Battalion Staff
4
3

Totals
93
74

* - Indicates Fire Station that staffs a volunteer EMS ambulance from its maximum staffing complement Monday-Friday, 0800 hours to 1800 hours.
Table .  On-duty Career Platoon Staffing, November, 1999.

	The department does have a policy for the notification of volunteer members of the organization via radio dispatched paging.  Policies  “Signal 15-Bravo” and “Signal 15-Charlie” are designed to notify volunteer firefighters and EMS personnel, respectively, to report to their duty stations and staff their apparatus.  For volunteer firefighters, this procedure is becoming less effective due to the declining number of volunteer firefighters in the department.
	Addendum D to Operational Policy #13 does a fair job of outlining fire station level preparation for storm response, but its major focus is preparation for response to emergencies created by severe winter weather.  This addendum to Operational Policy #13 was written following severe winter weather that struck the Central Virginia area in January, 1995 with incapacitating snowfall.  This part of Operational Policy #13 provides very few guidelines for officers, at any level in the organization, to use for resource deployment and management during the response to storm related emergencies.
	The department also does not have a process for the staffing of reserve fleet fire apparatus and ambulances if and when off-duty personnel report for duty.  This lack of process is further complicated by the fact that the department has no system of tracking where reserve fleet apparatus is located throughout the county.  When not in service replacing normal apparatus, pieces of the reserve fleet are housed across the county in fire stations that have available space in the station.  Reserve ambulances, with the exception of biomedical equipment such as defibrillators, are stocked for immediate deployment as a replacement piece, or to meet demand when the system is short of ambulances.  Fire apparatus, however, is largely devoid of any equipment except fire hose in the case of pumpers.  When a reserve fire unit is placed in service almost all of the necessary equipment must come off of the unit that it is replacing.  This practice makes it almost impossible to staff reserve fire apparatus for possible deployment either before an impending storm, or in the aftermath of a storm.

Fire Department Responsibilities in Disaster Response-Response
	As mentioned previously, Operational Policy #13, Addendum D does not provide any significant guidelines for resource deployment and resource management by senior fire officers during severe weather responses.  The policy does call for the Senior Battalion Chief to notify the Emergency Communications Center (ECC) to (1) reduce the number of emergency resources dispatched on calls for service, i.e., a one engine and one truck on a structural call where the Computer-Aided Dispatch System (CADS) recommendation is three engines and one truck.  The Senior Battalion Chief is also to direct that the ECC  limit the dispatch of resources to no more than three Priority 3 fire calls, and no more than three Priority 3 EMS calls at a time.  This last directive is only of marginal value for fire call types because presently the overwhelming majority of fire call types are classified as Priority 1 (See Appendix A).
	In past response to severe storm emergencies the fire department has had a major role in assisting with damage assessment.  The department has a strong tradition of providing a high level of customer service to the county’s citizens.  Much emphasis has been placed on fire department resources being dispatched to calls to assess the situation and provide necessary services such as salvage work where a tree has fallen into a house, clearing of fallen trees from roads, etc.  In the early stages of the incident this has historically been reactionary–the citizen calls 9-1-1, and the department responds resources.  There is no systematic method identified for fire companies to evaluate their response areas after the storm to determine what the problems are, where they exist, and what are the most critical needs (J.E. Graham, personal communication, September 16, 1999).

	The department has no policies or procedures in place for the extensive documentation that is required for storm related response.  The county’s EOP identifies the need for documenting incurred expenses for fire and hazardous materials related incidents and the need to continue such for the duration of the incident.  These expenses may include items such as: (1)overtime costs for recalled personnel, (2) apparatus expenses during operations, and (3) contract costs for additional materials and services.  There is an additional need to document the response of organizational volunteers and their role in providing resources to the incident.  The extensive federal and state documentation requirements for reimbursement of disaster related expenses make the need for accurate and complete documentation a necessity if the county is to receive post-incident reimbursement.  Historically the fire department has had to spend days, and some times weeks, obtaining the necessary information after the incident.  This usually involves the collection of handwritten notes, scattered receipts, copying employee timesheets, and verbal interviews with key participants.
	Chesterfield Fire Department’s senior officers do not have adequate training and experience working with the county’s Emergency Operations Plan and the Emergency Operations Center, when that facility is activated.  This situation creates confusion, redundancy, ineffective operations, and inefficient use of available resources.  The fire department historically has assumed the majority of the burden for managing emergency and non-emergency situations resulting from severe storm response even when the EOP placed that responsibility with another department, or other departments were responsible for providing resources as support agencies under the plan.

Scope of the Project
	This project will analyze Chesterfield Fire Department’s current policy for response to severe storm related emergencies and make recommendations to improve that policy.  For the purposes of this project, severe weather is defined as meteorological activity that produces straight-line or rotational winds, i.e., thunderstorms or tornados, or is tropical in origin, i.e., tropical storms or hurricanes.
	The project will use the information gained from the National Fire Academy course, Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management, to systematically evaluate the fire department’s roles and responsibilities  in severe storm response, how it currently approaches those roles and responsibilities, and how it can make improvements in those areas.  That course presented material covering: (1) emergency operations; (2) the Incident Command System; (3) community risk assessment; (4) incident documentation; (5) capability assessment; (6) media relations; (7) damage assessment; (8) the Emergency Operations Center; and (9) contemporary legal issues for the fire service.  This project will focus its analysis and recommendations for improvement on items 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7.   Though the remaining items all have significant influence on Chesterfield County’s response to severe storm related emergencies,  they are areas currently addressed in the county’s EOP.  Analysis of that document is conducted regularly by the county’s Emergency Service Coordinator, the Fire Chief, and county government staff.

	Each year in the United States fire and EMS agencies respond to thousands of incidents that result from severe weather.  These incidents result in death, injury and property losses in the hundreds of millions of dollars.  For example:
March 27, 1994 - Piedmont, AL a tornado struck a church on Palm Sunday killing twenty people and injuring more than ninety others.
July 11, 1990 - Denver, CO, the worst hailstorm in U.S. history injured more than sixty people at an amusement park.  Hail, up to baseball-size, caused more than $600 million in damage.
July 1, 1985 - Cheyenne, WY, a slow-moving supercell brought eight inches of rain that resulted in a flash flood and hail one foot deep.  Sixteen people were killed and damages exceeded $67 million (Vavrek, Holle, Allsop, Davies, and Hoadley, 1995, p.3)
	In addition to the deaths, injuries, and property damage that result from severe windstorms, in the form of thunderstorms, tornados, and hurricanes, there is a significant threat to emergency responders as well.
On the night of 8/12/99 in Iberia, MO at least one firefighter was transported Code 3 to Lake Ozark General Hospital after being struck by lightning while fighting a structure fire.  Initial reports were multiple firefighters struck.  We were under Severe Thunderstorm warnings at the time and I was having a hard time keeping up with all of the radio traffic on their frequency along with ours (Off-Site News, www.firehouse.com, 1999).

	Emergency responders are not immune from the hazards that severe windstorms present.  Perhaps they are even more exposed as they frequently respond during the event when the hazards from wind, rain, and lightning are at their greatest.  It is probably a safe assumption that most responders are not knowledgeable about the hazards and therefore do not take the necessary precautions.  Many departments have probably not addressed this issue through policy, procedure, or training because of that lack of knowledge.
In most years it (lightning) is the thunderstorm’s greatest killer.  A possible contributing reason for this is those lightning victims frequently are struck before or just after the occurrence of precipitation at their location.  Many people apparently feel safe from lightning when not experiencing rain (Department of Atmospheric Sciences, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1999, http://ww2010.atmos.uiuc.edu).
	Vavrek, et al., (1995) in their discussion of violent thunderstorms, supercells, highlight the technology advancements in weather forecasting that have enabled forecasters to provide more timely warning of severe weather.  “Radar is an indispensable tool for detecting and observing supercells.  The WSR-88D Doppler is a much improved tool for detecting thunderstorm intensity and supercells (Vavrek et al., 1995, p.6).  With the increasing availability of access to the Internet and on-line weather forecasting, the authors are of the opinion that public safety officials should become skilled and knowledgeable in the use of Doppler Radar to anticipate weather actions for effective planning.  Almost in the same breath, however, the authors sound a word of caution about total reliance on technology.

Despite great advances in meteorology and instruments for supercell identification during the last decade, severe weather can develop so rapidly that warnings may not reach you in time.  In such cases, use common sense and pay attention to the visual clues of potentially dangerous thunderstorms.  Severe weather from supercells may threaten when the following are visible, especially from the northwest, west, or southeast (1) large thunderstorm towers, (2) well-defined cloud “anvils,” (3) clouds that are dark, low hanging, and sometimes tinged with green, (4) rotating clouds, (5) hail, (6) frequent lightning, and (7) torrential rain (Vavrek et al., 1995, p.9).
	The FAA (1999) at its General Aviation Accident Prevention Program website wrote of the need for aircraft pilots to be knowledgeable of thunderstorms and associated weather hazards.  It further wrote that pilots must be able to combine that knowledge of weather with the technical information provided by their instruments, or airport control towers, to make good flight decisions.
	The National Weather Service’s publication, Spotter's Guide for Identifying and Reporting Severe Local Storms (www.nws.noaa.gov/om/tstorm.htm, 1999), provided much information that would enable emergency responders to make accurate observations about developing weather.  This information could be critical for responder safety and would enable responders to communicate vital and accurate information to senior emergency managers for decision making.

Thunderstorms
	The geography of the U.S. plays a major part in thunderstorm development.  The most important geographical feature is the  lack of any major mountain formations running east-west across the country.  The lack of such a physical divide allows warm, moist air from the Gulf of Mexico to move northward where it frequently collides with cold, dry air flowing southward from Canada.  This meteorological collision, frequently occurring over the Midwestern U.S., results in the severe weather indicative of that region of the country.
	Ebert (1988) described thunderstorm development as a four-stage process.
Cumulus Stage- “Fair weather” cumulus clouds typically seen during the afternoons of sultry summer days.  May or may not evolve into thunderstorms.  Cloud tops reach about 22,000 feet.
Mature Stage- Has both updrafts and downdrafts.  Downdrafts usually occur in connection with precipitation falling from upper portions of the cloud dragging cooler air downward.  Cloud tops usually reach beyond 30,000 feet.
Cumulonimbus Stage- Huge cloud with cloud tops reaching 40,000 to 60,000 feet with updrafts of 40-60 feet per second.  These storms have massive downdrafts that can equal the updrafts.  This is the most violent stage of the storm with torrential rains or hail, incessant lightning, and possibly tornados.  These cumulonimbus clouds may prevail for at least one hour in contrast to ten or fifteen minutes for smaller cumuli types.
Dissipating Stage-The storm has expended all of its energy and only downdrafts occur.  Most lightning stops and only steady rain persists (Ebert, p.92).

	Vavrek et al. (1995) wrote that more than 100,000 thunderstorms occur every year in the United States.  Of these thunderstorms, meteorologists estimate that 2,000-3,000 each year achieve the status of “supercell” thunderstorm. They wrote that east of the Rocky Mountains supercells are most frequent in spring and summer during the late afternoon and early evening.  Here, weather systems with favorable wind conditions have access to warmth and moisture from the Gulf of Mexico.
A supercell is a thunderstorm with a main updraft region that is persistent and rotating.  While all thunderstorms are composed of updrafts and downdrafts, a supercell has a dominant updraft region that can persist for hours.  The term “cell” refers to an individual cumulus cloud tower or a thunderstorm with an updraft and a downdraft near each other (Vavrek et al., 1995, p.6).
	Although less than five percent of all thunderstorms are supercells, they (supercells) cause a disproportionate number of deaths and injuries, and property damage associated with severe weather.  “While less than fifty percent of supercells produce tornados, virtually all strong and violent tornados are spawned by supercell thunderstorms” (Vavrek et al., 1995, p. 7).  Supercells can also produce:

1.	abTornados
2.	abWinds exceeding 57 miles per hour
3.	abHail ¾" in diameter or greater
4.	abRainfall capable of local and flash flooding
5.	abDangerous lightning

Some supercells persist for several hours and track over hundreds of miles while producing severe weather.  In contrast, ordinary thunderstorms last less than one hour and cover shorter distances.
	Meteorologists catagorize supercells as Classic, High Precipitation, and Low Precipitation Supercells.  Classic Supercells have a well-defined area of precipitation just northwest of the cloud tower or main updraft.  Beneath the main updraft, and a short distance southwest of the precipitation, is a rain-free cloud base.  A lowering or rotating wall cloud is evident beneath this base.  The Classic Supercell is usually isolated.
High Precipitation Supercells produce more precipitation than Classic or Low Precipitation Supercells. Rain and hail may obscure the rain-free base beneath the main updraft.  These types of cells are often embedded in lines or clusters of thunderstorms.  The advent of WSR-88D Doppler (also called NEXRAD Radar) has shown that High Precipitation supercells are more prevalent than previously thought.  In most of the U.S. High Precipitation storms are now considered the most frequent type of supercell (Vavrek et al., p.6)
	Low Precipitation Supercells are usually found on the High Plains of the U.S. where moist air from the Gulf of Mexico meets dry air from the north and west.  These produce little rain and are rather small.  “Although they look less threatening than other supercells, they can produce severe weather” (Vavrek et al., p.7).

Outflow Phenomena-Downbursts
	Information from the WW2010 website, of the Department of Atmospheric Sciences (DAS) at the University of Illinois at Urbanna-Champaign, http://ww2010.atmos.uiuc.edu, describes a downburst as a strong downdraft which includes an outburst of potentially damaging winds on or near the ground.  Downdrafts with a diameter greater than 2.5 miles are classified as a macroburst; smaller downdrafts are referred to as microbursts.
As a macroburst or some non-severe gust-front passes overhead, the ragged, concaved-shaped underside of the shelf cloud accompanies the onset of cold outflow winds at the ground.  Although some rotation may be visible in these clouds, it is likely to be short-lived and without vertical continuity, precluding a major tornado (DAS, 1999).
	Downdrafts, both macrobursts and microburst, are thought to be less significant than tornados.  In reality, they are just as lethal, if not more so in some circumstances.  Many aircraft crashes in recent years have been caused by either macrobursts or microburst that occurred as pilots were making their critical landing approach (DAS, 1999).  On January 3, 2000, a severe storm front that moved through the Ohio Valley uprooting trees, knocking down powerlines, and ripping roofs from structures.  National Weather Service investigators determined that the damage was caused by straight line winds from microbursts, some of which had winds clocked in excess of 130 MPH (Weather Channel, 2000, www.weather.com/weather_center).
Tornados
	Ebert (1988) wrote that tornados occur in just about any part of the world, but are most numerous in North America, especially in the central and southeastern regions of the U.S.

The total varies from year to year, but it is estimated that about 90 percent of the world’s tornados occur in the U.S.
The development of tornados requires severe weather systems, including violent thunderstorms.  These strong thunderstorms may develop as either intensive, single convectional storms, or they may form ahead of well-developed cold fronts of fast-moving mid-latitude cyclones.  In either case, the air masses involved must contain high levels of moisture with large amounts of latent energy (Ebert, 1988, p. 81).
	Each tornado has its own characteristics; yet most of them form behind the so-called “wall cloud,” that is the usually heavy rain which pours out of the leading sector of the thundercloud or cumulonimbus.  “This veil of rain explains why most tornados are obscured during their initial phase of development” (Ebert, p.83).
	Since 1971 tornado researchers have used the Fujita-Pearson Tornado Scale, more commonly known as the Fujita Scale,  to rate the intensity of a tornado (See Table 7 next page). The scale rates the intensity of the tornado by examining the damaged caused by the tornado after it passes over a man-made structure and by measuring approximate path length and width. 

Rating
Category
Windspeed
Path Length
Path Width
Description

F0
Gale Tornado
40-72 MPH
0.3-0.9 miles
6-17 yards
Light damage; some damage to chimneys; branches broken off trees; shallow-rooted trees uprooted

F1
Moderate tornado
73-112 MPH
1.0-3.1 miles
18-55 yards
Moderate damage, peels surface off roofs, mobile homes pushed off foundations or overturned

F2
Significant tornado
113-157 MPH
3.2-9.9 miles
56-175 yards
Considerable damage; entire roofs torn from frame houses; large trees snapped or uprooted

F3
Severe tornado
158-206 MPH
10-31 miles
176-566 yards
Severe damage; walls torn from well-constructed houses; trains overturned

F4
Devastating tornado
207-260 MPH
32-99 miles
0.3-0.9 miles
Houses leveled; cars thrown long distances

F5
Incredible tornado
261-318 MPH
100-315 miles
1.0-3.1 miles
Strong frame houses lifted off foundations and carried considerable distances to disintegrate
Table 7.  Fujita-Pearson Tornado Scale (FPP Scale), www.stormfax.com/fujita.htm, 1999
Hurricanes
	Ebert (1988) describes a hurricane as the most powerful storm in nature.  That power is never more evident then when a hurricane makes landfall.  A hurricane making landfall does so with tremendous winds and torrential rainfall.  Coastal regions are also susceptible to the storm surge, a wall of water being “pushed” ashore ahead of the offshore winds.
Areas inland also experience tornados spawned by the outer thunderstorm bands. 
	Strong winds are the most common means of destruction associated with hurricanes.  Their sometimes continuous barrage can uproot trees, knock over buildings and homes, fling deadly debris around, and sink or ground boats.  The intensity of a hurricane is measured by the sustained wind speed found within it.  The relative strength of a hurricane is also measured on a scale based on its greatest wind speed.  Table 8 on the next page shows the Saffir-Simpson scale, named for the men who invented it, which measures the damage potential of a hurricane based on its greatest wind speed.
Scale #, Category
Central Pressure (inches of mercury)
Wind Speed (MPH)
Storm Surge (Feet)
Observed Damage

1
>=28.94
74-95
4-5
Some damage to trees, and unanchored mobile homes

2
28.50-28.91
96-110
6-8
Major damage to mobile homes, downed trees, damage to roofs

3
27.91-28.47
111-130
9-12
Destroy mobile homes, damage  buildings

4
27.17-27.88
131-155
13-18
Completely destroy mobile homes 

5
<27.17
>155
>18
Extensive damage to homes and industrial buildings, blow away small buildings
Table 8. Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Damage Potential Scale, http://ww2010.atmos.uiuc.edu, 1999 
	While coastal areas historically bear the brunt of a hurricane’s destructive winds and storm surge, the torrential rains cause both flash and long term flooding.  Hurricanes and tropical storms are known to dump as much as a meter (about 3 feet) of rain in just a couple of days (DAS, 1999).  Table 9 below shows selected rainfall totals from the landfall of Hurricane Opal.

Rainfall from Hurricane Opal (1995)

Ellyson, FL
15.45"			

Evergreen, AL
8.10"

Peach Tree City, AL
7.66"

Mobile, AL
7.48"

Pensacola. FL
7.27"

Hurlburt Field, FL
6.64"

Atlanta, GA
6.59"

Fulton Co., GA
6.22"

Anniston, AL
6.09
Table 9.  Rainfall from Hurricane Opal, 1995, http://ww2010.atmos.uiuc.edu, 1999

	According to DAS (1999) the total number of flash flood deaths has exceeded tornado fatalities during the last several decades.
Two factors seem to be responsible for this: public apathy regarding the flash flood threat and increased urbanization.  When concrete replaces soil, rain water will run off rather than soak in.  Flash flood producing rainfall has made the dramatic water rescues frequently seen in the media all too familiar, especially in urban areas and popular mountain camping spots (DAS, 1999, http://ww2010.atmos.uiuc.edu/(Gh)/guides/mtr/svr/dngr/flood.rxml).
Implications of Severe Windstorm for Communities
	The literature indicates that severe windstorms affect communities in many ways, but predominantly by (1) damage to structures from high wind; (2) flooding from torrential rains; (3) damaging hail; and (4) lightning.  “Losses attributed to hurricanes, tornados, and local winds are estimated to total $0.5 to $2.0 billion a year in the United States” (Minor, 1988, p.87) Damage to buildings and other structures during windstorms is becoming a major problem for many communities.  Minor (1988) identifies urban sprawl, and the decline in the quality of certain types of building construction, as key factors in the amount of damage that high winds can cause.
Studies of wind-induced damage indicate that the wind resistance of buildings is related to the amount of engineering attention given to them.  Buildings classified as full engineered, pre-engineered, marginally engineered, and non-engineered are, in that order, increasingly susceptible to wind damage (Minor, 1988, p.93).
An explanation of Minor’s terminology may be helpful.  Minor describes the types of buildings in each of the categories of engineering as follows:
Fully engineered-buildings are designed by professional engineers and architects.  Pre-engineered buildings are planned as a group by engineers before construction and are marketed as individual units throughout the country.  Marginally engineered structures make up the largest loss category in windstorms.  These buildings are built with combinations of masonry, light-steel framing, open-web steel joists, wood framing, wood rafters, and concrete.  Although these materials are used with success in engineered designs, they are often carelessly assembled and provide only minimal protection from wind-induced pressures (Minor, 1988, p. 94).
	Single-family and multiple-family residences, certain apartment units, and many small commercial buildings account for the vast majority of buildings that are not engineered.  These buildings offer little resistance to lateral and uplift pressures induced by high winds because of their largely wood framed construction.  “Weak roof-to-wall and wall-to-foundation connections, little resistance to lateral loads, and inadequate overall structural integrity typifies these buildings.  They can be damaged by winds of 75 mph and total destruction may occur when winds reach 125 mph” (Minor, 1988, p. 95).
	Tornados have a tremendous capacity to cause death and injury and destroy structures.  Ebert (1988) wrote about the destructive power of a tornado and made the correlation between wind speed and dropping pressure in the vortex of the tornado.
The total destruction often caused by tornados is the result of their (1) extremely high rotary wind velocities, and (2) the partial vacuum that exists within the vortex . . . .Estimates based on engineering studies of tornado damage indicate that horizontal windspeeds in the vortex may be higher than 300 mph (Ebert, 1988, p.83).
	The low pressure inside the vortex can only be estimated since it is impossible to get measuring devices into the vortex of a tornado, unlike the eye of a hurricane where a plane can fly around.  Ebert wrote that it is possible that the pressure may drop to as low as 17.7 inches of mercury, or about 60 percent of normal atmospheric pressure.
If the outside atmospheric pressure, caused by the passage of a hurricane, would drop anywhere from one to five inches of mercury, the net excess pressure inside a tight building could rise from 70 to 400 pounds per square foot.  This pressure build-up, in combination with the force exerted by the high winds, can lead to a total disintegration of the structure (Ebert, 1988, p.84).
	While the strong, rotational winds associated with hurricanes and tornados are well known for their destructive capabilities, straight-line winds created by macrobursts and microbursts have much potential for creating damage.  “Strong straight-line winds accompany thunderstorms more often than tornados and may be as damaging to persons and property as a small tornado” (Kessler and White, 1988, p. 6).
Managing the Consequences of Severe Weather
	Severe weather has the potential to bring a disaster to bear on a community both in the short term (thunderstorms and tornados) and the long term (hurricanes and floods).  Any of these weather induced disaster events can create a multitude of emergency coordination and management problems for a community because these events differ greatly from daily emergencies.

One of the reasons disaster response is difficult to coordinate is because disasters are different from routine, daily emergencies.  Disasters generally cannot be adequately managed merely by mobilizing more personnel and material.  Disasters may cross jurisdictional boundaries, create the need to undertake unfamiliar tasks, change the structure of responding organizations, result in the creation of new organizations, trigger the mobilization of participants that do not ordinarily respond to local emergencies, and disable equipment and facilities.  As a consequence of these changes, the normal procedures for coordinating community emergency response may not be adapted well to the situation (Auf der Heide, 1989, pp. 49-50).
	Mikel (1998) discussed the impact of thunderstorms on the town of Naperville, IL and the affect of those storms on the local fire department.  Over a four-year period (1994-1997) Naperville recorded 25 structure fires caused by lightning strikes and 97 incidents of significant structural damage from lightning strikes that did not cause a fire.  “During a thunderstorm, the department often handled as many calls in a one-half hour as it normally did in an entire 24-hour shift” (Mikel, 1998, p. 3).
	Auf der Heide (1989) wrote that disasters are the ultimate test of a community’s emergency response capability.  The ability to effectively respond to disasters is becoming more important because of  factors that tend to increase: greater population densities, less stable building construction, inadequate building codes, etc.

Unfortunately, there are recurring difficulties with disaster response.  Lessons learned are not always being applied to other communities.  Sometimes this is because accurate information regarding the basic underlying causes of the difficulties are not readily available to emergency and disaster responders (Auf der Heide, p.2).
	Kasperson and Pijawka (1985) wrote about the disaster response roles of federal, state, and local governments.  According to the authors, the federal government has the most experience in managing disasters because of its disaster response role in all fifty states.  Individual states have less experience because they are responsible only for disasters within their borders.  Of the three levels of government, local governments have the least experience in managing disasters. “Local governments bear a large responsibility for disaster response because they are closest to the event and are apt to be on the scene before substantial state or federal resources are available” (Kasperson and Pijawka, 1985, p.13).  Cigler (1986) in describing the disaster response relationships that exist among the three levels of government called this disparity in disaster response experience and disaster response responsibility the “intergovernmental paradox.”
The intergovernmental paradox refers to the fact that the local government, which is least likely to see disaster as a key priority, is most likely to be faced with the responsibility for carrying out disaster response. . . .The trend in the United States has been to place most of the responsibility for disaster response on local government (Cigler, 1986, p.8).
	Auf der Heide (1989) wrote that local governments and officials may be held financially liable for certain consequences of disasters if their community were not prepared or did not respond properly.

“A loss due to disaster can be recovered in court if the victim can show: (1) the governmental body owed a duty to the victim to avoid, prevent, or lessen such a loss; (2) that the body failed to carry out this duty; and (3) that the loss occurred as a result of this failure” (Kusler, 1985, p. 119).   Kusler also wrote that the exposure liability for local government has also become greater.  He listed several factors that may increase local government liability in the context of emergency response:
1.	abThe courts have recognized broadened concepts of the duties and responsibilities of local government.
2.	abThe “act of God” defense for disaster losses is less frequently accepted by the courts.
3.	abThe ability of local governments to claim “sovereign immunity” has been substantially reduced.
4.	abThe duty of governments to develop disaster countermeasures is becoming more frequently stipulated in legislation (Kusler, 1985, p. 120).		
	Graham (1997) spoke of the concept of public safety agencies applying risk management principles to their application of policy and procedure.  Graham stated that just as the safety manager looks at risk and frequency to mitigate risk and improve safety, any agency that provides emergency services to the public can use that same examination to identify needed policy and procedure.  Further, the agency can identify which policies have the most risk and design training that enhances the knowledge of policy by response personnel to increase the likelihood that the policy will be followed, thus decreasing the risk (See Figure 1 on next page).

Figure 1. Risk/Frequency Analysis of Policy and Procedure (Graham, 1997).
In Figure 1, Graham’s statement is  that those policies and procedures with the highest risk and the lowest frequency constitute the greatest liability (consequences) to emergency response organizations.  He further spoke that those policies can be subdivided into the categories of non-discretionary time (NDT) and discretionary time (DT) policies.  NDT policies are those policies where the situation provides little or no time to reference the applicable policy–personnel have to have a deeply ingrained knowledge of the policy for effective decision making and action to take place, thus minimizing the risk.  DT policies cover those situations where time does exist to reference the policy, i.e., through checklists, field guides, etc., to make effective decisions.  Graham contends that such informed decision-making results in proper conduct at an operation rather than the organization having to deal with the consequences of a poor decision (See Figure 2 on next page).

Figure 2. Risk Management to ensure proper conduct at incidents (Graham, 1997)

Managing Fire Department Operations at Severe Storm Emergencies
	Cowardin (1981) wrote that every officer in charge of an incident, whether volunteer or part-time, acting, temporary or career oriented, needs a method by which direction can be given to emergency forces under his\her control.
The problem with the fire service's lack of direction for emergencies is that we do not build a system of management which can be applied to day-to-day situations as well as a problem which may double or triple the size of the department.  Therefore, a breakdown occurs in the management structure right at the point where the emergency reaches its most critical stage (Cowardin, 1981, p. 7).
	As described earlier in this literature review, Auf der Heide and others make the case that response to disaster emergencies is different from that required for daily operations.  Auf der Heide (1989) wrote that disaster planners would be best served not to attempt to develop plans and operations based on a “worst-case” disaster scenario.

He argues that such planning (1) amplifies public and responder apathy (“can’t happen here mentality”); most disaster research in the United States has focused on moderate events involving tens to hundreds of casualties; and (3) applying limited resources to the most improbable type of disaster (“the big one”) is not cost effective.  “Planning should be for disasters of moderate size (about 120 casualties); disasters of this size should present the typical inter-organizational coordination problems that are also applicable to larger events” (Auf der Heide, p. 25).
	In the course of this literature review the author was able to locate very few pieces that describe fire department response procedures to such weather related incidents as thunderstorms, tornados, hurricanes, etc.  The majority of sources researched were of the anecdotal or historical nature–they described what happened, but provided very little information on how the departments involved managed incidents using policies and procedures that they had in place prior to the event.  Two courses at the National Fire Academy, Command and Control of Fire Department Operations at Natural and Man-made Disasters, and Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management, provided the most in-depth information on preparing for and conducting fire department operations at storm related emergencies.
	FEMA (1994) identified the critical components that should be part of a fire department’s policies and procedures for response to natural and man-made disasters.  Following Auf der Heide’s recommendations that disaster planning should focus on addressing the needs of the moderate sized disaster, the type a community has a likelihood of encountering, these critical components would seem to be appropriate for severe weather emergencies.

Those critical components are identified as:

1.	abSituation assessment and size-up
2.	abIdentifying incident objectives
3.	abDeveloping an organization to manage the incident
4.	abDevelop a system of resource management
5.	abDevelop a communications plan
6.	abDevelop an incident safety plan
7.	abDevelop an incident medical plan (FEMA, 1994, pp. 3-5 to 3-6).
Situation Assessment and Size-up
	FEMA (1994) describes this component as necessary direction on how to provide for security of department resources and personnel (while fulfilling first responder requirements during the initial stage of a major incident or disaster).  This component should also address the need to provide command with information on what has happened, the scope and magnitude of the incident.  This assessment has two basic functional tasks that must be completed–the impact of the event on emergency resources and facilities and the impact on the community.  The former should be completed as soon after the precipitating event as possible.
Ensure the safety of yourself and your co-workers.  Assess the condition of:

		Yourself and your co-workers
		The station and apparatus
		Utilities: gas, water, electricity, and phone lines
Move apparatus out of the station to the primary safe area.  If the primary area is unusable, move to the secondary safe area.
Complete a roll call (Redmond Fire Department, 1998, p. 1)
	Myrtle Beach Fire Department uses the designation of “Snapshot Assessment,” a term commonly found  in the review of several fire department plans, to describe the same type of activity. (See Appendix F).
Preliminary Assessment-Disaster Assessment Snapshot.  This tool is designed to report preliminary conditions following a disaster.  It includes reports of personnel, equipment, and facilities as well as a rapid “snapshot” of conditions and damage in the immediate area of the location where the assessment is performed.  This is not a detailed assessment of the situation and needs.  It is designed to permit all initial reports to be made using a common measurement device (Myrtle Beach Fire Department, 1999, unnumbered page).
	Palm Beach County Fire Rescue (1999) categorizes similar initial activity as an Impact Assessment.  The first phase of the Impact Assessment is the Primary Survey.
The primary survey should be conducted first to determine: (1) the status of personnel (no injuries, minor injuries, serious injuries); (2) status of equipment and apparatus (in service, in service but needs repair, out of service); (3) status of structural damage to station (none, low, moderate, high, extensive) (Palm Beach County Fire Rescue, 1999, p. 13).
South Trail Fire Protection and Rescue Service District (1999) requires each station to conduct a similar initial assessment of their immediate area using similar criteria and procedures.
	FEMA (1994) describes the secondary assessment as size-up.  A fire department’s initial responsibility in a disaster is virtually the same as for routine daily emergencies.

“They must assess the situation and perform a size-up and triage.  Regardless of how you refer to these tasks, they must be done, and the information transferred to command” (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-42).  The emphasis in a disaster, however, needs to be on completing the assessment prior to resources actively engaging in service delivery.  Without a systematic assessment of the event’s impact on the community at large the Incident Commander does not know the scope and magnitude of the incident.  The mechanism for this assessment is the “windshield survey.”  The “windshield survey” consists of pre-identifying a route and target occupancies within a primary response area and traveling that route after a disaster” (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-45).
Each company will conduct a windshield survey of their preassigned area.  Companies will report via radio to operations in the Central Station the conditions of their areas.  These reports are to include the status of utilities, roadways, and pending emergency calls.  NO COMPANY WILL COMMIT TO A SITUATION UNTIL THEY HAVE COMPLETED THEIR SURVEY (South Trail Fire Protection and Rescue Service District, 1999, p 11).
	Palm Beach County Fire Rescue Department (1999) uses the terminology of “jurisdictional survey” to describe their assessment of the impact on the community.  That department’s priorities are the status of target hazards, major response routes, and housing developments in the county.  Redmon Fire Department’s Earthquake Emergency Plan calls for their personnel to survey the community and categorize hazards using a color-coded designation: red for significant damage, yellow for moderate damage, and green for little or no damage.  (See Appendix G).

Using the attached check sheets, and using the designated route, do a drive-by assessment of the commercial, multi-family residential, major arterials, shelters (schools and churches), and high hazard occupancies in your area.  You are expected to stick to the route as much as possible (Redmon Fire Department, 1998, unnumbered page).
	Main (1995) wrote about the strategic benefits of a well-coordinated structural triage system following a tornado that struck the Evansville, IN area.  In that paper the author recommended that the City of Evansville and surrounding townships adopt and use the structural triage procedures used by FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams to allow better coordination between local resources and USAR teams during disaster response.  Myrtle Beach Fire Department (1999) and Palm Beach Fire Rescue (1999) include the USAR system for building triage as part of their response plans.  Using the system ensures that structures are checked only once, thus scarce emergency response resources do not get involved in redundant work.
Identifying Incident Objectives
	Developing incident objectives is an important responsibility for any Incident Commander, but becomes even more critical in a disaster situation.  “Every emergency incident, no matter how small, requires some form of planning to control the problem (Auf der Heide, 1989, p. 151).  For the larger scale incident, such as those caused by severe weather, a more formalized process of identifying objectives and committing them to written form becomes critical to the success of operations.  Auf der Heide (1989),  FEMA (1994), and FEMA (1999) all recommend that the Incident Commander, as quickly as possible, begin that formal documentation of incident objectives using standard Incident Command System Forms 201-220. (See Appendix K).
The experienced emergency responders who developed  ICS spent over a year designing the forms that are used in the planning process.  Their work focused on preparing documents that would: (1) follow the Management by Objectives concept; (2) answer the questions, “What do we need to know?” and “What do we need to do?” on complex incidents; (3) be relatively easy to complete; and (4) be of real assistance, not just an exercise in paperwork, for personnel working under crisis conditions (Auf der Heide, 1989, p.152).
	FEMA (1999) wrote that an Incident Action Plan documents the actions developed by the Incident Commander and Command and General Staffs during the Planning Meeting. A properly completed action plan specifies control objectives, tactics to meet the objectives, resources, organization, communications plan, medical plan, and other appropriate information to use in tactical operations.  The use of ICS Forms 201-207, when properly completed, constitutes a thorough Incident Action Plan (FEMA, 1999, ICS Forms Catalog).
	The written IAP is the cornerstone of good documentation of the emergency response.  All emergency responses require some form of documentation, i.e., fire reports, patient care reports, a hazmat response report, etc.  The emergency nature of a disaster does not lessen the need for, nor alleviate, requirements for complete documentation.
Documentation will be greater in both volume and in scope than during routine emergencies.  Workloads will be proportional to the size of the disaster, or greater. This need is driven by: (1) more extensive damage; (2) more agencies involved; (3) greater cost; and (4) increased possibilities of something going wrong (FEMA, 1999, SM 5-3).

Developing an Organization to Manage the Incident
	A severe storm can quickly create a level of devastation in a community that rapidly creates demands for service that exceeds the abilities of emergency responders.
The tornado struck in mid-afternoon, tearing along a path 200 meters wide and seven kilometers long and causing an estimated $10 million in damage.  With winds reaching approximately 270 km/h, it was categorized as a force 3 tornado, falling into the middle of a scale of 0 to 5 established by Environment Canada.  Hundreds of homes suffered serious damage.  Thirty out of approximately 260 families had their homes completely demolished (Drapeauu, 1994, p.2).
	Such situations require the rapid development of a management organization that enables an emergency response organization to safely, effectively, and efficiently deploy and manage resources.  This is especially true since the operations needed will vary dramatically from those employed on a daily basis to routine emergencies.  The conditions that responders will have to operate in will be unlike anything they may have seen in their career.  Eichelberger (1991) wrote about emergency response operations in the town of Plainfield, IL following a destructive tornado.  Responders were faced with entire blocks of homes that were destroyed, no street signs or landmarks for navigation, downed communications systems, and a lack of information about the scope and magnitude of the event until very late in the operation.
	FEMA (1993) wrote that the Incident Command System is designed to be use in response to emergencies caused by fires, flood, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados, and any number of other natural and man-made incidents.

Many emergency response organizations in the U.S. now use the ICS to manage their daily response to emergencies.  However, when a community is faced with an event that generates numerous small incidents, or several large incidents in the same geographical area, simultaneously the full expansion of the ICS organization may not be adequate. “The Incident Complex and Area Command are two tools that were developed as a result of experience with such disasters.  The definition of Incident Complex is two or more individual incidents located in the same general proximity which are assigned to a single incident management team or unified command to facilitate management (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-17).
	FEMA (1994) wrote that the following factors should be considered when using an Incident Complex:
1.	abA complex may be managed under a single or unified command.
2.	abThe incidents are close enough to be managed by the same incident management team.
3.	abSome staff and/or logistical support economies could be achieved through a combined management approach.
4.	abPlanning, Logistics, and Finance activities can be adequately provided to the Incident Complex from a single management team.
In an Incident Complex where numerous incidents are handled quickly and with only a few resources, the incidents are not named, but handled as tasks within a division or branch (See Figure 3 on next page).

Figure 3. Incident Complex Organization (FEMA, 1994, p.3-22)

	FEMA  (1994) wrote that some incidents occurring in the same general area and drawing from the same resources may even exceed the capabilities of the Incident Complex.  Experience with these situations, such a multiple wildfires in the same area, led to the concept of Area Command.  This system inserts a level of management between the agency or EOC and multiple incidents.  The incidents themselves many be managed by single or unified command.  The Incident Commanders, after appropriate notification, report to the Area Commander (See Figure 4 below).

Figure 4. Area Command Organization (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-22).

	Incident Commanders are a part of the Area Command structure.  Area Command does not replace the incident level ICS organization.  The primary responsibilities of the Area Commander are to:

a.	abProvide effective agency or jurisdictional oversight for assigned incidents.
b.	abEnsure that Incident Commanders have a clear understanding of agency expectations, intentions, and constraints related to the incidents.
c.	abEstablish priorities between various incidents based on incident needs and agency policy and direction. (Probably the most important responsibility.)  This will include three priorities: (1) priorities among incidents; (2) priorities related to allocating critically needed scare resources; (3) priorities related to demobilization.
d.	abEnsure that Incident Management Team (IMT) personnel assignments and organizations are appropriate for the kind and complexity of the incidents involved.
e.	abMaintain liaison with officials in charge, assisting and cooperating agencies, and other interested groups.
f.	abCoordinate the demobilization of assigned incidents (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-20).
	Palm Beach County Fire Rescue (1999) has adapted these two concepts into their disaster response management system package.  That department uses the terminology of Battalion Command in place of Incident Complex; a Battalion Command Team (BCT) manages the multiple incidents that occur in the same battalion (geographical area).  (See Figure 5 on next page).

Figure 5. Battalion Command Team. (Palm Beach Fire Rescue, 1999).

	

That department uses the terminology of Department Command Team (DCT) in place of the Area Command described by FEMA (1994).  The DCT responsibilities are essentially the same as those of the Area Command team.  (See Figure 6 below).

Figure 6. Department Command Team. (Palm Beach County Fire Rescue, 1999).
	FEMA (1994) wrote that adding these additional tools to the ICS was not sufficient to effectively manage disaster situations.  They identified a shortcoming in the management of major incidents: the inexperience of officers filling Command and General Staff positions.
If it logical that a well trained and experienced first responder will function better at a single family dwelling fire, then it is illogical for a high ranking executive fire officer to anticipate success in the management of a major disaster with little or no time in preparation (FEMA, p. 3-30).
	One of their recommendations for improving this situation is for fire departments to develop predesignated Incident Management Teams (IMT).  “An IMT can generally be defined as a group of highly qualified personnel functioning as a well trained, disciplined, pre-identified team who responds to and manages incidents involving complicated environmental, life, property, and political influences” (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-30).
Develop a System of Resource Management
	Quarantelli (1983) wrote that emergency planners are frequently guided by the assumption that one of the primary problems in disaster response is lack of resources.  Many disaster response sources use some variation of the definition that disasters are emergencies that overwhelm available resources.  Quarantelli wrote that is not always the case. “The problem of too many resources is coming to be recognized as a pattern which is found, at some time or another, in many disasters” (Quarantelli, 1983, p. 104).
	Eichelberger (1990) and Mann (1993) both wrote of the need to effectively manage resources following severe weather.  Eichelberger, in analyzing the response to the tornado that struck Plainfield, IL, wrote that not having a good handle on what resources were available, where resources were deployed, and when resources were available hindered response efforts.  Mann made similar observations of the response to Hurricane Andrew.

Both wrote that the problems were exacerbated by: communications problems (systems being out of service, radio frequency differences between agencies, etc.); a lack of rapid development of an effective organizational structure; and resources coming into the disaster area from surrounding areas.
	Tallahassee (1999) identified a resource management tool for use during response to severe weather in that city.  The purpose of a “Road Clearing Task Force” is to disburse equipment and provide road clearing and emergency response after a storm. 
Each task force is composed of at least: (1) a Public Works unit capable of clearing a road of debris; (2) a police unit for traffic control and other assistance; (3) a fire unit for rescue and fire suppression; (4) an Electric Utility crew (Tallahassee, 1999, www.state.fl.us/citytlh/emergency/hurrican.html).
	Auf der Heide (1989) wrote that resource management problems are often the result of inadequate situation analysis.  “Procedures for ongoing needs assessment is a prerequisite to efficient resource management in disasters” (Auf der Heide, p. 115).  Enhanced resource management is one of the key elements of the ICS.  “ICS resource management procedures are designed to overcome the typical problems of too few, too many, lost, or mismanaged response forces” (Irwin, 1989, p. 141).
	The most important response resource is people.  One of the most common problems in a severe weather incident is assessing the welfare of off-duty response personnel and recalling those additional personnel to aid in the response effort.  Mann (1993) wrote of the impact that Hurricane Andrew had on the response personnel in agencies affected by the storm.

Many had homes of their own destroyed, or had significant family situations that hampered their ability to report for duty.  Eichelberger (1991) reported similar circumstances that were exacerbated by no procedures in the department directing personnel how to report their status and availability for recall.
	Palm Beach County Fire Rescue (1999) and Myrtle Beach Fire Department (1999) both have specific procedures in place to account for the welfare of their personnel and recall them to duty if necessary.  Palm Beach County Fire Rescue designates the month of May as Hurricane Preparation Month.  One of the tasks assigned to each supervisor during that month is to ensure that the personnel information (home address and phone numbers) for each of their subordinates is accurate in the department’s Record Management System.  “When a hurricane watch is issued for the County, all off-duty personnel are required to call into their respective Battalion Headquarters to report their name and phone number for future call back” (Palm Beach County Fire Rescue, 1999, p.6).
	Myrtle Beach Fire Department has a procedure whereby off-duty personnel, who would be required to report for duty following a storm, are directed to report in at their assigned work station.  If unable to do so, they report to the nearest available fire station.  The Fire Department establishes an Employee Accountability Desk (designated telephone) in their Emergency Operations Center and the Officer-in-Charge of each station is responsible for providing hourly personnel accountability reports to the Accountability Desk.  Any employee who cannot get to a fire station may report their status directly to the Accountability Desk.

The names of those personnel not accounted for in some manner within 12 hours following the end of the storm will be presumed to be in need of assistance and efforts will be made to reach them at their home or last know location (Myrtle Beach Fire Department, 1999, p.11).
	Salt Lake City Fire Department (1999) experienced many problems with personnel accountability and recall of off-duty personnel when a tornado struck that city on August 11, 1999.  Those problems included a lack of a procedure to recall off-duty personnel to increase available personnel resources, and a lack of a procedure to communicate information on the welfare of emergency personnel to concerned family members.
	Bradford (1999) wrote of a new computerized scheduling and callback system being used in the Long Beach (CA) Fire Department.  That computerized system, developed by a software company in Orange County, CA, is used on a daily basis for the staffing of fire stations, management of leave from duty, filling of daily positions with overtime employees, etc.  The system enables each employee to take responsibility for maintaining their personal information in the system.
The system is so intelligent that it can be used to find someone before a person can do it because each staff member has a personal calendar and contact list that they keep updated in the system.  The system can tell us if the person is at home, working a callback (overtime shift), doing an exchange (trading a shift with someone from another station, or on vacation or sick leave.  All we have to do is punch in the name, and the computer gives us a telephone number where the person can be reached (Bradford, 1999, p.58).

	The system also has the capability to be used for the recall of personnel for emergency situations, i.e., recall to increase staffing in anticipation of severe weather, or for response to a severe weather event.
The system can notify personnel by home phone, mobile phone, or pager.  It can be programmed to leave recorded messages on a home answering machine or portable phone voice-mail system. . . .  Service administrators can use the system to automatically notify personnel of  . . . emergency situations” (Bradford, p. 58).
	The literature review also indicated a problem of having enough emergency apparatus available for recalled personnel to staff during severe storm response.  Salt Lake City Fire Department (1999) and Eichelberger (1991) wrote that those departments could not staff reserve fleet apparatus because units were not sufficiently equipped to function as emergency response units. (Personnel transfer equipment from their primary apparatus to the reserve apparatus when their primary unit must go out of service).  Palm Beach Fire Rescue (1999), Myrtle Beach Fire Department (1999), and South Trail Fire Protection and Rescue Service District (1999) ensure that reserve apparatus is properly equipped for approaching hurricanes as part of their operational policies.   
Develop a Communications Plan
	Auf der Heide (1989) wrote that one of the most consistent observations about disasters is that communication is inadequate.  Brunacini (1985) wrote that what many perceive as a communication problem, may in fact be more of a coordination problem.

The most crucial types of information that need to be shared are those related to:
a.	abAn ongoing assessment of what the disaster situation is and what disaster countermeasures need to undertaken
b.	abAn ongoing determination of what resources are needed to undertake the countermeasures, what resources are present, assigned, out-of-service, what resources are available, how they can be obtained, what is their capacity, and how long it will take for them to arrive
c.	abA determination of the priority of needed disaster countermeasures (and therefore, resource allocation)
d.	abA determination of what persons and organizations will be responsible for the various tasks necessary to accomplish the countermeasures (Sorenson, Mileti, and Copehaver, 1985, p. 32).
	Auf der Heide (1989) wrote that disaster research done by many researchers, including Kilijanek, Quarantelli, and Worth, suggests that many communications problems are “people problems.”  Communications equipment may be in short supply, but more often than not a physical means of communication is available.  Examples of “people” problems in communication include the following:

1.	abThe “Robinson Crusoe syndrome,” or “we’re the only ones on this island.” Organizations are accustomed to operating autonomously and fail to change this approach where multiple agencies are involved and are dependent on one another.  Each person gives priority to the information needs of his own organization rather than that of the overall response effort.
2.	abTerminology and procedures used to exchange information vary among different organizations.
3.	abThere is a hesitancy to depend on other organizations, often due to lack of trust or familiarity, or due to political, jurisdictional, and personal disputes.
4.	abThere is no mutual agreement as to who has the responsibility for the collection and dissemination of various types of information, or to whom it should be distributed.
5.	abPersons possessing information do not realize that another person who needs it doesn’t have it.
6.	abThe information needs of other organizations are not understood.
These are crucial aspects of communication that no amount of radio equipment is likely to correct (Rosow, 1977, p. 173).
	FEMA (1994) wrote that communication is one of the most important commodities for routine emergency response; communication becomes critical during disaster response. “In particular, the importance of communications during the assessment of disaster situations cannot be overstated” (FEMA, p.3-42).
During Hurricane Andrew, the first reports from South Dade County, where the worst damage occurred, were words to the effect of “It’s the worst thing I’ve ever seen, there’s total destruction.”  However, at the Metro-Dade County EOC, just ten miles north of where the reports were originating, the damage appeared to be, “a lot of trees down with some minor damage to homes.”

This discrepance caused some delays in moving resources to the stricken area immediately following the storm.  It wasn’t a lack of confidence in the person making the report, but rather the exact meaning of his/her words (Castillo, Montes,  and Paulison, 1992, p.10).
	FEMA (1994) wrote that when normal communications are operational, i.e., radio systems and telephone systems, it is important for response personnel to accurately describe the situation at their location.
Specifically, the following will improve the effectiveness of your communications and the resulting operations that they produce.

1.	abDisciplined, concise messages
2.	abClear articulation of situations, status, and resource requests
3.	abAn effective understanding how messages are interpreted (FEMA, p. 3-42).
	FEMA (1994) wrote that a written communications plan, using ICS Form 205, should be part of a written Incident Action Plan (IAP).  “That communication plan should describe radio channels or frequencies that will be used for each element of the incident organization (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-6).
	Salt Lake City Fire Department (1999), Mann (1993), Mikel (1998), Castillo et al (1992), and Eichelberger (1991) all wrote of the communications difficulties associated with mutual aid response to severe storm emergencies.  The authors all cited lack of inter-agency planning, procedures, and training as the contributing factors to the problems that were experienced while managing the consequences of hurricanes and tornados that struck their communities. 

	Another communications situation that should be addressed is what takes place when normal means of communications are not functional.  “First understand that command should be aware of the situation by virtue of not receiving information.  This should indicate a high priority to restore some type of communication as soon as possible” (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-43).  In such situations, organizations should also have contingency plans that outline independent operational guidelines for field unit commanders (FEMA, 1994). 
Develop an Incident Safety Plan
	Emergency responders are not immune to the physical hazards to can be presented by severe weather.  High winds, torrential rains causing flooding, lightning, and hail can create significant safety hazards for personnel and equipment.
Medic/small vehicle unit operations will be terminated when sustained winds of 50 mph exist or local conditions dictate unsafe conditions, i.e.,  localized flooding, downed wires, etc.  Suppression unit operations will be terminated when sustained winds of greater than 60 mph exist, especially if other local factors dictate unsafe conditions, i.e., localized flooding, downed wires, etc. (Myrtle Beach Fire Department, 1999, p.26).
	South Trail Fire Protection and Rescue Services District (1999) states that all operational units will return to their quarters and secure their apparatus and stations when sustained winds reach 70 mph.

In the state of Florida, Metro-Dade Fire Department, Coral Gables Fire Department, and City of Miami Fire Departments all have written procedures by which these departments operate during incidents of hurricanes.  Included in these standard operating procedures are orders to cease operations at fifty miles per hour sustained wind speeds (Hughes, 1998, p. 21).
While high winds have the potential to certainly have the potential to overturn, or damage emergency response vehicles, the greater potential for damage comes from flying debris.  This flying debris from loose objects, falling trees, disintegrating structures, etc., also poses a tremendous physical threat to personnel who are operating in such conditions (FEMA, 1994).
	While high winds are certainly the most immediate safety concern of response during severe weather, other hazards such as lightning, flash flooding, and hail can be equally dangerous.  The information contained in the literature review of the technical information relative to weather indicated that people in the United States do not have a clear understanding of the dangers presented by thunderstorms, especially the more powerful supercell thunderstorm.  While tornados and hurricanes may garner the majority of the weather headlines, communities have a higher degree of exposure to thunderstorms if one looks at the gross numbers.
	Segerstrom (1991) wrote that each year in North America between 200 and 500 people will die in floods and many more will be injured.  The author stated that unless trained in swift water rescues, many emergency responders do not have a good appreciation, or degree or respect, for the hazards of moving water.

Water moving down a gradient is incredibly powerful.  At 3 mph, water presses against the legs of a person standing in current with nearly seventeen pounds of pressure.  When the speed is doubled, however, the water pressure is quadrupled to more than sixty-eight total pounds of pressure.  And when the speed increases to 9 mph, which is still not very fast, the pressure doubles again.  In fact, water pressure exerted against a victim pinned against a storm drain may exceed several hundred pounds.  A boat in similar circumstances would have several thousand pounds of pressure against it.  Victims and rescuers alike are constantly being overwhelmed by such forces (Segerstrom, 1991, p. 21).
	Segerstrom also addressed the hazards associated with a rescue from vehicles caught in flood waters.  Many drivers insist upon driving through flooded areas for a variety of reasons: they don’t want to waste time on an alternate route; they may view it as a challenge.
Regardless of the reason for crossing, the standard sedan will have approximately 600 pounds of water pressure against it in a surface current as slow as 6 mph.  Each foot of water depth will displace approximately 1,500 pounds.  So, only 2 feet of water and a few feet per second of surface current will wash away a car.  Remaining air will keep the car on the surface for about 45 seconds (Segerstrom, 1991, p. 28).
	NFPA (1990) wrote that between 1980 and 1989 29 firefighters lost their lives in 25 separate incidents while on duty. “As might be expected, the largest proportion of deaths occurred while performing rescues (41%)” (NFPA, 1990, p.29).  Almost half the victims (13) were not wearing any protective or diving gear when they drowned and another four deaths occurred with the firefighters wearing structural firefighting gear.

Four of the victims were wearing structural firefighting protective clothing when they drowned.  One of them was placing flares along a roadway when he apparently fell into a drainage ditch.  Another was assisting a motorist whose vehicle had been washed off the road in torrential rains. . . .The fourth firefighter was evacuating residents of a coastal area during a storm.  He ignored orders to put on a life jacket at least four times.  He also had been told to remove his coat and boots since they would act like anchors if he fell into the water (NFPA, 1990, p. 33).
	Ausmus (1994) wrote of the dangers of lightning and its associated hazards to human beings to prepare a foundation for a lightning safety awareness program at Norfolk (VA) International Airport.  His research indicated that lightning is a powerful and unpredictable phenomenon that can lead to serious injury or death for its victims. “Statistical information provided in the literature review indicated that the majority of lightning strikes occur in environments in which prudent measures for self-protection were not taken” (Ausmus, 1994, p.3).
	Mikel (1998) wrote that the lightning associated with severe weather posed a significant lethal threat to emergency responders during a storm.  Included in his discussion of the issue was the need for emergency responders to obtain lightning prediction technology to more accurately determine what specific areas will be most susceptible to lightning from an approaching storm.  “This equipment, when combined with an increased understanding of storm behavior, and good strong common sense, can enhance the safety and efficiency of fire operations during storms” (Mikel, 1998, p. 3).

	Safety hazards continue to exist after the storm passes.  Buildings damaged by the storm, unstable utilities, downed trees, blocked roads, etc., present many hazards to responders.  Eichelberger (1991) described the utter chaos that existed when a tornado demolished several blocks of homes in Plainfield, IL.  That chaos was exacerbated by structural debris that was standing several feet high in the streets, live powerlines across streets, and nails puncturing the tires of the apparatus.  Birden (1992) wrote of an even higher degree of devastation from a tornado that struck Chandler, MN.  In that event, all but ten of Chandler’s 110 homes were demolished by the force of the storm.  Missing street signs and missing landmarks made for difficult response of resources as even personnel familiar with the town were disoriented due to the lack of any navigational landmarks.  Responders must be aware that hazards exist for some time after the storm passes.
Many hazards will be encountered during the first 72 hours after a hurricane.  These include, but are not limited to:
a.	abWires down
b.	abGas leaks
c.	abFires
d.	abUnsafe structures
e.	abFlooding
f.	abHazardous materials incidents
g.	abTraumatized animals
h.	abHeat stress (Myrtle Beach Fire Department, 1999, p.28).

	FEMA (1994) wrote that the development of incident safety plan and its communication throughout the organization are critical for safe operations during disaster situations.
This component assures personnel safety (by identification of hazards associated with the particular type of incident/disaster.  This information can be transferred to ICS Form 202 of the written (IAP) and in an attachment page to the IAP, usually titled “Safety Message (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-6).
Summary of Literature Review
	The review of the literature revealed an enormous amount of technical weather information that should be the foundation of emergency response procedures to severe storm related emergencies.  Emergency responders are not immune to the hazards that can be presented by high winds, torrential rains, lightning, and hail as they attempt to provide emergency services to the public.  The literature contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning thunderstorms, especially the most powerful thunderstorm, the supercell thunderstorm.  The potential for the supercell to inflict severe damage with straight line winds greater than, or equal to that of a tornado was not known by the author prior to this research.
	The literature review revealed that the knowledge of basic weather observation skills, i.e., cloud types, cloud formations, wind direction and speed, and prevailing weather patterns for a jurisdiction, can be of great benefit to emergency responders, especially when operating in the field, to avoid being surprised by violent weather.  The ability of emergency managers to use this visual information to anticipate severe weather was also brought out in the literature review.

	The literature also emphasized the increase in sophistication of radar technology, especially the advent of Doppler Radar, and its impact on the ability of forecasters to issue severe storm advisories.  This has increased the amount of warning time for the public and emergency responders, but often that time is still measured in minutes, not hours.  The advent of weather related websites on the Internet provides emergency response organizations with the ability to put that technology in fire and EMS stations within their organizations.
	From an emergency response to severe weather perspective the literature review was found to be lacking in some areas, while plentiful in others.  The books and academic papers reviewed tended to focus on the more general topic of weather related disasters, i.e., the large scale situation such as a hurricane or tornado that inflicts catastrophic damage and casualties on a community.  The author was able to locate very few sources that addressed the smaller scale thunderstorms, supercells, and microbursts that a community would be likely to encounter on a more frequent basis.
	After action reporting of the damage inflicted on communities by severe weather and efforts of emergency responders to response and manage those incidents was plentiful in the literature, and tended to be the more current sources.  Most of those sources reviewed for this project told the story of problems encountered, how those problems were solved, and lessons learned by the responding organizations.
	The author was unable to find published documents, either in hard copy or on the Internet, of fire department procedure for managing severe storm related emergencies.

The majority of the technical information came from the National Fire Academy courses, Command and Control of Natural and Man-made Disasters, and Executive Analysis of Fire Services Operations in Emergency Management.  The author did obtain and reviewed seven unpublished operational plans from fire departments, the majority of which came from Florida and addressed hurricane response.  The manual review of more than 100 fire department websites on the Internet found that while this new media is being used extensively for public education and marketing of fire department services, it has not yet become a medium for the sharing of operational policies and practices among fire service organizations.  The sole exception was that of the City of Tallahassee (FL) site that contained the city’s basic hurricane response plan.  Another excellent site, though it dealt exclusively with earthquake response, was that of the Los Angeles County (CA) Fire Department.

	The research procedures for this project began with a review of available literature on the subject of fire department response to severe storm emergencies.  This search took several forms.  First was an electronic review of the resources of the National Fire Academy’s Learning Resource Center using the STAR computerized “card catalog” system while on campus for the course, Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management.  During this search the author searched on the term, “emergency response to thunderstorms.”  The author reviewed books and periodicals for pertinent information on the topic.

	Upon returning  from the Academy, the author made a second search of the card catalog using the Learning Resource Center’s Internet website, www.lrc.fema.gov, searching on the additional terms of  “emergency response to hurricanes, floods, tornados” and  “emergency response to lightning, hail, storms.”  The former yielded 102 sources and the later produced 112 sources.  After reviewing the card catalog entries for those sources that appeared to have relevance to the research, the author requested those materials for review from the LRC through the use of the Inter-Library Loan program with materials sent to the Chesterfield County Library, Meadowdale Branch.
	A third search for research material was made on the Internet using the Microsoft Internet Explorer software between August, 1999 and November, 1999.  That search used the AltaVista search engine using the search term, “fire department response to severe storms.”  That search yielded more than 300 fire department websites that the author manually reviewed for relevant content.
	The author conducted a search for applicable fire department operational policies using the Microsoft Outlook Express software to send electronic mail requests to fire departments across the country.  Using a list of 50 former National Fire Academy classmates, the author requested copies of operational policies and procedures related to response to severe storms.  Respondents were asked to send such policies via electronic mail in the WordPerfect or Microsoft Word file format, or through the U.S. mail.  A total of seven responses were received, three via electronic mail and four via regular mail.

	The author interviewed individuals with experience and knowledge in severe weather and emergency response to severe weather emergencies.  These individuals work for local, state, and federal agencies.  Lynda Price, Emergency Services Coordinator for Chesterfield County, VA, was interviewed on October 1, 1999.  William Sammler, a weather forecaster with the National Weather Service Office in Wakefield, VA was interviewed by telephone on October 14, 1999.  Tim Armstrong, a weather forecaster with the National Weather Service Office in Wakefield, VA was interviewed by telephone on November 16, 1999.  Senior Battalion Chief James Graham, Chesterfield Fire Department, Emergency Operations Division with 22 years of experience in Emergency Management, was interviewed on September 16, 1999.  Richard McDonnell, Information Services Manager, Chesterfield Fire Department, conducted the incident history search of Chesterfield County’s Computer Aided Dispatch System (CADS) archives between November 1, 1999 and November 28, 1999 to obtain statistical data relative to severe storms in Chesterfield County.  The author also reviewed written memorandums of storm related activity that battalion staff officers completed and forwarded to the Chief of the Department from January, 1995 through November, 1999 to obtain information on smaller scale storm incidents.
	The author reviewed the Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan, Part 1, for Chesterfield County to obtain information on severe storm history in Chesterfield County.  A computer search of the County’s Computer Aided Dispatch System (CADS) was done to obtain information on emergency calls for service during selected severe storm events.  A second search was completed using a comparable time frame for each selected storm for three days before the event and three days after the event.  This information was used to determine the impact of severe storm activity on the number and types of calls for emergency service received by the department.
	To determine the readiness of Chesterfield Fire Department officers to manage severe storm emergencies, the author developed a written survey (See Appendix C).  The survey was designed to assess the two levels of officers that would be involved in managing emergency response to severe storms: company officers (Lieutenants and Captains); middle managers (Senior Battalion Chiefs, Battalion Chiefs, and Senior Captains).  All officers of those ranks were sent surveys, those assigned to the Emergency Operations Division and those officers currently assigned to staff positions in other divisions of the department.  The survey was sent to those officers on October 28, 1999 through the department’s electronic mail system.  Officers were asked to print the survey and return the completed hard copies of the survey to the author through the department’s internal mail system by November 15, 1999.  The author felt that by compiling the results from the survey a profile for Chesterfield Fire Department Officers could be developed that would be useful in developing a policy for response to severe storm emergencies.
	A total of 86 surveys went to the total officer population and 61 surveys (70.9%) were returned.  For the company officer population, 65 surveys were sent out and 44 surveys (67.7%) were returned.  For the middle manager population, 21 surveys were sent out and 17 surveys (81.0%) were completed and returned.  Both the response of the total survey population, and that of the individual officer populations were below that which would indicate a 95% confidence level as described in the Research Section of the Executive Development curriculum at the National Fire Academy.  The total officer population sample of 86 surveys would have required a return of 70 surveys.  The company officer population sample of 65 surveys would have required a return of 56 surveys; the middle managers would have had to return 19 of the 21 surveys.

	The author tabulated the survey results manually using a simple matrix and then entered the data into the computer graphics software Microsoft Powerpoint to produce the charts and tables used in this project to answer the research questions.
	The author wrote the text of this Applied Research Project using Corel WordPerfect software, version 8.0.  The charts and figures for the project were developed using Microsoft Powerpoint 97 software.  The Internet browsers, Microsoft Explorer and Netscape, were used to conduct on-line computer research on the Internet computer network.  
Limitations
	The literature review revealed a very small amount of material directly related to the response to severe storm emergencies in the context of training and operational procedures.  There was sufficient material on the characteristics and hazards of severe weather, i.e., hurricanes, thunderstorms, flooding, etc.  The primary deficiency was in how fire departments respond to those emergencies and how they train their personnel to respond safely, effectively, and efficiently.  An extensive on-line computer search of the Internet computer network, and the Learning Resource Center’s On-line Card Catalog at the National Fire Academy was unable to yield significant sources of such operational polices and procedures.
	The small size of the officer survey population limited this research in Chesterfield County.  The lower than desired number of survey responses, especially for the company officer population, could affect the results of the survey.  However, one of the issues identified in the literature review was the lack of training that officers receive for response to severe storm emergencies, and the lack of policy and procedure in organizations to guide officers in the management of such emergencies.
Both of these points could lead one to conclude that officer apathy, as indicated by the survey return results, is a resulting attitude for officers.  Since they have not been exposed to concepts and practices for managing severe storm emergencies in training, and there is not well-defined policy or procedure for the same in the department, they may feel that their daily emergency management skills and experience will be sufficient.

	The problem examined in this Applied Research Project is that Chesterfield Fire Department has no system for managing the extraordinary demands for service that a severe storm can enact upon its resources.  This study used the historical, evaluative, and action research methods to answer the following research questions.

1.	abHow vulnerable is Chesterfield County to severe weather, i.e., thunderstorms, hurricanes, tornados, etc.?
	Chesterfield County is extremely vulnerable to the effects of severe weather.  In the literature it described the United States as a whole as very vulnerable to the formation of severe weather systems, particularly thunderstorms, because of the absence of any significant mountain ranges running in an east-west direction.  The lack of such physical barriers allows warm, moisture-laden air from the Gulf of Mexico to flow northward where it readily collides with cold, dry air coming down from Canada.  The resultant collision spawns some of the most violent weather on earth, in the form of supercell thunderstorms and tornados, and the battleground is the Midwestern United States, particularly the Great Plains.

	Chesterfield County is a microcosm of that larger national weather development scenario.  Lying in the central Piedmont region of Virginia, the Blue Ridge Mountains (part of the Appalachian Mountain Range) run north-south approximately ninety miles west of the county.  The Atlantic Ocean lies approximately one hundred miles to the east of the county.  Warm, moist air from the Gulf of Mexico frequently flows northward through Georgia and the Carolinas up through Virginia, and Chesterfield County.  In the spring and summer this moisture frequently fuels late afternoon thunderstorms; in the winter it can bring significant snowfall.  Hurricanes and their remnants also follow that path to Chesterfield County.  Since 1972, the County’s Emergency Operations Plan lists twelve significant incidents that required county response for emergency services above normal operations levels.  All twelve were caused by severe weather: supercell thunderstorms and tornados; hurricanes and their remnants; and flooding either from the previously mentioned storm types, or non-tropical, slow-moving  moisture-laden low-pressure systems.  The Hazard Analysis contained in the county’s Emergency Operations Plan ranks the  windstorm/tornado/severe thunderstorm category as the second most likely vehicle for a disaster in Chesterfield County, exceeded only by a hazardous material accident.  The hurricane/tropical storm category was rated a close third.
	Flooding is a major concern because the county is part of the drainage basin for two rivers, the James and the Appomattox.  This has been dramatically illustrated in 1999 as the remnants of Hurricane Dennis and Hurricane Floyd both passed through Chesterfield County.  Hurricane Floyd, which dropped more than seven inches of rain on the county over a period of several hours, created some of the most extensive small streams flooding that the county had ever experienced.
The literature contained information that localized flooding, particularly flash floods, becomes more of a hazard as land becomes developed and concrete and asphalt covers more and more ground preventing rain from soaking into the ground.  Chesterfield continues to experience rapid growth and development that started in the early 1970's and that scenario is taking place today.
2.	abHow does severe weather affect the number of calls for service received by the department? 
	Severe weather creates a significant increase in the overall number of calls for service, and for three particular calls types: hazardous conditions; public service calls; and alarm activations.
For three selected storms a six-day average was calculated for fire calls, EMS calls, hazardous conditions, public service calls, and alarm activations received for the same time period as the storms.   (Hazardous Conditions, Public Service, and Alarm Activations are included in the total fire call figures). Figure 7 below compares the calls for service received during a tornado/thunderstorm that moved through the southern part of the County’s Matoaca District on August 6, 1993 between 1330 hours and 1730 hours to the same time period for three days before the storm and three days after the storm.

Figure 7. Tornado of August 6, 1993. Comparison of calls for service vs. 6-day average for time period 1330 hours to 1730 hours.

The total number of calls for service (fire and EMS) during that incident (45) represents a 200% increase over the six-day average of August 3-5, and August 7-9, 1993 for the same time period. (The six-day average was fifteen calls for service during the same 1330-1730 hours period).  Calls for service for hazardous conditions, i.e., downed power lines, transformer fires, lightning strikes with no fire, hazard control for situations not involving a motor vehicle accident, etc., which are practically none existent during the six-day average account for thirteen (28.8%) of that total number.  Public Service calls which include response for water shut offs, tree removal from roadways, trees into structures with no other hazards, etc., made up six (13.3%) of the total increase in call activity.
	Figures 8  below shows the same comparison for a microburst that struck the Clover Hill District on March 8, 1995.

Figure 8. Micro-burst of March 8, 1995. Comparison of calls for service vs. 6-day average for time period 1730 hours to 2330 hours.

The 90 calls for service during that incident is a 529% increase over the six-day average of 17 calls for service (March 5-7, and March 9-11 for the same time period).  The Hazardous Conditions calls and Public Service calls show an increase consistent with that shown in Figure 7 above.
	Figure 9 below shows the comparison for Tropical Storm Fran, a storm that affected the entire county on September 6, 1996 from 0100 hours to 1900 hours.

Figure 9. Tropical Storm Fran, September 6, 1996. Comparison of calls for service vs. 6-day average, 0100 hours to 1900 hours.

During that prolonged storm (17 hours) the department responded to 355 total fire calls.  That represents a 602%  increase over the six-day average of 59 calls for service during the same time period.  The  Hazardous Conditions calls, 116 (32.7%) and Public Service calls 127 (35.7%) accounted for 68.4% of that increase.
	Severe weather not only increases the total number of calls for service received, but also increases the rate at which those calls are received.  Table 10 on the next page illustrates the increase in the calls per hour experienced during the selected storms as compared to the six-day average.  
Storm
Calls/Hour (During Storm)
Calls/Hour (Six-Day Average)
% of Increase

Tornado, 8/6/93
11.25
3.75
300%

Micro-burst, 3/8/95
15.0
2.83
530%

Tropical Storm, 9/6/96
20.9
3.5
597%
Table 10. Comparison of calls for service per hour received.  Selected storms vs. 6 day-average for same time period.

	Such rapid increases in the number of calls for service can quickly tax the available resources of the department as it attempts to provide service to its citizens.  This is particularly true if the event encompasses the entire county as Tropical Storm Fran did in 1996.  Emergency resources can be shifted from unaffected areas to the hazard area for smaller events, such as the tornado/thunderstorm and microburst.
3.	abWhat policies and procedures does Chesterfield Fire Department currently have in place for response and emergency operations during severe weather?
	The Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) for emergency 9-1-1 calls for service in Chesterfield County is the Emergency Communications Center (ECC).  The ECC is a consolidated emergency communications center, separate from the police or fire department,  that handles all E-9-1-1 calls from the public and dispatches those calls for service to the police, fire, and EMS agencies in Chesterfield County.
	Fire and EMS calls are prioritized as Priority 1, 2, or 3 calls for service.  For EMS calls, priority 1 calls are those with immediate life-threatening potential, i.e., cardiac arrest, uncontrolled bleeding, altered mental status, difficulty breathing, etc.
Priority 2 calls are those calls that could be life-threatening, but the threat is not immediate, i.e., stroke patients with no difficulty breathing, a seizure patient who has stopped actively seizing, etc.  Priority 3 calls are those where no threat to life exists, i.e., a fractured leg, back injury, sick case, etc.  Emergency resources respond with red lights and siren on priority 1 and 2 calls; priority 3 calls are handled without red lights and siren. These priorities are established by the Operational Medical Director, who serves in that capacity for both the ECC and the fire department.
	Fire calls for service are categorized as either priority 1 or 3 (See Appendix A).  Resources respond with red lights and siren on priority 1 calls only.  Presently 30 of the 35 (85.7%) fire call types that can be entered into the ECC’s Computer Aided Dispatch System (CADS) are categorized as priority 1.  The fire department’s present storm policy advises that during inclement weather the Senior Battalion Chief should direct the ECC to dispatch no more than three priority 3 fire calls, and three priority 3 EMS calls at any one time.  The small number of call types currently categorized as priority 3 does not significantly lessen the number of calls that the ECC needs to dispatch, and to which the fire department needs to respond.  This is especially true when one of the call types that increases dramatically during severe weather, the Hazardous Condition call type, is presently categorized as a priority 1 though it includes those calls, i.e., downed power lines, transformer fires, lightning strikes with no fire, etc.,  that should be considered as a lower priority during severe weather events that stress the emergency response system.

	The number of priority 1 call types becomes a driving force that quickly depletes available resources in a response district.  The following scenario is quite typical in Chesterfield County. Emergency units are quickly dispatched as single-unit resources to a variety of calls such as wires down, trees into homes, transformer fires, etc.  Engine and truck companies are dispersed throughout their response districts, and in many cases may be responding to calls in their second due area.  At the same time, fire units are continuing to be dispatched with medic units (ambulances) on EMS calls as dictated by the Emergency Medical Dispatch (EMD) protocols that are part of the CADS.  Next, a true emergency is reported, i.e., a structure fire caused by a lightning strike, and the closest resources may be coming from a third or fourth due engine company.  (Given the large geographical area of the county, 446 square miles, such fire companies may routinely be responding from a distance of 8-10 miles or more.)  (J.E. Graham, personal communications, September 16, 1999).
	The department’s present adverse weather policy primarily addresses flooding that can occur on the James and Appomattox Rivers, and Swift Creek (a local waterway in the county). Addendum D to that policy addresses some tactical and task level operations during inclement weather, but focuses mainly on winter weather situations as it was developed in response to lessons learned from emergency response during severe winter snows in January, 1995.  Neither the policy nor the addendum provide strategic direction to the department’s middle and upper managers to aid them in conducting fire department operations during severe weather events.

	The department’s Incident Command System policy has not been updated to include components such as Incident Complex and Area Command as outlined in the National Fire Academy’s Command and Control of Natural and Man-made Disasters.  Battalion Chiefs do not act in the capacity of resource managers for their battalions during severe weather events causing a rapid increase in calls for service received, and multiple working events in their battalion.  Rather, they continue in their normal operations response mode of attempting to respond to significant events, i.e., structure fires, where they function as the Incident Commander for that event.  When plans are developed, they tend to be ad hoc plans developed for the incident based on the knowledge and skill levels of the officers involved.  There is no consistency from incident to incident and we continually re-manage similar incidents (J.E. Graham, personal communication, September 16, 1999).
4.	abWhat training do Chesterfield Fire Department officers receive for response and emergency operations before, during, and after severe weather and how well prepared do they feel they are for such operations?
	Chesterfield Fire Department has no specific training programs for its operational personnel to prepare them for response to the type and magnitude emergencies that severe weather can produce.  All officers receive training on the department’s Incident Command System, but that training focuses on the use of ICS for fire, EMS, and hazardous materials incidents that would be within the scope of normal operations.

	Senior Battalion Chiefs, Battalion Chiefs, and Senior Captains make up the Middle Manager population within the department.  The advanced level ICS training that the Middle Managers have received addresses scenarios for those same categories of incidents were the amount of necessary resources to manage the incident will be larger than daily operations.  There are no training programs that address the scale of resource management that a severe weather event could require, or that would prepare those Middle Managers to manage multiple incidents covering large geographic areas of the county.
	Recently, the department completed development of its Officer Development Program Level II curriculum.  That program is targeted toward those Lieutenants and Captains who have completed the Level I program.  This new course, for which delivery starts in January, 2000, contains an eight-hour program covering Chesterfield County’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), the fire department’s role in that plan, and how the County’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is designed to function when activated.  All fire department Middle Managers were required to attend the pilot delivery of that course.  At the time this research project was completed that was the only formalized training that the Middle Managers had received on that topic and that was approximately two years ago.  There has been no additional training, or scenario-based exercises directed at that group to develop and maintain their proficiency with the materials and concepts of the EOP and the EOC.  Only those Middle Managers who have had to attend the yearly EOC operational drill, because they are a Division Head, or happened to be assigned to the EOC from the Emergency Operations Division on the day of the drill, have received exposure to the process.

Results of the Fire Officer Survey
	Forty-four (67.6%) of the 65 first-line supervisors (Lieutenants and Captains) who received the survey completed it and returned it to the author.  None of the respondents reported that they had completed any of the severe storm response training programs offered by the National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute. Table 11 below illustrates the survey results from those officers.
Question
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree

I feel the organization has a plan for safe effective and efficient response to severe storm emergencies.
0
6
7
29
3

I am trained and prepared to manage emergency response resources at my level in the organization.
0
3
1
32
8

I understand the hazards and special operations and resource management necessary for response to storm related emergencies.
1
5
6
31
1

I receive adequate training for response to storm related emergencies.
1
15
7
20
1
Table 11. First-Line Supervisor Responses to survey
	Twenty-one Middle Managers received the survey with 17 (81.0%) completing the survey and returning it to the author.

	Three Middle Managers reported that they had attended the NFA course, Command and Control of Natural and Man-made Disasters.  Two different Middle Managers reported that they had attended the NFA course, Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management.  The other 12 respondents reported that they had attended none of the NFA or EMI courses.  Table 12 below shows the responses of Middle Managers to the survey questions.
Question
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree

I feel the organization has a plan for safe effective and efficient response to severe storm emergencies.
0
6
7
29
3

I am trained and prepared to manage emergency response resources at my level in the organization.
0
3
1
32
8

I understand the hazards and special operations and resource management necessary for response to storm related emergencies.
1
5
6
31
1

I receive adequate training for response to storm related emergencies.
1
15
7
20
1
Table 12. Middle Manager Responses to Survey

5.	abWhat are benchmarks for response to severe storm emergencies exist that could enable Chesterfield Fire Department to make its operations more safe, effective, and efficient?

	The review of the literature, including the operational policies of several fire departments, indicates that an emergency response to severe weather related incidents require strong policy and procedure in the following areas: (1) situation assessment and size-up; (2) developing and communicating incident objectives; (3) development of an effective  incident management organization; (4) efficient and effective resource allocation; (5) addressing incident safety issues.
Situation Assessment and Size-up
	Following a severe storm related event a department must be able to quickly assess the immediate impact of the storm on emergency resources and facilities.  The operational plans reviewed all contain provisions for a “snapshot” or preliminary assessment by fire station personnel of their equipment, personnel, facilities, and what are the conditions in the immediate vicinity of their physical location.  This initial assessment information is quickly relayed to the appropriate level of management for the event so that an initial assessment can be made as to the initial size and scope of the emergency.
	Once that preliminary assessment has been completed, emergency resources are directed to systematically assess the condition of their first-due response area through the use of the “windshield survey.”  Emergency apparatus and personnel physically drive predetermined routes through their response area and collecting information on storm impact based on what they can see through the windshield of their apparatus.  Supervisors completing the windshield assessment should focus on assessing the status of transportation routes, target hazards, public utilities, etc., and recording significant findings for communication to department managers.  Company Officers are directed to only stop and provide emergency service for obvious life-threatening situations.  

The emphasis is on completing the survey as quickly as possible to provide more complete information as to the size and magnitude of the incident to the emergency incident managers, both in the field and in the EOC.
Developing and Communicating Incident Objectives

	The literature review identified the need for developing objectives for the incident and the ability to communicate those objectives to all officers involved in managing the incident.  The material presented in the NFA courses, Command and Control of Natural and Man-Made Disasters and Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management, emphasized the need to collect and analyze the information provided by companies in the field to develop incident objectives.  Further, that information should be used to develop a written Incident Action Plan (IAP) using standard Incident Command System forms.  Auf der Heide (1989) specifically stated the need for such written documentation.
Form 202 (Incident Objectives) is the key to effective action.  It is the initiator of the planning and control process and the place where Command begins to form and direct the organization.  The form allows Command to describe all desired objectives and priorities (Auf der Heide, 1989, p. 153).
The fire department operational plans reviewed for this project all directed that either the ICS forms, or agency designed forms containing the same information, be used for all responses to severe weather emergencies.

Organization
	The ability to organize and manage resources is critical to the success of emergency operations during severe weather emergencies.  The review of the literature indicates a need to have an incident management system that is congruent with daily operations, but gives incident managers additional tools for comprehensive management of information and resources.  The enhanced ICS should have the “look and feel” of the system that personnel work with on daily operations, but should provide fire officers with the capabilities to manage the extraordinary demands for resources that a severe weather emergency can trigger.
	The advanced ICS organizational components of Incident Complex and Area command described in the NFA class, Command and Control of Natural and Man-made Disasters, provide such organizational tools to an organization.  The Palm Beach Fire Rescue Department has taken those ICS tools and incorporated them into their Hurricane Response Plan as Battalion Command and Department Command.  Each of those levels of organization and management have clearly defined roles and responsibilities that are described in the plan.
Resource Assignment
	The information reviewed for this project revealed a need for organizations to make more effective and efficient use of its resources during response to severe weather emergencies.  This resource management and assignment is very closely allied with the previously mentioned need for an enhanced ICS.  A fire department must recognize that the normal operation of receiving an E-9-1-1 call from the public and then dispatching resources according to a response protocol in a Computer-Aided Dispatch System (CADS) will quickly consume available resources, and that those resources may not be going to the situations where they are most needed.
	Different system must be in place to allow managers to receive the field assessment reports from front-line personnel, analyze that information, and then deploy resources where they can be most effective.  In many cases this creates the need to operate outside of the parameters of the CADS.  The Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) cannot function as the centralized entity receiving requests for service, processing those requests, and dispatching resources.  The reviewed organizations designate that the overall incident manager must become responsible for the overall deployment of resources to subordinate commanders in the field.  Those subordinate commanders then become responsible for the deployment and management of their assigned resources for as long as they have situations in their area of responsibility that require resources.
Incident Safety
	Severe weather presents many safety hazards to emergency response personnel.  Strong winds, both rotational and straight-line, lightning, torrential rain, and hail all present significant threats to emergency responders.  Fire department policy for response during these events, and non-response as well, needs to be predicated on a knowledge of the science of weather and the hazards.
	The literature review indicated that great advances have been made in the abilities of meteorologists to more accurately predict severe weather.  The advent of Doppler Radar in the late 1980's dramatically increased their capability to detect rotational winds, those associated with tornados, thus enabling weather centers to give the citizen population more advance warning.  However, that warning may only occur minutes before the storm strikes.

On the evening of April 1, 1998 and F3 tornado touched down near the town of Coatesville in Hanover County. . . . A Severe Thunderstorm Warning was issued at 6:45 p.m. and upgraded to a Tornado warning at 6:50 p.m.  Despite the nearly ten minute lead time for the warning, there were two fatalities associated with this tornado (National Weather Service, 1998, http://tgsv5.nws.noaa.gov/er/akq/Hanover.htm).
	Emergency response personnel need to become familiar with Doppler Radar technology and how to interpret what the radar is showing.  The number of Internet websites that provide Doppler Radar imagery has increased dramatically in recent years.  One of the best found in this research project was Intellicast.Com, www.intellicast.com, which offers Doppler Radar views for entire United States.  It also offers all three major Doppler Radar products: base reflectivity, velocity, and precipitation.  The Intellicast site also gives the viewer the ability to see all three products in motion over a six-hour time lapse.
	Emergency responders should also develop a working knowledge of identifying approaching severe weather based on visual clues such as cloud formation, changes in windspeed and direction, and the direction from which severe weather approaches their locality.  Airline pilots receive extensive training in such weather observation for use in their approaches for landings.  This allows them to confirm the technical information provided to them by instruments such as radar, and to react appropriately when conditions change faster than the instruments can react to the changes.  Emergency responders can find themselves in similar circumstances, especially when they are in the field and do not have access to technical information from sources such as Doppler Radar.  A sound understanding of weather dynamics can help field commanders make more appropriate decisions to protect the safety of their personnel.
	Strong winds present a physical hazard to personnel and vehicles just from the force of the wind that can blow vehicles off the road and overturn even large vehicles such as pumpers and aerial apparatus.  Additionally, winds cause trees to fall, utility wires to come down, structures to disintegrate, etc., creating “missiles” from the resulting debris.  The reviewed fire departments all stipulate in their policies at what windspeed emergency response will cease until windspeeds diminish to acceptable levels.
	Torrential rains associated with severe weather, especially hurricanes, can present a number of safety hazards including: (1) localized flooding; (2) road washouts; (3) mudslides; (4) persons trapped in swift water: and (5) persons trapped in vehicles trapped by swift water.  Fire department vehicle operators need to be especially cognizant of the hazard of road washouts particularly given the gross vehicle weights of today’s fire apparatus.  Personnel need to be familiar with areas in their response area that are prone to flooding from heavy rains and avoid driving through moving water until the stability of the road can be established.
	Persons and vehicles trapped in swift water present a significant life-safety hazard to both the victim and the rescuer.  All first responders should be trained in initial response techniques for such incidents and apparatus should be equipped with the proper personal protective clothing and personal floatation devices for all personnel.  Structural firefighting clothing is not appropriate protective clothing for swift water rescue operations, and can become a liability if personnel fall into the water due to the weight of the waterlogged material.  Personal floatation devices rated for recreational purposes and “Mae West” style devices are not appropriate for the dynamic situations presented by swift water.

	Many fire departments, including Chesterfield Fire Department, are committed to providing the highest quality of service to every emergency call for service that they receive.  However, when the observer looks at the dramatic increase in calls for service, and the short time span when that increase occurs during severe weather, it is clearly evident that those expectations cannot be met.  For three selected storms in Chesterfield County in the 1990's (a tornado, a micro burst, and a tropical storm) that percentage of increase in the number of calls for service ranged from 300 percent (a tornado) to 597 percent (a tropical storm).  Such dramatic increases in a short period of time severely taxed the resources of the department because there were no policies and procedures in place to manage these drastic deviations from normal operating procedures.
	The results of the survey of fire officers in the department are interesting and puzzling in light of the lack of policy, procedure, or training provided by the department for response specific to severe weather emergencies.  Company Officers, first-line supervisors, receive no training regarding the safety hazards associated with response to severe storm emergencies.  They also receive no training on the importance of the preliminary, or “snapshot” assessment, and the “windshield survey” and how to complete those two vital incident assessment functions.  Company Officers also do not receive adequate training to enable them operate in an independent mode of incident management, i.e., managing incidents and resources at the tactical level while Battalion Chiefs adopt a more strategic level of management at the battalion or county-wide level.

	The survey responses of the Middle Managers were equally contradictory given the lack of severe storm related training that they have received.  The low number of that group that has been exposed to formal strategic-level training, such as that offered by the NFA and EMI, would seem to suggest that the comfort level of the majority in dealing with severe weather emergencies is rooted in their past experience of dealing with such emergencies.  That experienced-based learning may be very narrow in scope (based on their position in managing previous incidents) and short on application to future incidents (based on the size and magnitude of the previous incidents).  The lack of formal training for that group as a whole presents a consistency problem as well as a possible negative influence on their ability to work collectively on large scale emergencies.
Weather
	The research for this project revealed a large body of information regarding weather that the author had never been exposed to, certainly not in the context of response to emergency incidents.  Though the literature review indicated that thunderstorms are very common, the potential for danger, especially from a supercell thunderstorm, is probably not common knowledge in the fire service.  Although less than five percent of all thunderstorms are supercells, they (supercells) cause a disproportionate number of deaths, injuries, and property damage associated with severe weather. Supercells can also produce:

1.	abTornados
2.	abWinds exceeding 57 miles per hour
3.	abHail ¾" in diameter or greater
4.	abRainfall capable of local and flash flooding
5.	abDangerous lightning (Vavrek et al., 1995, p. 7).  
	The historical data for severe storms in Chesterfield County correlates with that information from the literature review.  The county’s geographical position on the Virginia Piedmont, between the Blue Ridge Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean, provides a conducive atmosphere for the development of thunderstorms.  The Central Virginia region, which includes Chesterfield County, has a thirty-year average of 36.5 days per year with thunderstorm activity.  The most favorable time of year for thunderstorm development is early spring to late summer.  (William Sammler, personal communication, October 14, 1999).  Tornados or micro bursts accounted for five of the 12 significant severe storms that the county has experienced since 1969 (Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan, Part I, August 5, 1997).
	The county also lies in a storm track followed by hurricanes, or their tropical storm remnants, that make landfall in the southeastern United States.  Since 1969, seven of the 12 significant severe storms that the county has experienced were hurricanes, tropical storms, or their remnants (Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan, Part I, August 5, 1997).
	Chesterfield Fire Department personnel would benefit greatly from training about the characteristics of severe weather and its potential for adverse consequences in the county. That training would develop a greater awareness of the types of damage that could occur and the safety hazards that they would face while responding to emergencies during severe weather.  Such training would also enable Middle Managers  (Senior Battalion Chiefs, Battalion Chiefs, and Senior Captains) to make better decisions about when conditions are too hazardous for response operations to continue.

	“Radar is an indispensable tool for detecting and observing supercells.  The WSR-88D Doppler is a much improved tool for detecting thunderstorm intensity and supercells (Vavrek et al., 1995, p.6).  Chesterfield Fire Department would greatly enhance the abilities of its Middle Managers to effectively plan for emergency operations before severe weather strikes by training those managers in the interpretation of Doppler Radar information.  The advent of Internet websites such as www.intellicast.com (University of Michigan) and www.weather.com (the Weather Channel) makes this technology readily available to the general public.  The department currently has Internet access at its three battalion headquarter offices, and in its administrative offices.  This access should be expanded to all fire station locations so that Middle Managers and Company Officers would have access to the service regardless of their location in the county.
	A good working knowledge of how to use the information provided by Doppler Radar is not enough.  Despite great advances in meteorology and instruments for supercell identification during the last decade, severe weather can develop so rapidly that warnings may not reach personnel in time.  Emergency responders must be able to use common sense and pay attention to the visual clues of potentially dangerous thunderstorms.
Severe weather from supercells may threaten when the following are visible, especially from the northwest, west, or southeast (1) large thunderstorm towers, (2) well-defined cloud “anvils”, (3) clouds that are dark, low hanging, and sometimes tinged with green, (4) rotating clouds, (5) hail, (6) frequent lightning, and (7) torrential rain (Vavrek et al., 1995, p.9). 

	Airline pilots must be able to make quick decisions while making takeoffs and landings based on what they see as well as what weather technology is telling them.  The ultimate decision on weather to take off or land when severe weather threatens an airport is that of the pilot.
“. . . Pilots must be able to correlate the technical information provided to them by the air traffic controller and tower personnel with their own visual observations of weather conditions.  Don’t let compulsion take the place of good judgement--the first decision need not be your last if it’s a one-hundred-eighty degree turn--safety is Always professionalism” (FAA, 1999, p.2).
	Training in weather observation and field “forecasting” would enable all officers to recognize the imminent potential for severe weather so that proper planning for operations could take place, especially when those officers are in the field and do not have access to radar technology.
Situation Assessment
	Fire departments that provide EMS for their communities have known for many years the need for situation assessment when preparing for, and managing, multiple-casualty incidents (MCI).  One of the key objectives identified in managing a MCI is the need to conduct systematic triage to determine the number and severity of patients, and to prioritize the treatment and transportation of patients based on severity (Burkle, Sanner, and Wolcott, 1984, p. 45).  Patient care resources are directed to those patients with the most severe injuries and patients receive the minimum amount of resources to accomplish the task.  The incident management focus is on balancing the available resources and the patient care needs so that the greatest number of patients get an acceptable level of patient care (Aud der Heide, 1989, p. 166).
It probably is not the same level of care that they would have received had they been the only patient, but it will probably be a level of care necessary for a successful outcome.
	Severe weather emergencies or disasters are characterized by great uncertainty.  Often the character and extent of the damage and the secondary threats (leaking chemicals, downed power lines, weakened dams) are not immediately apparent and therefore the necessary countermeasures not undertaken (Auf der Heide, 1989, p. 63).   The information gathered during the preliminary assessment, or “snapshot” assessment, coupled with the secondary, or  “windshield assessment”, is the necessary incident “triage” that the emergency managers need to develop incident action plans and allocate resources to the situations where the most good can be done for the greatest number of people.  “Disasters are also very fluid in nature with needs changing from minute-to-minute.  This fluidity necessitates a procedure for determining and updating what the overall disaster situation is and what problems need to be tackled” (Auf der Heide, 1989, p.63). 
	Chesterfield Fire Department currently has no such procedures in place for the wide-spread systematic assessment of the county should severe weather strike creating extensive damage and secondary hazards.  The normal operating practices remain in place: (1) emergency 9-1-1  calls from the public come into the Emergency Communications Center; (2) the call is entered into the Computer-Aided Dispatch System (CADS); (3) CADS recommends what emergency resources to dispatch based on unit availability in the computer; (4) emergency resources respond to the incident and operate according to normal procedures; (5) upon completion of the assignment the resource clears for another call, which it receives, or it returns to quarters to await another call.

The only calls that the emergency response “system” (the ECC and the Fire Department) knows about are the ones reported by the citizens who make the 9-1-1 call.  The size, scope, and magnitude of the situation are not accurately known until the situation is over.
	Fire company officers (Lieutenants and Captains) are not trained in how to do situation assessment of their response district.  Nor are they training in a system of structural triage, such as the USAR program, so that structures that have been searched or assessed can be marked as such, thus eliminating the potential that the same building would be searched by another crew.
	The department’s middle managers are not trained in how to collect such information from fire companies in their battalion (if it existed) and analyze the information for strategic decision making purposes.  Middle Managers are not trained to become information and resource managers for their area of responsibility; they continue to respond from one call to another “searching” for the situation, which under normal operating conditions, would require the presence of a Middle Manager, i.e., a structure fire, building collapse with persons trapped, etc.  Chesterfield Fire Department needs to train its Middle Managers to function at the strategic level during mitigation activities before and after severe weather strikes.
Developing Incident Objectives
	Emergency response to severe storm related emergencies require strong strategic leadership on the part of senior emergency managers and equally strong tactical leadership from officers commanding fire companies (J.E. Graham, personal communications, September 16, 1999).  The widespread devastation and multiple problems in multiple areas create the need for a comprehensive written Incident Action Plan (IAP) that identifies the priorities necessary to mitigate those problems (FEMA, 1994, SM 3-15).
That IAP needs to be based on a thorough situational analysis and must be communicated to all appropriate command personnel.  Without the development of such an IAP and its communication to all appropriate command personnel chaos reigns and there is a great deal of activity without significant progress in managing the incident (FEMA, 1999, SM 3-17).  There must be centralized strategic planning and an IAP  for the “total picture” so that managers of field operations know where they fit into the plan, and how they need to keep the information flowing to the top of the organization (FEMA, 1994).
	Chesterfield Fire Department’s command level officers are not experienced and practiced in the development of a comprehensive IAP.  The skill with which an officer, or group of officers, manages the complex and multiple problems caused by severe weather is predicated on their previous experience, if they have any, of managing such a situation.  This causes the organization to remanage incidents, or to manage large-scale incidents as it would the smaller routine emergencies (J.E. Graham, personal communication, September 16, 1999).
	The use of standard documentation afforded by the use of standard ICS forms is a critical component of the IAP.  For the larger scale incident, such as those caused by severe weather, a more formalized process of identifying objective and committing them to written form becomes critical to the success of operations.  Auf der Heide (1989),  FEMA (1994), and FEMA (1999) all recommend that the Incident Commander, as quickly as possible, begin that formal documentation of incident objectives using standard Incident Command System Forms 201-220. (See Appendix K).  The department currently has, and uses, ICS Tactical Worksheets for use in managing incidents.  These worksheets, however, are tactical in nature and designed for the management of a single incident.
They do not help focus the Incident Commander on the development of strategic objectives for larger and more complex incidents.  Such tools would help the department’s inexperienced command officers to have such a more standardized approach to the development of incident objectives.  The use of the ICS forms would also provide the total documentation package that would be necessary for after-action activities, i.e., reimbursement requests, litigation, insurance claims, etc.  “It is very difficult to capture data after the fact; information must be captured about events as they occur (FEMA, 1999, SM 5-4).
Developing an Effective Organization
	FEMA (1994) and FEMA (1999) introduced the advanced ICS components of Incident Complex and Area Command as necessary components of an organization’s ICS to effectively manage larger scale incidents.  Chesterfield Fire Department has not added such capabilities to its ICS since its adoption in 1985.  These tools would enable senior managers to exercise greater command and control at larger incidents while at the same time maintaining the principles of ICS: (1) unity of command; (2) effective span of control; and (3) functional positions.  These additional tools also would help facilitate better incident communications and resource management.

Resource Management
	Emergency managers responding to the increased service demands of a severe weather emergency are faced with a situation very similar to a MCI–more problems than they have resources.  The demands of severe weather emergencies require a different paradigm than that used of daily response to emergencies.

Initially, as mentioned above in situation assessment, tactical resources (engine companies, truck companies, and ambulances) must function more as reconnaissance units than as providers of emergency services. Chesterfield Fire Department’s tactical resources historically respond to emergency calls during, and after, severe weather has struck and function as they do on a daily basis.  Each incident to which they respond is managed as a separate and stand-alone problem, not related to other situations that may be happening within their battalion, or geographical area.
 “The management of many emergency response agencies is patterned on the military model.  The reflects the belief that the most effective emergency operations are carried out under rigid control exercised from a single commander. . . .this works well in the independent, daily routine operations of these organizations. . . . disasters need a different approach (Drabek, 1985, p.9).
	The company officers of the department need training in how to operate in the more decentralized command and control environment that is required to effectively respond to severe storm devastation.  Those tactical level resource managers will have to make many decisions normally reserved for their superior officers.  They will also have to direct a specified amount of resources in a larger geographical area to achieve control of multiple problems.  For example, an engine company officer may be assigned an engine, a brush truck, and a front-end loader, and be directed to assess and manage the problems in a subdivision of fifty homes (Eichelberger, 1991, p. 32).
	The department’s middle managers need to become skilled and practiced in receiving situation status reports from company officers in the field, processing that information for their area of responsibility, and then allocate the appropriate resources within their area.
In short, they need to learn how to quickly decentralize the normally very centralized operations of the department.  Battalion Chiefs need policy direction and training on how to quickly develop an organizational structure that is focused on information and resource management, not command and control of single incidents.  This command and control group also needs to learn how to effectively work with the supervisors of the ECC to manage the backlog of calls received from the public for which emergency resources are not immediately available for response.  The everyday operational “mentality” of getting to resources to a call as quickly as possible is not feasible during response to severe weather emergencies (J.E. Graham, personal communication, September 16, 1999).
	Another component of resource management that needs to be addressed is how emergency calls are prioritized and resources dispatched.  The historical review of severe weather in Chesterfield County revealed many situations where situation assessment activities such as the “windshield assessment” may not be necessary due to the smaller scope and magnitude of the event.  Typically, this is the spring or summer thunderstorm that generates 30 to 40 calls for service during a period that lasts an hour to hour-and-a- half (Review of storm related activity memorandums to Fire Chief completed by battalion staff officers, November 20, 1999). 
	Currently, the ECC  has 35 available fire call types that can be used to enter an emergency call for service into the CADS for dispatch.  Thirty of those call types are Priority 1, the highest priority, which dictates a “red lights and siren” response by response personnel.  When a thunderstorm does strike, the number of Priority 1 calls received and dispatched can quickly commit the available resources in the county to situations that may not be life-threatening.  

Included in those Priority 1 call types are situations such as: (1) alarm activation/no fire; (2) mutual aid to surrounding jurisdictions; (3) trash/dumpster fires; (4) vehicle fires; (5) outdoor/refuse fires; (6) hazardous conditions, i.e., downed power lines, lightning strikes with no fire, transformer fires, etc.; and (7) smoke investigations.  The research results for this project showed that the number calls for service entered into the CADS as call types “hazardous conditions” and “alarm activation/no fire” increased significantly during the selected storm events.  This same type of increase for these call types occurs for smaller storm related activity as well (Review of storm related activity memorandums to Fire Chief completed by battalion staff officers, November 20, 1999).
	The current operational policy for storm response directs the Senior Battalion Chief on duty to direct the ECC to dispatch, and have active, no more than three Priority 3 calls at any given time.  This does not have a significant effect on the “resource drain” since only one Priority 3 call type (Public Service call) occurs with any significance during severe weather.  The department would be better served to reclassify the fourteen less significant Priority 1 call types as Priority 2 call types (See Appendix H).  Under normal operating conditions emergency responders would still respond to those Priority 2 call types under emergency conditions, “red lights and siren”.  (This would be consistent with the dispatch procedures for EMS calls that categorize calls for service as Priority 1, 2, or 3).  In a severe storm situation the Senior Battalion Chief could direct the ECC to only dispatch emergency resources to Priority 1 calls until the severe weather subsides.  The ECC would continue to log any Priority 2 or 3 calls into CADS for dispatch after the storm; priority 2 calls would get priority post storm followed by Priority 3 calls.

This action would allow the Senior Battalion Chief and their other middle managers to more effectively manage the county’s emergency resources.
	The department’s currently operational policy for the recall of off-duty personnel is not adequate and has not been revised since 1995.  The policy states that shift commanders (company officers) who are in quarters will, upon notification, make telephone calls to off-duty personnel directing them to report for duty.  The policy states that those personnel will respond to their assigned duty stations unless directed otherwise.  There is no systematic methodology for getting those recalled personnel into the system where they can do the most good.  Palm Beach County Fire Rescue (1999), Myrtle Beach Fire Department (1999), Castillo, Montes, and Paulison, (1992), and Eichelberger (1991) all identified this as a significant issue that must be addressed to ensure that the organization can increase its resource levels for more effective response.
	Computer software solutions are available that could eliminate this problem.  Bradford (1999) wrote of one software package that addresses many of the personnel and staffing issues of a fire department, including the recall of off-duty personnel.  Other software packages, such as those used by telemarketing companies provide a ready solution to the singular personnel issue of recalling off-duty personnel.  Many police departments across the country are already using so-called “Reverse 9-1-1" software to place calls, using a computer, to residents in an area specified in the computer to alert them of criminal activity, or to issue evacuation notices due to impending severe weather. “It is sophisticated enough to indicate whether a call was received or whether a message was left on an answering machine.  It can also be programmed to keep trying” (Sharp, 2000, p. A2).

	Chesterfield Fire Department also needs to identify where and how its personnel assigned to staff assignments can be best utilized to enhance response resource levels.  There are currently 68 fire officers, firefighters, and civilian personnel assigned to the Fire and Life Safety, Training and Safety, Administration, Maintenance and Logistics, and Information Services divisions within the department.  “The mobilization of personnel resources assigned to staff positions can provide the Incident Commander with additional resources particularly for ICS staff positions” (Hughes, 1998, p. 28).  By identifying in the storm response plan how to effectively notify and assign those personnel to ICS positions, staff reserve apparatus, and other support functions, the department would significantly improve its response resources, especially during weekday business hours.
	Palm Beach County Fire Rescue (1999), Myrtle Beach Fire Department (1999), Castillo, Montes, and Paulison, (1992), and Eichelberger (1991) also identified in their writings the necessity of having reserve apparatus within a department properly equipped for deployment.  That deployment may be necessary because primary units have been damaged by the severe weather, or because those units will be staffed by recalled off-duty personnel or staff personnel from support divisions.  Chesterfield Fire Department currently has several pumpers in its reserve fleet, but those units are not equipped for immediate deployment.  With the exception of attack and supply hose, all emergency response equipment must be transferred to the reserve unit from the primary unit that it replaces.
Safety Issues	
	The review of the literature provided a great deal of information about the safety hazards associated with response to severe weather emergencies.  Emergency responders are not immune to the threats presented by high winds, lightning, torrential rains, or hail.
“High windspeeds from severe weather, i.e., hurricanes or tropical storms, present a significant hazard to personnel, and even to large fire apparatus” (Mann, 1993, p. 15).   “Debris from demolished buildings, road signs, and even whole automobiles can become deadly missiles in a thunderstorm or tornado” (Vavrek, Holle,  Allsopp, Davies,  and Hoadley, 1995, p. 4).  High winds associated with severe weather have the most devastating effect on residential occupancies, mobile homes, and small businesses because these structures, especially the residential structures, are of non-engineered construction.  Such non-engineered construction offers the least resistance to high winds (Minor, 1988, p. 95).  Tornados have an even more devastating impact on such structures because of the “twin punch” of rotary wind velocities and the partial vacuum that exists within the vortex (Ebert, 1988, p. 83).
	“Torrential rains associated with severe weather can quickly turn even small local streams into raging rivers” (Segerstrom, 1991, p. 20). Flooding associated with severe weather was identified as causing the highest number of deaths each year from weather, yet the majority of fire departments do not train and educate their personnel on handling emergencies that can occur in flood waters (NFPA, 1999, p. 29).  Heavy rains and water from streams and creeks that have breached their banks can quickly undermine the foundations of roadways making their navigation extremely hazardous, especially for large vehicles such as fire apparatus (Segerstrom, 1991, p. 20).
Summary
	Chesterfield County provides an ideal setting for the types of safety hazards described above.  The county is extremely vulnerable to severe weather as described elsewhere in this project.
A significant amount of the construction in the county falls into the non-engineered construction category: (1) single-family dwellings, (2) apartment buildings and condominiums; and (3) small businesses.  The county’s roadway infrastructure contains many two-lane roads that can quickly become flooded from nearby small creeks and streams.
	Chesterfield Fire Department would significantly improve the safety, effectiveness, and efficiency of its emergency response to severe weather situations by developing a comprehensive policy for that response and training all of its personnel in how to use that policy.  The application of the risk management principles associated with safety (examination of risk and frequency) to develop policies and procedures for emergency response can significantly increase the probability of proper conduct should such response be required (Graham, 1997).  Though the frequency of actual response to a severe storm, such as a hurricane or tornado, may not be extremely high on an annual basis in Chesterfield County, the consequences (risk) of fire department personnel not responding appropriately could be devastating for the department, the county government, and ultimately the citizens who needed the service.

The recommendations of this study are as follows:

1.	abAdopt the draft guidelines for response to severe storm emergencies contained in Appendix I.
2.	abRevise the E-9-1-1 Call-Coding priorities procedures used in the Emergency Communications Center as described in Appendix H.
3.	abTrain personnel on the characteristics and associated hazards of severe weather systems that contain straight-line or rotational winds, or are tropical in origin.
4.	abTrain personnel in the use of Doppler Radar technology and visual observation skills to identify and forecast the potential for severe weather.
5.	abPurchase lightning detection equipment for placement on all emergency response vehicles.
6.	abDirect fire companies to develop “Windshield Assessment” routes and checklists for their first-due response area.  Also direct those companies to develop a listing of target hazards that could present multiple-casualty situations should severe weather strike.  Update both sets of information on an annual basis.
7.	abTrain Emergency Operations Division personnel on situational assessment and ensure that all fire and EMS units have Severe Storm Response Boxes that contain the necessary supplies for situational assessment, and the equipment to mark structures after they have been assessed using the USAR structural triage system.
8.	abTrain company officers to be tactical leaders in a decentralized response environment.
9.	abTrain Middle Managers how to manage geographical areas of responsibility using Battalion Command Teams.
10.	abTrain Middle Managers about the County’s Emergency Operations Plan, how the interface between the Emergency Operations Center and field operations should work and have all middle managers participate in the yearly scheduled EOP tabletop exercises.
11.	abProvide training to all personnel on the safety hazards associated with response to severe storm emergencies, i.e., high winds, torrential rains, lightning, and hail, and how to protect themselves during response operations.
12.	abTrain all personnel, and provide the proper personal protective equipment aboard each response unit, for safe, effective, and efficient operations in floodwater situations.
13.	abRevise the department’s Incident Command System to include Battalion Command Team and Department Command Team components.
14.	abAdopt the use of standard ICS forms for all incidents and ensure that all Middle Managers have a complete ICS forms catalog.  Provide training in the use of those forms for incident documentation.  Ensure that there is a complete ICS Forms Catalog in the EOC for fire officers to use when working in the EOC.
15.	abProvide ICS and severe storm response guideline training annually in March to all personnel assigned to support services divisions, both uniformed and civilian, and determine how they can most effectively staff ICS positions, particularly when needed during normal business hours, 0830 hours to 1700 hours, Monday through Friday.
16.	abDevelop a new policy for the recall of off-duty personnel.  Identify and purchase a computerized program to make calls to off-duty personnel in the event that additional personnel resources are needed for emergency response.
17.	abEquip all reserve fleet apparatus with the necessary equipment and supplies so that such units can be rapidly deployed with recalled personnel when needed.

	Auf der Heide, E. (1989). Disaster response: principles of preparation and coordination. St. Louis, MO: C.V. Mosby Company.
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	Birden, J., (1992, September-October). Tornado. Minnesota Fire Chief. 8-9.
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	Department of Atmospheric Sciences at University of Illinois at Urbanna-Champaign (1999). Outflow phenomena: downbursts. [Website]. Available: www.ww2010.atmos.uiuc.edu/(Gh)/guides/mtr/svr/comp/out/home.rxml

	Drabek, T.E., (1985, January).  Managing the emergency response. In W.J. Petak (Ed.), Emergency management: a challenge for public administration. Washington, D.C.: American Society for Public Administration.
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	Eichelberger, J., (1991, June). Tornado devastates Plainfield. Fire Chief. 28-33.
	Federal Aviation Administration, (1999). Thunderstorms - don’t flirt . . . skirt’em.  General Aviation Accident Prevention Program. [Website]. Available: www.tc.faa.gov/ZDV/GA/tstorms.html
	Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1994). Unit 3: Controlling incident operations. In Command and control of fire operations at natural and man-made disasters.  Student manual. Emmitsburg, MD: Author.
	Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1999). Executive analysis of fire service operations in emergency management.  Student manual.  Emmitsburg, MD: Author.
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	Irwin, R.L., (1989). The Incident Command System.  In Auf der Heide, E. (Ed.) Disaster response: principles of preparation and coordination. St. Louis, MO: C.V. Mosby Company
	Kasperson, R.E., and Pijawka, D.K. (1985). Societal response to hazards and major events: comparing natural and technological hazards. In W.J. Petak (Ed.), Emergency management: a challenge for public administration. Washington, D.C.: American Society for Public Administration.
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	Main, G., (1995). Fire department search and rescue operations following tornado disasters. (Executive Fire Officer Program, Applied Research Project). Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy.
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	Mikel, R.J., (1998). How thunderstorms and lightning impact the Naperville Fire Department. (Executive Fire Officer Program Applied Research Project). Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy.
	Minor, J.E. (1988). Effects of wind on buildings. In E. Kessler (Ed.), The thunderstorm in human affairs (pp. 89-109). Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
	Myrtle Beach Fire Department. (1999). Emergency guideline disaster plan. Myrtle Beach, SC: Author.
	National Fire Protection Association, (1999, August).  Firefighter deaths due to drownings. Selected special analyses of U.S. firefighter fatalities (pp. 29-35).  Special report prepared for Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Fire Administration. Quincy, MA: Author.
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	Palm Beach County Fire Rescue Department.  (1999). Palm Beach County emergency operations plan: hurricane annex. Palm Beach County, FL: Author.
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FIRE TYPE		PRI		DESCRIPTION
A 42			 1	     	AIRCRAFT DOWN
includes all aircraft type emergencies (i.e.: landing gear problems, motor problems, unknown problems, in-flight emergencies with potential crash and actual crash)
  A 90			 1		ALARM ACTIVATION/NO FIRE
includes all alarm activations (i.e: alarm company reporting); if water flow, be sure to note in comments and radio operator will add a truck company. IF CALLER IS AT ACTUAL RESIDENCE OR BUSINESS BE SURE TO ASK IF ANY SMOKE OR FIRE IS VISIBLE
  C 11			 1		COMMERCIAL STRUCTURE
includes all fires for major Commercial, Industrial and Institutional structures
  C 40			 1		CONFINED SPACE RESCUE
confined areas not intended for human occupancy, with limited means of entry and exit, potential for contaminated atmosphere, or engulfment; these situations may require special forms of breathing apparatus, explosion proof lighting, atmospheric monitoring and an entry permit to rescue or recover victim(s)
  D 04			 1		DIVE TEAM/UNDERWATER RESCUE
includes all dive team calls where persons are trapped or possibly drown and are possibly below the water surface
  E 40			 1		ELEVATED RESCUE OPERATION
any situation requiring access to a victim, unable to get down or trapped in an elevated area where ground or aerial ladders will probably not reach (greater than 100' in height) i.e.: radio tower, water tank, power line tower, roof, and tall trees; and specialized rigging is required to access and remove victims
  H 11			 1		HIGH RISE STRUCTURE
includes all fires for High Rise structures (note: some non high rise buildings will be included - EX: Virginia State University)
 
I 44			 1		INTERIOR GAS LEAK
includes all calls where there is a gas leak in the interior of a building
L 44			 1		HAZARDOUS MATERIAL LEAK
includes calls where you know you have a hazardous material leak
  M 11			 1		STRUCTURE FIRE W/MUTUAL AID
includes structure fires in area of county that get mutual aid (i.e: Powhatan, Petersburg)
  M 40			 1		MACHINERY ENTRAPMENT
incidents where people are trapped in commercial, industrial, construction or farm machinery which may require specialized stabilization, lifting and manipulation; these incidents may also require the specialized cutting, distorting and/or disassembly of equipment components to rescue or recover a victim(s)
  M 59			 1		MUTUAL AID
includes all mutual aid calls outside of the county (i.e.: Petersburg, Powhatan - Fire and EMS type calls included)
  R 01			 1		REDUCED STRUCTURE
includes all structure fires where a reduced assignment is warranted
  R 04			 3		DIVE TEAM RECOVERY
includes all recovery calls where there is no emergency rescue involved
S 14			 1		SERIOUS BRUSH FIRE
S 40			 1		STRUCTURE COLLAPSE
incidents where structures/buildings have partially or totally collapsed with the possibility of injury or trapped victims inside the structure
T 15			 1		TRASH/DUMPSTER FIRE
includes trash and dumpsters

T 40			 1		TRENCH/EARTH COLLAPSE
incidents where trench or excavations have collapsed or underground construction requires special sheeting and shoring operations; these incidents may also require atmospheric monitoring and/or rope rescue to recover victim(s); also may include a pit or ravine in which a victim cannot exit; also may include a medical emergency where the victim is in an unshored trench or excavation
W 40               	1        		WATER/ICE RESCUE
any situation where person(s) visible and trapped or stranded in water or on an ice covered lake, pond, river or pool
2 01			 1		SPECIAL (FIRE ONLY)
includes any fire not classified in other sections (i.e.: telephone poles, electrical poles, porta-johns, etc.)
2 11			 1		STRUCTURE FIRE
includes all structures other than commercial or high rise
2 13			 1		VEHICLE FIRE
includes any vehicle fire outside of a structure or vehicle fires reported out
2 14			 1		BRUSH FIRE
includes all woods, grass, trees, field fires and fires of same nature, or out on arrival
2 15			 1		OUTDOOR/REFUSE
includes all yard storage, fences, etc.
2 40			 1		HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS
includes standby for downed power lines, transformers, lightning strikes with no fire, hazard control  (not involving 10-50) etc.
2 41			 1		CHIMNEY FIRE
includes fires that are contained completely within a chimney and does not cause damage to structure. If damage occurs to structure, this should be coded as structure fire

2 42			 1		VEHICLE ACCIDENT
includes overturned, trapped, over embankment, hazard control for 10-50 only
2 43			 1		EXCESSIVE HEAT
includes calls where there is no evidence of flame production, but there is evidence of melting or excessive heat
2 44			 1		HAZARDOUS MATERIAL/UNKNOWN
includes all calls where hazardous materials not leaking or outside natural gas leaks
2 56			 3		ILLEGAL BURNING
includes illegal burnings that are being controlled (attended or unattended)
2 59			 3		PUBLIC SERVICE
includes water shut off, tree removal from roadway, etc.
2 61			 1		SMOKE INVESTIGATION
includes all calls where smoke or smell are present (outside only) and fits no other category
2 71			 3		REDUCED FALSE ALARM
this is where you know it is a false alarm and you send a unit to take a report
6 20			 3		EMS WALK-IN CALLS
this code will be used when there is and EMS walk-in to a fire station that does not require an ambulance to respond (just firefighters on duty handling patient care).
6 50			 1		MEDICAL 10-50
includes all 10-50's where fire is sent for medical reasons (this code does not have to automatically be entered)

FUNCTIONAL APPENDIX 5: FIRE SERVICE 
MISSION 
To prevent and suppress fires and respond to hazardous materials incidents, thereby preventing or minimizing the loss of life and property, and to assist with rescue, warning, and other operations as required in time of emergency. 
ORGANIZATION 
The Fire Chief or a Fire Department representative will coordinate the response of the Fire Department and will be a part of the EOC staff which will assist with the overall direction and control of emergency operations. 

The Chesterfield Fire Department is staffed with approximately 334 full-time personnel and 380 volunteer firefighters. 

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 

The Chesterfield Fire Department is capable of suppressing all types of fires and responding to a hazardous substances incident (see Functional Annex Hazardous Materials Emergency Plan). 

Should an emergency demand greater resources than are available within the County, fire departments in nearby jurisdictions will assist. Likewise, the Chesterfield Fire Department will assist other jurisdictions when needed. All such assistance should be in accordance with existing mutual aid agreements. 

The Chesterfield Fire Department maintains its own equipment and supplies. 
	
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACTIONS - FIRE SERVICE 

18.	abNormal Operations

1.	abDevelop and maintain plans and procedures to provide fire services in time of emergency
2.	abReview and update plans and procedures, as time permits

2. 	Increased Readiness - A natural or man-made disaster is threatening the local area

a.	ab	Alert on-duty personnel
b.	ab	Identify status of vehicles and equipment. 

1.	abEmergency Operations 

1.	abMobilization Phase - Conditions continue to worsen requiring  full-scale mitigation and preparedness 

		activities

1.	abAlert personnel to stand-by status

2.	abBegin to implement record keeping of all incurred expenses for fire and hazardous materials related incidents and continue for the duration of the emergency
3.	abCheck firefighting and communications equipment. 
4.	abThe Fire Chief or his representative should report to the EOC and assist with emergency operations
5.	abAs the situation worsens, alert and assign duties to all personnel. Fire department personnel may be requested to assist with warning and evacuation

2.	abResponse Phase

		Disaster strikes. An emergency response is required to protect lives and property.

1.	abFollow established procedures in responding to fires or hazardous materials incidents
		2. 	For other disasters: 
	
			a .	Continue to assist with evacuation as required

2.	abAssist with ground search and rescue, if requested 

3.	ab		Record disaster-related expenses for fire service functions. 

4.	Recovery 

	a. Continue to provide essential services as required. 
	
	b. Continue search and rescue operations, if required. 

	c. Assist with cleanup operations
	
	d. Assist with the inspection of damaged facilities, if applicable. 

	e. Compile and submit records of disaster-related expenses for fire service functions. 

EOP Appendix 5 

5-2 

August 5, 1997 

TO:		All Chesterfield Fire Department Career Officers

FROM:	Senior Captain Robert P. Avsec

DATE:	October 28, 1999

SUBJECT:	Survey for Executive Fire Officer Program Applied Research Project (ARP)

I am currently working on my ARP for the course, Executive Analysis of Fire Department Operations in Emergency Management.  The topic of my ARP is, “Chesterfield Fire Department Response to Severe Storm Emergencies.”  One of my goals for this project is to develop a model policy and operating guidelines to improve our organization’s ability to manage emergencies and resources during severe storms.  As part of my research for this project I am surveying all junior and senior career officers gain their assessment of how well prepared they and the  department are to respond to severe weather emergencies.  (For this survey, severe weather is defined as severe thunderstorms, tropical storms and hurricanes, and tornados.)  Please print this e-mail attachment,  answer the following questions, and return the hard copy survey to me at the AO Office, Fire Station 15, before November 15, 1999.

What is your current position in the organization?	Q 	First-line Supervisor (Lieutenant, Captain)
Q 	Middle Manager (Sr. Battalion Chief, Battalion Chief, Senior Captain)
Please rate your response to these statement using the following scale:

	1-You strongly disagree with the statement.
	2-You disagree with the statement.
	3-You have no opinion regarding the statement.
	4-You agree with the statement.
	5-You strongly agree with the statement.

1. I feel the organization has a plan for safe, effective, and efficient response to severe storm emergencies.
1	2	3	4	5

2. I am trained and prepared to manage emergency response resources at my level in the organization.
1	2	3	4	5

3. I understand the hazards and special operations and resource management necessary for response to storm related emergencies.
1	2	3	4	5

4. I receive adequate training for response to storm related emergencies.
1	2	3	4	5

I have completed the following training pertinent to storm related emergency response:
QNational Fire Academy, Command and Control of Natural and Man-Made Disasters
QNational Fire Academy, Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management
QEmergency Management Institute, IEMC: All Hazards-Preparedness and Response
QEmergency Management Institute, IEMC: Hurricane-Preparedness and Response

CHESTERFIELD FIRE DEPARTMENT
CHESTERFIELD, VIRGINIA

OPERATIONAL POLICY #13
		
SUBJECT:		Floods and Storm Related Emergencies
DATE:		September 20, 1996
PURPOSE:	Guidelines are in place to help manage floods and other unusual storm related emergencies such as severe thunderstorms, hurricanes, and tornadoes.  The Senior Battalion Chief on duty or the Emergency Incident Coordinator is responsible for the overall operation.
	
SECTION 1
The Senior Battalion Chief or Emergency Incident Coordinator will:

	1.	Monitor and evaluate National Weather Service, water levels, and the State Office of Emergency Services information.
	2.	Keep Emergency Communications informed and have them maintain a 24 hour log to record all contacts, pertinent information, and action taken.
	3.	Implement the Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Plan and activate the Emergency Operations Center per Emergency Services Operating Instruction #4.  Chesterfield Emergency Services has previous documentation on flood gauge readings for floods that have occurred in Chesterfield County.
	4.	Coordinate with other county and outside agencies such as the Red Cross, State Police, National Guard, etc.
	5.	Activate documentation and request TSU if photo or video documentation is necessary.		
	 6.	Prepare a written report of the shift's activities, conditions, preparedness, contacts, problems encountered, and actions taken for the Fire Chief by 0900 hours each day.  Give a verbal report at 1630 hours and as needed during the incident.
	 7.	Immediately following a flood or storm related emergency of significant damage, compile a damage assessment report (see Addendum B).  Reports should contain all pertinent damage information, names of occupants, and monetary value estimates.
	 8.	Keep stations updated and ensure complete preparedness.
	 9.	Notify the Duty Deputy County Administrator when appropriate per Administrative Policy #7.
10.	Notify the private residences and industries along the James River, Appomattox River, and Swift Creek areas affected by the weather and offer the fire department's assistance.  See the attached addendums.

SECTION 2
The Assistant Emergency Services Coordinator will also:

	1.	Monitor and evaluate National Weather Service, water levels, and the State Office of Emergency Services information.
	2.	Coordinate with other county and outside agencies such as the Red Cross, State Police, National Guard, etc.

SECTION 3
Environmental Engineering will:

	1.	Monitor Swift Creek and the Appomattox River during working hours per their emergency plan.  This will be turned over to the fire and police departments during non-working hours, weekends, and holidays.
	2.	Respond personnel from Environmental Engineering to the scene of a potential flooding problem that could be alleviated by remedial action, provided that:

			-	Fire and police have checked out the scene and determined remedial action can be taken.
			-	They are given the basic nature of the problem, and the names, addresses and phone numbers of residents affected.

			-	They are called in the following order by the Emergency Communications Center (after hours only):

				Drainage Foreman Bill Earp			  590-9054
				Drainage Superintendent 
					Jerry Duffy			  (703) 967-2445
				Director, Env. Engineering
					Dick McElfish                             	  790-1293

			Note:	VDOT handles roads and roadside ditches.
			Note:	During normal working hours, just contact the Environmental Engineering office for response.

SECTION 4
Government agencies to contact for weather and water flow information are listed below:

Corps of Engineers (Norfolk) 	    	     Lane Killam      (804) 441-7562
National Weather Service (Wakefield)	     Bill Sammler     (804) 899-4200
								     or	   (800) 697-3373
National Weather Service (Sterling)	     Barbara Watson   	   (703) 260-0209
National Weather Service (Richmond) 	     Rick Winther     (804) 222-2126
National Weather Service (Blacksburg)	                            (800) 221-2633
SECTION 5
Weather event reporting to the National Weather Service is as follows:

	1.	If personnel have questions regarding potential severe weather, they should call (800)697-3373.
	2.	If severe weather reports are received by agencies other than the National Weather Service, the Senior Battalion Chief will have Emergency Communications relay this information as soon as possible to the National Weather Service at (800)737-8624.  The following examples of severe weather should be reported:

		-	Tornado or funnel cloud
		-	Storm rotation or rotating wall cloud
		-	Hail and its size and depth on the ground
		-	Wind if 50 mph or greater
		-	Heavy rain - 1" or more in a given amount of time, or any indication that flooding may occur
		-	Damage from winds, tornadoes, hail, or floods.  If trees or branches have fallen, try to estimate size and type of tree.
		-	Ice accumulation on surfaces.
		-	Snow accumulation of 4" or more on road and grassy surfaces.
	3.	After the event, personnel should relay any documentation of severe weather to the National Weather Service by telephone or fax at (804) 899-3605.

F. Wesley Dolezal
Chief of Department
CHESTERFIELD FIRE DEPARTMENT

ADDENDUM D TO OPERATIONAL POLICY #13

PROCEDURE FOR EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
DURING  INCLEMENT WEATHER

The procedure described in this addendum should be implemented when severe weather, such as significant winter precipitation, hurricanes, flooding, etc., is forecasted to have an adverse affect on Emergency Operations staffing and service levels.

1.	Department Level Actions Initiated By On-Duty Senior Battalion Chief

	a.	Direct Administrative Officer (AO) to ensure that stations have sufficient resources to staff any first out apparatus responding from their respective stations with minimum of two personnel.  For example:

		-	Engine Company   (2 personnel)
		-	Truck Company    (2 personnel)
		-	Utility Vehicle      (1 personnel)
		-	Ambulance	         (2 personnel)

	b.	Assign available staff to four-wheel drive vehicles for those stations that do not have four-wheel drive brush trucks.  Where possible, use utility vehicles instead of brush trucks for ALS responders to protect ALS equipment.  This will enable the department to reduce engine and truck responses during adverse conditions.

		These assigned vehicles will carry the radio designation of “UTILITY” followed by the respective station number.	 Whenever possible, utility vehicles and brush trucks should be staffed with at least one ALS firefighter or officer and ALS equipment at ALS stations.  Four-wheel drive vehicles will respond in place of engines or trucks to assist ambulances, and for Priority 3 calls for service.  When responding to calls for service, four-wheel drive vehicles should proceed, if possible, ahead of other vehicles as “scouts” to assess conditions and help avoid other vehicles becoming stuck.

	c.	Direct Logistics to distribute tow straps and linch pins to all four-wheel drive units.  Such equipment should be used to assist ambulances and other similar sized fire department vehicles that become stuck.

	d.	Consider staffing the Chain Repair Shop with at least one Chain Repair Technician dedicated solely to repairing chains for Fire and EMS units.  In addition, special arrangements need to be made for disbursing spare chain saws and for servicing all chain saws to assure their availability.

	e.	Direct Emergency Communications to begin:

		-	Reducing response of emergency apparatus to calls for service;
		-	Suspending Flexible Unit Deployment of ambulances equipped with tire chains;
		-	Limiting number of Priority 3 EMS calls to no more than 3 at a time; 
		-	Limiting number of Priority 3 fire calls to no more than 3 at a time due to ice storm, wires down, etc.

	f.	For snow emergencies, initiate snowplowing operations with assigned staffing, using Utility North and Utility South as soon as possible to stay ahead of accumulation.  Vehicles should have plows mounted and be loaded with sand the day prior to expected inclement weather.  Give priority to plowing those fire stations staffing ambulances and rescue squad units. 

	g.	Direct the Administrative Officer to initiate emergency minimum staffing procedures and suspend use of computerized minimum staffing rotation for morning staffing needs.  The AO should attempt to fill vacancies using personnel from the off-going shift at the station where the vacancies exist.  If unable to do so, use the next closest station and so forth.

	h.	Initiate Flexible Shift Change to allow short notice traded time arrangements and allow personnel extra time to reach their duty station.  Allow short notice annual leave, if still available in the Staffing Book, for those personnel unable to report for duty due to severe weather.

	i.	If the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is activated, fill the department’s representative position with an off-duty Battalion Chief.  The on-duty Senior Battalion Chief should go to the Emergency Communications Center to coordinate all county resources.  If the EOC is not activated, and if beneficial, assign an off-duty Battalion Chief to the Emergency Communications Center, to coordinate communications and resource allocation, while allowing on-duty Battalion Chiefs to stay operational in the field.  The Senior Captain in charge of Emergency Communications can also serve in this position.

	j.	For snow/ice conditions, consider establishment of staged ambulances not equipped with tire chains, for use during long transports once main roads are clear of snow or ice.

	k.	The Senior Battalion Chief should notify rescue squad operations officers of the implementation of Section 1, Part B through Section 1, Part E above, as soon as possible.

2.	Fire Station Level Responsibilities - Company Officers will be responsible for the following once the Senior Battalion Chief declares that this policy is in effect.

	a.	Snow emergencies - assure that the primary and spare sets of snow chains are ready for each piece of apparatus that is equipped in their station.  Ambulances should have two spare sets of chains.  Test the operation of the insta-chains.

	b.	Assure that all portable power equipment is serviceable and has adequate fuel available.  This includes, but is not limited to:

		-	Portable power saws, particularly chain saws
		-	Portable generators
		-	Rescue equipment, i.e., Hurst tool power plants and accessories.

	c.	Assure that the station emergency generator is tested, operable and that adequate fuel is on hand.

	d.	Assure that four-wheel drive units, either permanently or temporarily assigned to the station, are equipped for first response duty.  Such units shall be staffed and respond as in Section 1, Part B above.

	e.	Assure adequate diesel fuel and heating fuel supplies are on hand.

			
FIRE TYPE		PRI		DESCRIPTION

 A 90			 2		ALARM ACTIVATION/NO FIRE
includes all alarm activations (i.e: alarm company reporting); if water flow, be sure to note in comments and radio operator will add a truck company. IF CALLER IS AT ACTUAL RESIDENCE OR BUSINESS BE SURE TO ASK IF ANY SMOKE OR FIRE IS VISIBLE

  M 40			 2		MACHINERY ENTRAPMENT
incidents where people are trapped in commercial, industrial, construction or farm machinery which may require specialized stabilization, lifting and manipulation; these incidents may also require the specialized cutting, distorting and/or disassembly of equipment components to rescue or recover a victim(s)

  M 59			 2		MUTUAL AID
includes all mutual aid calls outside of the county (i.e.: Petersburg, Powhatan - Fire and EMS type calls included)

  R 01			 2		REDUCED STRUCTURE
includes all structure fires where a reduced assignment is warranted

  2 01			 2		SPECIAL (FIRE ONLY)
includes any fire not classified in other sections (i.e.: telephone poles, electrical poles, porta-johns, etc.)

  2 13			 2		VEHICLE FIRE
includes any vehicle fire outside of a structure or vehicle fires reported out

  2 14			 2		BRUSH FIRE
includes all woods, grass, trees, field fires and fires of same nature, or out on arrival

  2 15			 2		OUTDOOR/REFUSE
includes all yard storage, fences, etc.

  2 40			 2		HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS
includes standby for downed power lines, transformers, lightning strikes with no fire, hazard control  (not involving 10-50) etc.

  2 41			 2		CHIMNEY FIRE
includes fires that are contained completely within a chimney and does not cause damage to structure. If damage occurs to structure, this should be coded as structure fire

  2 43			 2		EXCESSIVE HEAT
includes calls where there is no evidence of flame production, but there is evidence of melting or excessive heat

  2 61			 2		SMOKE INVESTIGATION
includes all calls where smoke or smell are present (outside only) and fits no other category

PURPOSE

The Severe Storm Response Guidelines are intended to provide an organized system for Chesterfield Fire Department to protect the citizens and visitors from adverse effects of a severe storm.. These guidelines are designed to assign responsibilities and establish procedures for the coordinated effort necessary to provide for the safe, effective, and efficient response to emergencies resulting from severe storms.  The Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Plan should be utilized for additional direction with respect to incident management, government intervention, and the Federal reimbursement process.
	
Chesterfield County is vulnerable to a full range of severe weather.  Severe weather is categorized as: (1) straight-line wind storms (severe thunderstorms, microbursts and macrobursts); (2) storms with rotational winds (tornados); and (3) tropical systems (tropical storms and hurricanes).  The entire geographic area of Chesterfield County is subject to the destructive force of severe storm winds. Because of its location between two major rivers, the County is subject to rapid local and small stream flooding caused by intense severe storm‑associated rainfall. Severe storm winds do much damage, but drowning is the greatest cause of severe storm deaths.

PREPAREDNESS
	
In Central Virginia, the conditions for severe thunderstorm development are most favorable during the early spring and summer months.  Hurricane season, that time most favorable for the development of tropical storm systems, is June through November.  Tropical systems that affect Virginia occur most frequently in August and September.  The month of March is designated for Severe Storm Season Preparation. By March 31st  of each year the department will ensure that  the following activities are completed:
	
Each Operational Battalion Chief will ensure that each of the stations for which they have operational responsibility have completed the following:

•	abUpdated their listing of target hazards that have the potential for multi‑casualty incidents.
•	abUpdated listing of routes for units to use for “windshield assessment” of their first-due district.

The Operational Senior Battalion Chiefs will ensure that the following items are completed:

•	abEnsure that each Battalion Headquarters Office has a full catalog of ICS forms, status boards, extra portable radios, radio batteries, office supplies, etc., to function as a Battalion Command Center.
•	abConduct a pre-season briefing with their respective Battalion Staffs covering these guidelines to ensure that they understand their roles and responsibilities for operations during severe storm emergencies.
•	abEnsure that the Emergency Communications Center has a full catalog of ICS forms, status boards, office supplies, etc., to function as a Battalion Command Center, or Department Command Center if the EOC has not been activated.

Each First-line Supervisor and Middle Manager will ensure that:

•	abEach employee’s personal information is current and correct with the department’s Human Resources Unit in Fire Administration.  The Supervisor prints out a copy of the Department’s Personnel Roster and Phone Number list and keeps in the station.
•	abAll employees have received training on the Severe Storm Response Guidelines and understand their roles and responsibilities.  This training will be documented and records forwarded to the Training and Safety Division.
•	abThe Preparedness Section of the Severe Storm Response Checklist that’s appropriate for their work location has been completed. (See Appendix A)
•	abEach station has a Severe Storm Response Box containing copies of all forms, assessment route map books, spray paint cans, etc. (See Appendix B)
•	abEach emergency response unit is properly equipped with personal protective equipment, and rescue equipment necessary for operations in flooded areas.

The Chief of Maintenance and Logistics will ensure that:

•	abAdequate bulk supplies of items such as plastic sheeting, staples, nails, portable saw supplies, etc., are in stock and ready for distribution to fire stations.
•	abThe division has a current plan to safely, effectively, and efficiently distribute supplies to fire stations, and emergency scenes that does not rely on the resources of the Emergency Operations Division for its implementation.

Severe Storm Watch

When the National Weather Service issues a severe storm watch for Chesterfield County, Chesterfield Fire Department will activate the appropriate sections of these guidelines.   Severe weather can strike quickly and without adequate warning - - be Proactive.

Monitor Weather Conditions - The on-duty Battalion Staff and all First-line Supervisors should begin to closely monitor weather conditions.

•	abRegularly check the Doppler Radar images for information regarding storm strength, movement, anticipated precipitation, and wind speeds.
•	abClosely monitor for physical indicators of severe weather such as “anvil” cloud formations, cloud fronts, “wall” clouds, wind direction, development of lightning, etc., using the National Weather Service Spotter's Guide for Identifying and Reporting Severe Local Storms (Appendix D).  These indicators may be present in local areas of the county before they appear on the Doppler Radar image.  (Keep in mind the Doppler Radar originates in Wakefield, Virginia, a significant distance away from the county)
•	abFirst-line Supervisors should report significant local weather conditions to their respective Battalion Command Team.

The Senior Battalion Chief will increase Emergency Operations Division staffing resources through one, or all, of the following means:

•	abCancellation  non-essential staffing assignments (training, TQI group activity, etc.)
•	abImplementation of  Signal 15-Bravo, Signal 15-Charley to recall volunteer personnel
•	abReassignment of  staff officers and civilian employees
•	abImplementation of Recall of off-duty personnel

Initiate Documentation Process

•	abDuring a severe storm Watch all First-Line Supervisors (career and volunteer), and each Battalion Staff member should begin completing the Unit Log (ICS Form 214). The Unit Log should contain information relating to work hours of personnel, equipment utilized, items purchased, and all information and orders given. Documentation during a large emergency situation is often difficult, but necessary. Written documentation is essential for federal reimbursement and must be done continuously throughout the management of the severe storm emergency.

Identify locations and status of reserve Fire and EMS apparatus

•	abEnsure that units are equipped for emergency response and ready for service either as replacement for front-line apparatus that may become unserviceable, or to be staffed by recalled personnel.

RESPONSE

Severe Storm Conditions
When actual severe storm conditions exist, every attempt will be made by the Chesterfield Fire and EMS continue its primary mission of protecting the lives and property in Chesterfield County. However, it should be remembered that Fire and EMS personnel are subject to the same environmental limitations as are the members of the public.

Situational Assessment

The purpose of situational assessment is to complete a brief rapid assessment of the overall situation, not a thorough detailed assessment of each situation. The information obtained from the impact assessment process will be evaluated to develop incident strategies based on identified priorities.  Situational Assessment shall be completed through a rapid survey conducted in two phases: the “Snapshot” Survey and the “Windshield Assessment”. (See Appendix C for forms).

As soon as possible after the passage of severe weather, environmental conditions permitting, the Senior Battalion Chief will direct all Fire/EMS stations in the county to conduct a  “Snapshot” Survey of their staff, station, apparatus, and area adjacent to the station.  The “Snapshot Survey should evaluate:

•	abStatus of personnel (no injuries, minor injuries, serious injuries)
•	abStatus of equipment and apparatus (in service, in service but need repairs, out of service)
•	abStatus of structural damage to station (none, low, moderate, high, extensive)
•	abVisual observations made by First-line Supervisor making a 360 degree “scan” of the immediate area around their worksite

The First-line Supervisor will document this information on the “Snapshot Assessment” Form.  The Battalion Command Team (BCT) Planning Officer for each battalion will collect the results of this survey during the Fire/EMS Station Roll Call.  The Roll Call will be conducted via telephone if telephone service has not be compromised.  If telephone service is not available, the BCT Planning Officer will conduct the Roll Call using the Information Radio Tac assigned to their respective battalion. (See Communications Section of these Guidelines)  

Following the Roll Call, the BCT Incident Commander(s) will direct units in the area affected by the severe weather will conduct a “Windshield Assessment” of their first-due response area using the pre-defined routes for their district.  Areas known to be affected by the severe weather should be given highest priority.

•	abStatus of target hazards, especially those with potential for multiple casualties,  (none, low, moderate, high, extensive)
•	abStatus of major response routes (none, low, moderate, high, extensive)
•	abStatus of developments (none, low, moderate, high, extensive)

The emphasis is to complete the “Windshield Assessment” as soon as possible.  Do not stop to provide emergency services except in cases where there is a clearly evident life-safety issue that needs your resources, i.e., a victim visibly in need of immediate rescue, a fire that can be quickly knocked down with a mounted master stream device to prevent spread to an occupied structure, etc.  Avoid commitment of the resources of your unit that will prevent you from completing the survey as quickly as possible.

Without the information gathered during the “Windshield Assessment” the Battalion Command Team will not know the true size and magnitude of the incident and will be unable to develop a comprehensive Incident Action Plan. Significant findings concerning damage to target hazards (Impact Estimate Score of 4) and infra-structure (Impact Estimate Score of 4) should be reported to the BCT Planning Officer using the Information Radio Tac assigned to their respective battalion.  All other findings should be documented on the “Windshield Assessment” Log for communication to the Battalion Command Team Planning Officer after the entire survey has been completed.

While conducting the “Windshield Assessment” record non-life threatening medical situations on the “Non-life Threatening Medical Log”. (Appendix C).  Communicate the information on this log to the Battalion Command Team Planning Officer upon completion of the “Windshield Assessment”.

Incident Objectives

The Senior Battalion Chief is responsible for the creation and dissemination of the Incident Action Plan (IAP) for county Fire/EMS emergency operations.  The Senior Battalion Chief should begin preparing the IAP using the following ICS Forms:

•	abForm 201 (Incident Map)
•	abForm 202 (Incident Objectives)
•	abForm 203 (Organization Assignment List) or Form 207 (Organizational Chart)
•	abForm 204 (Division Assignment List)
•	abForm 205 (Communications Plan)
•	abform 206 (Medical Plan)

The IAP should be strategic in nature and address the following issues:

•	abObjectives to be accomplished county-wide
•	abCommand and control structures for the incident
•	abPersonnel resource assignments
•	abResource requirements, allocation, and management
•	abCommunications and information management
•	abIncident Safety issues

Operational Periods-Operational periods should not exceed twelve hours.

•	abThe initial IAP should address the first twelve-hour operational period.  An updated IAP should be completed for the next twelve-hour operational period prior to the current IAP’s expiration.  If the next operational period will involve the on-coming shift, then the new IAP should be completed by the on-coming Senior Battalion Chief and their staff.

Organization

The Senior Battalion Chief will determine the appropriate level of ICS organization needed for the incident based on conditions reported during the Situational Assessment.

Battalion Command Team - The on-duty Battalion Staff should prepare to operate their respective battalions as a Battalion Command Team under the scope of the department’s expanded ICS.  Each Battalion Chief is the Incident Commander for their battalion and is responsible for the Operations, Planning, and Logistical functions in their battalion.  This is the basic command and control structure for those severe weather incidents that affect a single battalion.  The Senior Battalion Chief has the authority and responsibility for the IAP and resource allocation county-wide.  The BCT structure is designed to facilitate better implementation of the IAP, and better information and resource management at the battalion level.

Battalion Command Team Structure

The BCT should operate from the appropriate Battalion Headquarters station, or other physical location that provides sufficient working room, radio access, telephone access, and computer access, i.e., the Public Safety Command Vehicle. (See Position Description Sheets in Appendix E)

Department Command Team - The Department Command Team (DCT) should be activated for those situations that involve multiple battalions, or the entire county.  The Senior Battalion Chief is the Incident Commander for the DCT.  The DCT should operate from the Emergency Communications Center Tactical Control Room, or other physical location that provides sufficient working room, radio access, telephone access, and computer access.

Department Command Team Structure

See Appendix E for Position Job Descriptions

Delivery of Emergency Services

The ECC will continue to dispatch Priority 1 calls for service unless directed to discontinue so by the Senior Battalion Chief due to environmental hazards such as excessively high winds.

After the initial needs of the impact assessment surveys and search and rescue missions are completed, the department may resume the delivery of emergency services. The ECC and the DCT Planning Chief will coordinate the delivery of services, through a priority basis, to those on the existing "waiting list." The DCT Operations Chief will coordinate and announce any modifications to the normal incident reporting system.

When the threat of severe weather striking the county is imminent, or has struck the county, the Senior Battalion Chief has the authority to direct the Emergency Communications Center to do the following:

•	abBegin using “reduced response” dispatch protocols for Priority 1 emergency calls
•	abSuspend the dispatching of any Priority 3 emergency calls.  The ECC will continue to enter the calls into CADS for assignment to the Battalion Command Teams.
•	abSuspend the dispatching of any Priority 2 emergency calls. The ECC will continue to enter the calls into CADS for assignment to the Battalion Command Teams.

Resource Assignment
			
When volunteer personnel respond to Signal 15 Bravo and Signal 15 Charley recalls, the officer in charge of each staffed piece of apparatus will notify the Battalion Command Team Planning Officer for their battalion of their available status.  The BCT Operations Officers may deploy a staffed volunteer resource from a station that has multiple units to a station in need of resources.  The career Officer-in-Charge of a station should utilize volunteer and career personnel in their station to achieve maximum staffing levels on all units.  Split crews are an acceptable option, i.e., moving a career driver/operator to a volunteer unit that lacks a driver, increasing staffing on a career unit with volunteer firefighters, etc.

The Senior Battalion Chief has the authority to cancel annual, holiday, personal and compensatory leave unless the employee is physically out of the state/area and return to Chesterfield County is not feasible. The Senior Battalion Chief may waive this requirement in cases of personal hardship. 

Off-duty personnel who live any area of the county that is affected by severe weather should contact the BCT Planning Officer for their assigned station to report their welfare and that of their family.

If off-duty personnel are recalled to duty, those personnel should notify the BCT Planning Officer for the battalion they are normally stationed in, and report to their assigned duty station.  If they are unable to reach their assigned duty station, then they should notify the BCT Planning Officer for the closest station where they will be able to report for duty..

Staff Officers and other personnel not assigned to the Emergency Operations Division will be assigned to a Battalion Command Team or the Department Command Team.  Those assignments are as follows:

•	abFire and Life Safety Division - Reinforces the North Battalion Command Team at Fire Station 16
•	abTraining and Safety Division - Reinforces the South Battalion Command Team at Fire Station 14
•	abFire Administration Staff (excluding Deputy Chiefs) - Reinforces Central Battalion Command Team at Fire Station 15.
•	abMaintenance and Logistics Division - Reinforces the Department Command Team.
Personnel should report to their assigned BCT when recalled while off duty, or if directed while on duty. If personnel are unable to reach their assigned BCT, they should notify the nearest BCT Planning Officer for reporting instructions.  Personnel will be placed into positions on their respective team, or assigned to staff existing emergency apparatus, or reserve apparatus.

Communications Plan

The Senior Battalion Chief will implement the Communications Plan as quickly as possible before severe weather strikes so as to avoid losing channels because of escalating calls for service.

North Battalion Tac Channels - C, D, E

Tac C - North Battalion Operations
Tac D - Information channel for use to communicate situational assessment information to Battalion Command Planning
Tac E - Available as a tactical channel

Central Battalion Tac Channels - F, G, H

Tac F - North Battalion Operations
Tac G - Information channel for use to communicate situational assessment information to Battalion Command Planning
Tac H - Available as a tactical channel

South Battalion Tac Channels - I, J, K

Tac I - North Battalion Operations
Tac J - Information channel for use to communicate situational assessment information to Battalion Command Planning
Tac K - Available as a tactical channel

Command Staff Tac Channel - O

Incident Safety

Personnel should be cognizant of the safety issues that can accompany severe weather.  High winds, torrential rains, lightning, and hail present significant physical hazards to the public and responders alike.

High Winds

•	abWhen sustained winds reach 50 MPH all small vehicles (staff vehicles, ambulances, etc.) will be directed to cease operations and return to quarters
•	abWhen sustained winds reach 60 MPH all large vehicles (engines, trucks, crash trucks, etc.) will be directed to cease operations and return to quarters.
•	abPersonnel should wear their helmet and eye protection at all times due to the potential for flying debris.

Torrential Rains

•	abHeavy rains can quickly turn local streams and creeks into raging waterways.
•	abPersonnel should avoid driving through high water unless they are certain as to the structural integrity of the road surface.
•	abPersonnel operating near moving water must wear the appropriate personal protective equipment and personal floatation device.  Structural firefighting PPE is not appropriate and its use should be avoided when at all possible when working around moving water.

Lightning

•	abAll incident operations should cease in any area where visual weather patterns indicate that lightning is possible, especially if lightning has been spotted in the area.  Personnel should seek appropriate shelter until the danger has passed and the Incident Commander issues the order to resume operations.

Other Safety Concerns

•	abDowned utility lines
•	abGas leaks
•	abUnsafe structures
•	abHazardous materials
•	abTraumatized animals
•	abHeat stress

Search and Rescue Missions

Based on degree of structural damage reported during the jurisdictional survey, Field Operations personnel may be directed to complete search and rescue missions. No search and rescue mission will take place prior to the completion of a systematic recon and safety survey. The main concern of the recon and safety survey is the safety of both the rescuers assigned to the search and rescue mission and the victims. The results of the search and rescue missions will be  reported to the Operations Officer at the Battalion Command Team.

In areas where minor structural damage is noted, search and rescue missions will usually involve a door-to-door search to determine the status of each occupant. Occupants should be instructed as to the location of an emergency shelter and mass care distribution site if established. In areas where moderate structural damage is noted, search and rescue missions will be performed in accordance with the standard USAR procedures (Appendix F). The objectives for these search and rescue missions is to perform damage and hazard assessment, locate surface victims and identify points of immediate access. In areas where structural damage is classified as destroyed, search and rescue missions will be limited to the USAR marking system only.
								
FEMA has established several State/National USAR Task Force teams throughout the nation. All US&R Task Force activities coordinate through the state Department of Emergency Services (DES) who serves as the primary point of contact for FEMA. A USAR Task Force is also a state resource which can be requested without a request for federal assistance. Each USAR Task Force team is comprised of 62 persons specifically trained and equipped for large or complex USAR operations. Each USAR team is able to deploy within 6 hours of notification and is self-sufficient for the first 3 days.

MUTUAL AID ASSISTANCE
During the response phase of a disaster, it may become necessary to request the assistance of fire/EMS providers from outside the affected disaster area, in a mutual aid approach. The Senior Battalion Chief is responsible for authorizing the use of mutual aid assistance and executing prior approved mutual aid agreements.

Appendix A - Severe Storm Response Preparedness Checklist

Fire/EMS Station:______________________			Date:_________________

Item	Prepardeness Phase	Watch Phase	
Personnel	Q Update Personal Information with Human Resource Unit in Fire Administration		
Severe Storm Response Guidelines	Q Deliver continuing education class on plan with personnel and send documentation to Training and Safety Division	Q Conduct review of company level operations under plan	
Station Generators	Q Ensure that unit has received preventive maintenance	Q Start generator and ensure that all circuits are operating properly	
Propane Supplies	Q Maintain at 40% level	Q Ensure supply is at 40% level	
Diesel Fuel Supplies	Q Maintain tank at 80% level	Q Ensure that supply is at 80% level	
Facilities and Grounds	Q Ensure that any outstanding exterior work orders are completed	Q Secure or store any exterior equipment or facilities	
Station Supply Inventories	Q Ensure that all inventories of consumable supplies are at maximum levels.	Q Verify levels of supplies	
Target Hazard Lists	Q Update list based on potential for life hazards		
“Windshield Assessment” Routes	Q Ensure that route maps are current	Q Review routes with personnel	
Severe Storm Response Box	Q Station has a containing copies of all forms, assessment route map books, spray paint cans, etc	Q Place Severe Storm Response Box aboard each emergency response unit	
Water Rescue Equipment	Q Each emergency response unit is properly equipped with personal protective equipment, and rescue equipment necessary for operations in flooded areas.		

Appendix B - Severe Storm Response Box for Worksites

Every Fire/EMS station will have a Severe Storm Response Box provided for each emergency response vehicle in that station.  The box will contain the following items:

•	abList of target hazards with potential for multiple casualty situations
•	abMap book of “Windshield Assessment” routes for the station
•	abSupply of “Snapshot Assessment” Logs
•	abSupply of “Windshield Assessment” Logs
•	abSupply of “Non-life Threatening Medical Record” Logs
•	abCopies of the “Impact Estimate Guide”
•	ab2- Forms Clipboards
•	abA copy of the USAR “Structural Triage, Assessment and Marking System”
•	abPens and pencils
•	ab3-Cans of International Orange Spray paint

Appendix C - Situational Assessment Forms

“Snapshot Assessment” Log

1.	abStatus of Personnel

Name	Assignment/Shift	No Injuries	Minor Injuries	Serious Injuries	

					

					

					

II. Status of Equipment and Apparatus

Equipment/Apparatus	In Service	Need Repairs	Out of Service	

				

				

III.	Status of Structural Damage to Station

Address	Station #	None-0	Low-1	Mod-2	High-3	Exten-4	

Completed By:	Station:	Date:	

“Windshield Assessment” Log

I.	Status of Target Hazards				Structural Damage

Address	Target Hazard	None-0	Low-1	Mod-2	High-3	Exten-4	

							

							

II.	Status of Major Routes				Flooding and Infra-Structure

Roadway	Cross Street	None-0	Low-1	Mod-2	High-3	Exten-4	

							

							

III.	Status of Subvisions				Structural Damage

Development Name	Map Page	None-0	Low-1	Mod-2	High-3	Exten-4	

							

							

Completed By:	Station:	Date:	

IMPACT ESTIMATE GUIDE

DIRECTIONS:
The Damage Estimate should be considered from a jurisdictional standpoint. Level of damage should be identified by the numerical value which best describes the level of damage suffered by the majority of the structures and/or infrastructure within each station’s primary response zone.

Structural Damage

1	Low	Minor damage to roof coverings and/or accessory structures such as screens enclosures, awnings, etc.	
2	Moderate	Structures are basically intact with the exception of roof coverings and wall siding, shutters, etc., missing or damaged	
3	High	Portions of roof missing and structure open to weather, walls mostly intact with the exception of openings, extensive damage to accessory structures	
4	Extensive	Roof and/or walls missing and open to weather, buildings and accessory structures destroyed	

Flooding Damage

1	None	Some minor street and yard flooding	
2	Low	Random street and yard flooding	
3	Moderate	Flooding above finished floors of buildings, streets may be impassable due to flooding	
4	Extensive	Flooding above finished floors with standing water present in buildings	

Infra-structure Damage

1	None	Minor debris and tree limbs in roads, all roads remain open	
2	Low	Some debris, utility lines and flooding of streets, some roads with limited access	
3	Moderate	Secondary roads are impassable due to debris, utility poles, lines, and/or trees down and flooding, major roads have limited access	
4	Extensive	Major roads and bridges are impassable due to trees, utility poles and lines down and/or flooding and erosion	

NON-LIFE THREATENING MEDICAL RECORD

DATE :___________			LOCATION: ______________		UNIT: _______________

TIME	NAME
LAST, FIRST, M.I.	SEX	AGE	MEDICAL PROBLEM
COMPLAINT	TREATMENT
RENDERED	DISPOSITION	

							

							

							

							

							

							

Appendix D - National Weather Service Spotter's Guide for Identifying and Reporting Severe Local Storms

PLEASE NOTE: THE FIGURES REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME....WE ARE WORKING ON IT! Use of this Guide:The information which is contained in this guide is not sufficient to qualify you as a SKYWARN spotter. Rather, it is provided as a reference source to supplement the National Weather Service's spotter training film and slide series. It has been compiled for use by trained spotters in the field and communications specialists who receive and relay the reports. It is not a general handout for the public. As a result of its specialized subject matter, a number of technical terms are used. Their meanings are explained in the text or in the glossary. 
I. Severe Thunderstorms
All thunderstorms are capable of producing tornadoes. In coastal areas, waterspouts and weak funnels frequently form in areas of weak shower activity. While these are dangerous and should be reported, they usually are not preceded by the cloud structures described in this guide. Strong to violent tornadoes are usually associated with what we shall call the Tornadic Thunderstorm. Other significant tornadoes do occasionally occur with Squall Line Thunderstorms. In the following sections, we will review the extremely important cloud features which commonly precede tornado and severe weather events. 
A. The Tornadic Thunderstorm:
These thunderstorms are usually separated from other thunderstorms or may even be isolated. This separation allows them to feed upon warm moist air from miles around. Figure 1 is a representation of a tornadic thunderstorm as a spotter might see it when located east of the storm, looking west. The storm is generally moving from the left to the right. The main updraft of warm moist air is entering the storm at cloud base below the Main Storm Tower. Strong winds aloft are blowing from the southwest to northeast. Air in the upper portion of the updraft eventually becomes colder than the surrounding air. At this level the cloud spreads out rapidly, forming an Anvil Clould. As precipitation begins to occur, downdrafts are created. 

Figure 2 is a view of the same storm and its associated weather from above, looking down. The intense updraft, which is rising out of the drawing, is located within the main storm tower as shown by the scalloped lines in a semicircle surrounding the medium blue areas. The downdraft air sinks to the ground in the area where precipitation is falling, mainly to the north and northeast of the updraft. A second downdraft forms just southwest of the updraft. This is the area, near the intersection of the updraft and this "rear-flank" downdraft, where the tornado is most likely to occur. Large hail is likely to fall just outside the updraft core, mainly northeast of the updraft. Tornadoes may also form along the Gust Front and Flanking Line, these are usually weak and short-lived. 
Looking back at Figure 1, we can see the primary features to look for at the cloud base. The Flanking Line Towers, Collar Cloud, and Tail cloud are explained in the glossary.

The three features of primary importance are the Rain Free Base, Wall Cloud, and Precipitation Area. In Figure 3, we are west of the storm looking east-southeast and the storm is moving to the left.
The heavy rain area to the left tells us where a main downdraft is located. The Rain Free Base extends from under the Main Storm Tower (which is tilted slightly to the left by the upper level winds) to the Flanking Line Towers. The lowering of the cloud base near the center is a Wall Cloud. The Wall Cloud is usually in the southwest portion of the storm within several miles of the rain area. Not all Wall Clouds rotate. Nevertheless, a rotating Wall Cloud usually precedes significant tornado development from minutes to over an hour. Be alert to the fact that some tornadoes may develop from the Rain Free Base itself. 
B. The Tornado:
Tornadoes vary greatly in appearance and intensity, ranging from the violent type (pictured on the cover) to the very weak and short-lived ones that last only a few seconds. In addition, a tornado's appearance frequently changes during its life cycle. Figure 4 shows a multiple vortex tornado which is composed of several small but intense vortices which revolve around a common center. These small vortices may develop and dissipate very quickly. At times, rainfall is drawn into the tornado's circulation, making it very difficult to see. While this is common in the southeast United States, it is not limited to that area as illustrated by the Kansas tornado in figure 5. In Figure 6, we see a tornadic dust whirl. It should no be confused with a dust devil which usually occurs on nearly cloudless and warm days having light winds. The first stage of tornado development is often a dust whirl at the ground with or without a funnel aloft. The tornadic dust whirl in Figure 6 did not develop beyond this initial stage. It is common for flanking line dust whirls to form along the gust front; these generally remain weak and short lived.
C. The Life Cycle of a Tornado:
In Figure 7, we are looking west and can see the typical pattern: Rain Free Base, Wall Cloud, and Precipitation Area. The Wall Cloud is located in the southwest quadrant of the storm, and formed 30 minutes prior to the tornado. In Figure 8, what appears to be a funnel cloud is visible under the left portion of the Wall Cloud. In fact, this is a tornado because damage was occurring at the ground even though it is too far to see the surface debris. In such a situation, you should properly report this as a funnel cloud, along with the fact that it is too far away for you to determine if it is on the ground. Report what you see, along with any additional remarks which would make the report more useful.
In Figure 9, the circulation becomes visible all the way to the ground. The thin, "needle-tipped" shape is common for a tornado in this early stage. The tornado reaches its mature stage in Figure 10, with its width at the surface expanding to 1/4 mile. Note the Tail Cloud forming to the right. We have changed position in Figure 11 and are looking southeast as the tornado moves away from the town of Union City, Oklahoma. The tornado is shrinking rapidly into the "rope stage," but is still very destructive.
During the latter portion of a tornado's life, it is common for it to decrease in size (not necessarily in intensity) and become increasingly tilted.
D. The Squall Line Thunderstorms:
Figure 12 is a view of a squall line as seen from above. Precipitation is shown in the diagram's central area, the gust front is the white line with teeth, and the anvil edge is in light blue. While any hail which may occur is usually smaller that occurring in the tornadic thunderstorm and considerably fewer tornadoes result, strong straight-line winds are common with squall lines. 
The strongest winds usually occur a few minutes after the gust front passage, just before or just after rain and hail begin. If tornadoes occur, they are generally weak, short-lived, and are found along the gust front. Occasionally, a tornadic thunderstorm will develop in association with a squall line. The most distinctive cloud associated with the squall line is the Shelf Cloud, shown in Figure 12. It is usually located above the squall line gust front. An individual tornadic thunderstorm or even an isolated non-severe thunderstorm may at times develop a shelf cloud associated with its gust front. Before we look closer at the shelf cloud, let's take a look at a vertical cross section of the squall line from point A to B in Figure 12. This is shown in Figure 13. Note that the squall line thunderstorm has a significantly different structure than the tornadic thunderstorm. In Figure 13, the squall line is moving from left to right. Updrafts form a nearly continuous curtain along the leading edge above the gust front. Downdrafts are located in the precipitation area to the rear. Thus the updraft-rainy downdraft orientation is reversed from that of the tornadic thunderstorm. 
In Figure 14, we are looking west at 3 layers of cloud near the south end of a gust front. The lowest band of cloud is a shelf cloud. This cloud is wedge-shaped and smooth and sometimes appears layered. As the squall line passes overhead, shown in Figure 15, gusty winds and a sharp drop in temperature can be expected. Upward motion is along the leading edge and downward motion along the trailing edge of the shelf cloud. Cloud base behind the gust front is often very turbulent, as shown here. Less common than the shelf cloud is a Roll Cloud. In Figure 16 it is seen as the detached tube shaped cloud. It can often be seen to rotate slowly about a horizontal axis. Like the shelf cloud, it may indicate the leading edge of a zone of strong straight-line winds. Because of its horizontal rotation, it may be mistaken for a tornado. Let's look at some other structures that are frequently falsely reported as tornadoes. 
E. Tornado Look-Alikes:
Virga or rain shafts are often reported as tornadoes. In figure 17, we see a developing rain shaft, which is fuzzy in appearance. An intense rain column, as in Figure 18, can be more difficult. Although it looks similar to the violent tornado on the cover of this guide, its edges are much less distinct. Mammatus clouds, as seen in Figure 19, are often mistaken for tornadoes. While mammatus often accompany severe thunderstorms (see figure 1), they are not severe in themselves and may also accompany non-severe thunderstorms.
The feature most often mistaken for a tornado is a scud cloud. These are ragged, low cloud fragments which usually are not attached to the cloud base. When the scud is attached to the cloud base as in Figure 20, it is very difficult to distinguish it from a wall cloud or tornado. In this example, and for all tornado look-alikes, the key is to LOOK FOR ORGANIZED AND SUSTAINED ROTATION ABOUT A NEARLY VERTICAL AXIS. 

Additional Tips for Skywarn Spotters
The first sign of a tornado may not be a funnel at the cloud base. Your first clue may be debris or dust at the surface, so be alert to events at ground level, as well as in the clouds. At night, lightning flashes can aid in identifying the Rain Free Base, Wall Cloud, and Precipitation Area.

Although a loud roar is frequently associated with a tornado, strong straight-line winds can also produce such a sound. 
If you spot from a fixed location, use a map to determine distances and directions to known landmarks such as water towers, TV towers, etc. This will help you estimate distance and direction in your reports. Mobile spotters should always have up-to-date maps and be familiar with the area in which they are operating. 
When available, use binoculars to look for rotation and other cloud features. Once you spot a funnel, tornado, or wall cloud, be alert for the formation of others in the area. 
If you find yourself in large hail, remember you are in or near the area where tornado formation is most likely in a tornadic thunderstorm. 
Always follow the basic safety rules. In open country, a spotter may be able to use his knowledge of the tornado's motion and available escape routes to drive away from the tornado safely. In urban area this is usually not possible because of traffic congestion.
Spotter Aids
Estimating Hail Size:

 pea size	1/4 inch	
marble size	1/2 inch	
dime size	3/4 inch	
quarter size	1 inch	
golf ball size	1.75 inch	
baseball size	2.75	
ESTIMATING WIND SPEEDS *(miles per hour)

 25-31	Large branches in motion; whistling heard in telephone wires	
		
32-38	Whole trees in motion; inconvenience felt walking against wind	
		
39-54	Twigs break off trees; wind generally impedes progress	
		
55-72	Damage to chimneys and TV antenna; pushes over shallow rooted trees	
		
73-112	Peels surface off roofs; windows broken; light trailer houses pushed or overturned; moving automobiles pushed off roads	
		
113-157	Roofs torn off houses; weak buildings and trailer houses destroyed; large trees snapped and uprooted 	
		
158 & up	Severe damage:cars lifted off ground	
		
*Adapted from the Beaufort and Fujita Wind Scales. 
National Weather Service Storm Spotter's Glossary and Supplemental Guide
Accessory Clouds 
Clouds that are dependent on a larger cloud system for development and continuance. Accessory clouds associated with the thunderstorm include roll, shelf, mammatus, and wall clouds. 
Anvil 
The spreading of the upper portion of a cumulonimbus cloud into an anvil-shaped plume usually of fibrous or smooth appearance. Strong or severe thunderstorms often have thicker anvils with the side and bottom having a cumuliform or slowly boiling appearance in the immediate vicinity of the parent cumulonimbus. 
Collar Cloud 
Frequently used as a synonym for a wall cloud although it actually is a generally circular ring of cloud surrounding the upper portion of a wall cloud. 
Cumulonimbus Cloud 
The parent cloud of a thunderstorm. The cumulonimbus cloud towers above ordinary cumulus clouds, with stronger or severe storms often having a more sharply outlined "hard" appearance with relatively rapid rising motions visible. The cloud's upper portion includes the anvil. Accompanying precipitation is often heavy and the usual occurrences of lightning and thunder with these clouds leads to the popular names of thunderhead or thundercloud. See also Thunderstorm. 
Cumulus Cloud 
A column of rising air that has condensed into a dense, nonfibrous cloud with distinct outlines, appearing much like a rising mound, a dome, or cauliflower. The base of the cloud is relatively flat and dark, while the tower is usually white and sunlit. The cumulus cloud is the first stage of a developing thunderstorm, although most cumulus do not form thunderstorms. 
Downdraft 
A column of generally cool air that rapidly sinks to the ground, most often accompanied by precipitation in a shower or thunderstorm. Areas of downdraft usually contain little cloud, and what clouds that may be present are typically dissipating. 
Flanking Line 
A line of cumulus connected to and extending outward from the most active portion of a parent cumulonimbus, usually found on the southwest side of the storm. The cloud line has roughly a stair step appearance with the taller clouds adjacent to the parent cumulonimbus. It is most frequently associated with strong or severe thunderstorms. 
Flash Flooding 
Flooding that develops very quickly on streams and river tributaries usually as a result of thunderstorms. Sometimes the onset of flash flooding comes before the end of heavy rains. There is little time between the detection of flood conditions and the arrival of the flood crest. Swift action is essential to the protection of life and property. 
Front 
A transition zone between two differing air masses. Basic frontal types are (1) COLD FRONT where cooler air advances replacing warmer air; (2) WARM FRONT- warmer air advances replacing cooler air; (3) STATIONARY FRONT- warmer air meeting cooler air with neither air mass moving appreciably. Thunderstorms can form in association with any of these fronts. However, fronts are not necessary for thunderstorm development. 

Funnel Cloud 
A funnel-shaped cloud extending from a towering cumulus or cumulonimbus base. It is associated with a rotating air column that is not in contact with the ground. The cloud is a tornado if a ground-based debris or dust whirl is visible below the funnel aloft. 
Gust Front 
The leading edge of the thunderstorm downdraft air. The gust front is most prominent beneath the rain-free base and on the leading edge of an approaching thunderstorm. It is usually marked by gusty cool winds, and sometimes blowing dust. The gust front often precedes the thunderstorm precipitation by several minutes. The shelf or roll cloud sometimes accompanies the gust front, especially when the gust front precedes a line of thunderstorms. 
Hail 
Precipitation in the form of balls or clumps of ice, produced by thunderstorms. Severe storms with intense updrafts are the most likely large hail producers. 
Hook Echo 
A radar pattern sometimes observed in the southwest quadrant of a tornadic thunderstorm. Appearing like the number six or a fishhook turned in toward the east, the hook echo is precipitation aloft around the periphery of a rotating column of air 2-10 miles in diameter. The hook echo is often found in a local area favorable for tornado development. However, many tornadoes occur without a hook echo and not all hook echoes produce tornadoes. 
Lightning 
Any and all of the various forms of visible electrical discharge caused by thunderstorms. Severe thunderstorms usually have very frequent and sometimes nearly continuous lightning. However, some non-severe thunderstorms also contain frequent and vivid electrical displays, while some severe storms are accompanied by little lightning. 
Mamma Clouds 
Also called mammatus, these clouds appear as hanging, rounded protuberances or pouches on the under surface of a cloud. With thunderstorms, mammatus are seen on the underside of the anvil. These clouds do not produce tornadoes, funnels, hail, or any other type of severe weather, although they often accompany severe thunderstorms. 
Precipitation Shaft 
A visible column of rain and/or hail falling from a cloud base. When viewed against a light background, heavy precipitation appears very dark gray, sometimes with a turquoise tinge. This turquoise tinge has been commonly attributed to hail but its actual cause is unknown. 

Rain-Free Base 
A horizontal, dark cumulonimbus base that has no visible precipitation beneath it. This structure usually marks the location of the thunderstorm updraft. Tornadoes most commonly develop (1) from wall clouds that are attached to the rain-free base, or (2) from the rain-free base itself. This is particularly true when the rain-free base is observed to the south or southwest of the precipitation shaft. 
River Flood 
Usually occurs on rivers, after flash flooding has occurred on streams and tributaries. River floods develop and reach their peak more slowly than flash floods. In many cases the river flood peak occurs after the rain has ended. 
Roll Cloud 
A relatively rare, low-level, horizontal, tube-shaped accessory cloud completely detached from the cumulonimbus base. When present, it is located along the gust front and most frequently observed on the leading edge of a line of thunderstorms. The roll cloud will appear to be slowly "rolling" about its horizontal axis. Roll clouds are not and do not produce tornadoes. 
Scud Clouds 
Low cloud fragments often seen in association with and behind thunderstorm gust fronts. These clouds are ragged and wind torn and are not usually attached to the thunderstorm base. Scud clouds do not produce severe weather. In some cases, when scud clouds are attached to the thunderstorm base they can be mistaken for wall clouds or tornadoes. 
Severe Thunderstorm 
A thunderstorm that goes from the mature stage to the severe stage before dissipating. Severe thunderstorms are most efficient "machines" because the updraft remains strong for a long time. They also occasionally contain rotations on a broad scale. Because of its structure, the severe storm may last for hours beyond the lifetime of a normal thunderstorm while producing large hail, high winds, torrential rain, and possible tornadoes. Officially, a thunderstorm is classified as severe if 50 knot (58 MPH) winds are measured, 3/4 inch or larger hail occurs, or funnel clouds or tornadoes develop. 
Straight Winds 
Winds associated with a thunderstorm, most frequently found with the gust front. These winds originate as downdraft air reaches the ground and rapidly spreads out becoming strong horizontal flow. Damaging straight winds, although relatively rare themselves, are much more common than are tornadoes. 
Shelf Cloud 
A low-level horizontal accessory cloud that frequently appears to be wedge-shaped as it approaches. It is usually attached to the thunderstorm base and forms along the gust front. The leading edge of the shelf is often smooth and at times layered or terraced. It is most often seen along the leading edge of an approaching line of thunderstorms, accompanied by gusty straight winds as it passes overhead and followed by precipitation. The underside is concave upward, turbulent, boiling, or wind-torn. Tornadoes rarely occur with the shelf cloud. 
Squall Line 
Any line or narrow band of active thunderstorms. The term is usually used to describe solid or broken lines of strong or severe thunderstorms. 
Tail Cloud 
A low tail-shaped cloud extending outward from the northern quadrant of a wall cloud. Motions in the tail cloud are toward the wall cloud with rapid updraft at the junction of tail and wall cloud. This horizontal cloud is not a funnel or tornado. 
Thunderstorm 
A local storm (accompanied by lightning and thunder) produced by a cumulonimbus cloud, usually with gusty winds, heavy rain, and sometimes hail. Non-severe thunderstorms rarely have lifetimes over two hours. A typical, non-severe thunderstorm life cycle consists of three stages: (1) CUMULUS STAGE-- warm, moist air rises (updraft) and condenses into tiny water droplets which make up the visible cloud. (2) MATURE STAGE-- the cloud grows above the freezing level; precipitation forms and becomes heavy enough to fall back to earth. This precipitation generates cool air which also sinks back to earth with the precipitation. (3) DISSIPATION STAGE-- Cool rain and downdraft spread throughout the storm replacing the updraft which is the lifeblood of the thunderstorm. The visible cumulonimbus cloud becomes softer in appearance, less distinctly outlined or "fuzzy" and dissipates, sometimes leaving only the high anvil cloud, as the storm rains itself out. 
Tornado 
A violently rotating narrow column of air in contact with the ground and extending from a thunderstorm base. The tornado is most often found in the southwest quadrant of the storm, near the trailing edge of the cumulonimbus cloud. Tornadoes and funnel clouds are usually pendant from (1) wall clouds, or (2) directly from the thunderstorm base, within a few miles to the southwest of the precipitation shaft. The spinning motion of a tornado is most often left to right on the front side and right to left on the backside (counterclockwise). Tornadoes have been called twisters and cyclones, but these words are all synonyms for the most violent storm on earth, with estimated wind speeds up to 300 mph. 
Updraft 
Warm moist air which rises and condenses into a visible cumulus or cumulonimbus cloud. Once the cloud forms, it depends on the updraft for continuance and further development. 
Virga 
Wisps or streaks of rain falling out of a cloud but not reaching the earth's surface. When seen from a distance, these streaks can be mistaken for funnels or tornadoes. 

Wall Clouds 
A local and often abrupt lowering of a rain-free cumulonimbus base into a low-hanging accessory cloud, from 1 to 4 miles in diameter. The wall cloud is usually situated in the southwest portion of the storm below an intense updraft, marked by the main cumulonimbus cloud and associated with a very strong or severe thunderstorm. When seen from within several miles, many wall clouds exhibit rapid upward motion and rotation in the same sense as a tornado, except with considerably slower speed. 
A rotating wall cloud usually develops before tornadoes or funnel clouds by a time which can range from a few minutes up to possibly an hour. Spotters should key on any lowering of the cumulonimbus base as suspect wall cloud, particularly when it is located southwest of the precipitation shaft. Wall clouds should be reported. NOTE: Sometimes other low-hanging accessory clouds are mistakenly identified as wall clouds. 
Warning 
(Issued for tornadoes, severe thunderstorm, flash flood, river flood.) A warning is issued when severe weather has already developed and has been reported by spotters or indicated by radar. Warnings are statements of imminent danger and are issued for relatively small areas near and downstream from the severe storm or flood. 
Watch 
(Issued for tornado, severe thunderstorm, flash flood.) A watch identifies a relatively large area in which flash floods or severe storms might occur. Watches are quite often issued before any severe weather has developed. Severe thunderstorm and tornado watches usually include an area 140 miles wide by about 200 miles long. The watch is only an indication of where and when the severe weather probabilities are the highest, and should not be confused with a warning. 

Appendix E - Expanded ICS Structure Position Descriptions

Battalion Command Team 
	
The Incident Commander will:

•	abDevelop the Battalion Action Plan (ICS Form 202) for each operational period in concert with the county-wide Incident Action Plan.
•	abIdentify personnel within each Battalion that will be assigned to the Battalion Command staff.
•	abDistribute the information packet indicating the assignment, function and responsibilities to each member of the Battalion Command Team. Each individual will review this information and report via phone to their counterpart at Department Command. (i.e.: Battalion Logistics Officer will report to the Logistics Chief  at Department Command). 
•	abDevelop the Communications Plan for the Battalion using ICS Forms 205 and 216.

The Operations Officer will:

•	abImplement the Battalion Action Plan for the battalion
•	abCoordinate the allocation of resources to incidents within the battalion
•	abDocument assignments and allocation of resources using ICS Form 204

The Planning Officer will:

•	abReceive situational assessment reports from units in the Battalion
•	abBegin documentation of the incident organization and resource deployment using ICS Forms 201 and 203 (or 207)

•	abMake recommendations for alteration of the Battalion Action Plan
•	abUpdate to the Situation/Status Report each operational period using ICS Form 209.

The Logistics Officer will:

·	Identify battalion logistical needs in concert with Operations and Planning.
!	Begin documentation of logistical requests and arrival of resources using ICS Form 211.
·	Request provisions for basic necessities (i.e.: cots, water, portable generators, portable toilets, additional maps, etc.) from the Logistics Chief. Coordinates emergency purchasing agreements with Finance Chief.

The Finance Officer will:
·	Ensure all work sites authorized with petty cash shall maintain the full limit ($200).

The Information Officer will:
·	Coordinate with Information Chief for the release of information.
·	Relay pertinent information to personnel within the battalion regarding the status of severe storm and actions taken by the department.

Department Command Team

The Incident Commander will:
·	Conduct a briefing for those personnel assigned to the Department Command Team and distribute the organizational chart identifying assignments.
·	Distribute assignment packets outlining assignments, functions, and responsibilities 
·	Develop the Incident Action Plan for each operational period using ICS Form 202.

•	abDevelop the Communications Plan for the county using ICS Forms 205 and 216.

The Operations Chief will:

•	abCoordinate allocation of emergency response resources in concert with the Battalion Command Team Operations Officers
•	abWork towards implementation of the county-wide Incident Action Plan
•	abDocument assignments and allocation of resources using ICS Form 204

The Planning Chief will: 

•	abReceive status reports from the Battalion Command Planning Officers and maintain current situation status information for the county
•	abBegin documentation of the incident organization and resource deployment using ICS Forms 201 and 203 (or 207)
•	abMake recommendations for alteration of the county-wide Incident Action Plan
•	abUpdate to the Situation/Status Report each operational period using ICS Form 209.

The Logistics Chief will:

·	Respond to resource requests the Battalion Command Logistics Officers
·	Coordinate emergency purchasing agreements with Finance Chief.
·	Prepare resource contingency lists using ICS Form 218.

The Finance Chief will:

·	Distribute to all Battalions/Divisions sufficient copies of the Unit Log (ICS Form 214).
·	Review procedures with County Finance for the emergency purchase of necessary items.
•	abObtain listing of potential supplies and vendors, and contact persons. 
·	Ensure all work sites authorized with petty cash are maintained at the full limit ($200).
·	Ensure that the department petty cash is  maintained at the full limit ($500).
·	Coordinate with the Emergency Operations Center regarding all requirements necessary for future reimbursement from the Federal Emergency Disaster Assistance program.

The Liaison Chief will:

·	Respond to requests from personnel for inter‑agency contacts.
·	Update Liaison Resource List indicating potential assisting/cooperating agencies and representatives (i.e.: American Red Cross, National Guard, Division of Emergency Medical Services, etc.)

The Information Chief will:

·	Coordinate with County Public Information Officer (at Emergency Operations Center) for the release of information to the media.
·	Communicate pertinent information to work locations within the department as to the status of the severe weather and the actions taken by the department.

 Appendix F - USAR “Structural Triage, Assessment and Marking System

Structure Triage, Assessment & Marking System

Structure/Hazards Evaluation Marking
Personnel conducting structure searches will outline a 2' X 2' square box at any entrance accessible for entry into any compromised structure. Aerosol cans of spray paint (International Orange only) will be used for this marking system. It is important to mark all normal entry points into a building under evaluation to ensure that personnel approaching the building can identify that it has been evaluated and discern its condition.

Specific markings will be clearly made inside the box to indicate the condition of the structure and any hazards at the time of this assessment. Normally the square box would be made immediately adjacent to the entry point identified as safe. An arrow will be placed next to the box indicating the direction of the safe entrance if the Structure/Hazard marking must be made somewhat remote from the safe entrance.

The depiction of the various markings as are follows:

•	abStructure is accessible and safe for search and rescue operations. Damage is minor or the structure is completely pancaked with little danger of further collapse.

/	
Structure is significantly damaged. Some areas are relatively safe, but other areas may need shoring, bracing, or removal of falling and collapse hazards.

: Structure is not safe for search and rescue operations and may be subject to sudden additional collapse. Remote search operations may proceed at significant risk. If rescue operations are undertaken, safe haven areas and rapid evacuation routes should be created.

	³ 	Arrow located next to a marking box indicates the direction to the safe entrance to the structure, should the marking box need to be made remote from the indicated entrance.

	HM	Indicates that a hazardous material condition exists in or adjacent to the structure. Personnel may be in jeopardy. Consideration for operations should be made in conjunction with a Hazardous Materials Technician. Type of hazard may also be noted.

Structure/Hazards Evaluation Marking (continued)
 The following information; Time, Date, and Unit ID will also be noted outside the box at the  upper right-hand side.
		
All personnel must be aware of the possibility, and look for other Structure/Hazards Evaluation markings made on the interior of the building. In addition, as each subsequent assessment is performed throughout the course of te mission, a new Time, Date. And Unit ID entry will be made below the previous entry, or a completely new marking box will be made if the original information is now incorrect.

The following illustration shows the various components of the Structure/Hazards Evaluation marking system:	
				7/1/99 1300 hrs
				HM - natural gas
				CFD-34
		  :		
		         ³

The depiction above indicates that a safe point of entry exists to the left of the marking (possibility a window, upper floor, etc.). The single slash across the box indicates the structure is not safe for search and rescue operations and may be subject to sudden additional collapse. The assessment was made on July 1, 1999 at 1:00 p.m.. There is an apparent indication of natural gas in the structure. This evaluation was made by Chesterfield Fire Department, Unit 34.

It should be noted that marking boxes would be placed in each of the specific areas within the structure (i.e: hallways, rooms, stairwells, etc.) To indicate conditions in separate parts of the building.

Search Assessment Marking
A separate and distinct marking system is necessary to conspicuously denote information relating to the victim location determinations in the areas searched. This separate Search Assessment marking system is designed to be used in conjunction with the Structure/Hazards Evaluation marking system. Personnel performing the search function will draw an “X” that is 2' X 2' in size with International Orange spray paint. The X will be constructed in two operations - one slash drawn upon entry into the structure (or room, hallway, etc.) And a second crossing slash upon exit.
'	Single slash drawn upon entry to a structure or area indicates search operations are currently in progress.

	V	Crossing slash drawn upon search personnel exit from the structure or area.

Search Assessment Marking (continued)
Distinct markings will be made inside the four quadrants of the X to clearly denote the search status and findings at the time of this assessment. The following illustrations define the Search Assessment Marks:	

CFD-34  V	  Left Quadrant - FEMA & US&R Task Force Identifer (i.e: Chesterfield Fire Department, Engine34)

       7/1/99
       1300 hrs
    V	Top Quadrant - Time and date that the Task Force personnel left the structure

	V	Rats		Right Quadrant - Personnel hazards

		V		Bottom Quadrant - Number of live and dead victims still inside the structure   (“X” if no victims)
	2 Live
	3 Dead

Search personnel should use International Orange spray paint to mark the exact location of a victim alert. In addition, surveyor’s tape may be used as a flag to denote the appropriate area, in conjunction with the spray paint marking. 

As with the Structure/Hazard Evaluation, it is important that the markings are specific to each area of entry or separate part of the building. If an areas is searched and no victims are found, it must be marked with an X. It is also important that situation updates be noted as they are available, to reduce needless duplication of search efforts. Previous search markings would be crossed out and a new marking would be placed next to it with the most recent information.

Personnel using the marking system will be inundated with additional information relative to the incident. Extemporaneous information needs to be acknowledged and appropriately disseminated - in most cases, this information would not be noted on the structure marking. 

Generally, the Search and Rescue Branch Manager, or Operations Section Chief will be in a position to pass additional received on to the appropriate element - rescue, command, medical, technical, etc.

NOTE:     It is important to clearly identify each separate structure within an area when important information is being disseminated to other operational entities. The primary method of identification should be the existing street name and building number, if known. Obviously, such identification is not always possible due to site conditions. In these situations, it is important that supervisory personnel establish a workable identification method for each specific structure.

Appendix G - Winter Storm Guidelines

Department Level Actions Initiated By On-Duty Senior Battalion Chief

I.	abDirect Administrative Officer (AO) to ensure that stations have sufficient resources to staff any first out apparatus responding from their respective stations with minimum of two personnel.  For example
A.	abEngine Company   (3 personnel)
B.	abTruck Company    (3 personnel)
C.	abUtility Vehicle      (2 personnel)
D.	abAmbulance	     (2 personnel)

II.	abAssign available staff to four-wheel drive vehicles for those stations that do not have four-wheel drive brush trucks.  Where possible, use utility vehicles instead of brush trucks for ALS responders to protect ALS equipment.  This will enable the department to reduce engine and truck responses during adverse conditions.
A.	abThese assigned vehicles will carry the radio designation of “UTILITY” followed by the respective station number. Whenever possible, utility vehicles and brush trucks should be staffed with at least one ALS firefighter or officer and ALS equipment at ALS stations.
B.	abFour-wheel drive vehicles will respond in place of engines or trucks to assist ambulances, and for Priority 3 calls for service.  When responding to calls for service, four-wheel drive vehicles should proceed, if possible, ahead of other vehicles as “scouts” to assess conditions and help avoid other vehicles becoming stuck.
III.	abDirect Logistics to distribute tow straps and linch pins to all four-wheel drive units.  Such equipment should be used to assist ambulances and other similar sized fire department vehicles that become stuck.

IV.	abConsider staffing the Chain Repair Shop with at least one Chain Repair Technician dedicated solely to repairing chains for Fire and EMS units.  In addition, special arrangements need to be made for disbursing spare chain saws and for servicing all chain saws to assure their availability.

V.	abThe Senior Battalion Chief will direct Emergency Communications Center Fire and EMS Dispatch Operations Supervisor to begin:
A.	abReducing response of emergency apparatus to calls for serviceLimiting number of Priority 3 EMS calls to no more than 3 at a time
B.	abLimiting number of Priority 3 fire calls to no more than 3 at a time due to ice storm, wires down, etc.

VI.	abFor snow emergencies, initiate snowplowing operations with assigned staffing, using Utility North and Utility South as soon as possible to stay ahead of accumulation.  Vehicles should have plows mounted and be loaded with sand the day prior to expected inclement weather.  Give priority to plowing those fire stations staffing ambulances and rescue squad units.

VII.	abDirect the Administrative Officer to initiate emergency minimum staffing procedures and suspend use of computerized minimum staffing rotation for morning staffing needs.  The AO should attempt to fill vacancies using personnel from the off-going shift at the station where the vacancies exist.  If unable to do so, use the next closest station and so forth.

VIII.	abInitiate Flexible Shift Change to allow short notice traded time arrangements and allow personnel extra time to reach their duty station.  Allow short notice annual leave, if still available in the Staffing Book, for those personnel unable to report for duty due to severe weather.

IX.	abIf the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is activated, fill the department’s representative position with an off-duty Battalion Chief.  The on-duty Senior Battalion Chief should go to the Emergency Communications Center to coordinate all county resources.  If the EOC is not activated, and if beneficial, assign an off-duty Battalion Chief to the Emergency Communications Center, to coordinate communications and resource allocation, while allowing on-duty Battalion Chiefs to stay operational in the field.  The Senior Captain in charge of Emergency Communications can also serve in this position.

X.	abFor snow/ice conditions, consider establishment of staged ambulances not equipped with tire chains, for use during long transports once main roads are clear of snow or ice.

Fire Station Level Responsibilities - Company Officers will be responsible for the following once the Senior Battalion Chief declares that this policy is in effect.

I.	abSnow emergencies - assure that the primary and spare sets of snow chains are ready for each piece of apparatus that is equipped in their station.  Ambulances should have two spare sets of chains.  Test the operation of the Insta-chains.

II.	abEnsure that all portable power equipment is serviceable and has adequate fuel available.  This includes, but is not limited to:
A.	abPortable power saws, particularly chain saws
B.	abPortable generators
C.	abRescue equipment, i.e., Hurst tool power plants and accessories.

III.	abEnsure that the station emergency generator is tested, operable and that adequate fuel is on hand.
IV.	abEnsure that four-wheel drive units, either permanently or temporarily assigned to the station, are equipped for first response duty.
V.	abEnsure adequate diesel fuel and heating fuel supplies are on hand.

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